Roy Jorgensen Associates, Inc. v. Deschenes

• Decision Date: 17 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-1588,80-1588
• Citation: 409 So.2d 1188
• Parties: 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4917 ROY JORGENSEN ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant, v. Hector J. DESCHENES, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1188

409 So.2d 1188

115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4917

ROY JORGENSEN ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant, v. Hector J. DESCHENES, Appellee.

No. 80-1588.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 17, 1982.

David W. Trench of Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel & Wolff, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Richard W. Smith of Johnson & Smith, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired), Associate Judge.

Mr. Deschenes, alleging that his contract of employment with appellant for a fixed term had been wrongfully terminated, recovered a money judgment against appellant following a non-jury trial. We conclude that the trial court erred in construing the employment as one for a fixed term, and we therefore reverse the judgment for appellee.

Appellant ("Jorgensen") is an engineering and management consulting firm working with ministries of highways in countries throughout the world. Deschenes, an engineer with prior experience in international trade and some background in the French and Spanish languages, was hired by Jorgensen as an equipment maintenance specialist for a highway project in Ecuador. At Deschenes' request, Jorgensen wrote a letter confirming the offer of employment. This letter, asserted by Deschenes to be the contract of employment, contained no express provision relating to the duration of the employment. However, it did state, "on or about October 31 you will be assigned to our Ecuador Highway Maintenance Technical Assistance Project in the capacity of Highway Maintenance Equipment Engineer for a period of 28 months," language which appellee contended and the court held was intended to create a contract of employment for a definite period of not less than 28 months. Mr. Deschenes went to Ecuador to commence his duties, but almost immediately a representative of the Ecuadorian government requested appellant to withdraw Mr. Deschenes from the project because of his inability to effectively communicate in the Spanish language. Appellant complied with the request, and being unable to otherwise utilize Mr. Deschenes in its organization, discharged him.

Prior to trial the parties stipulated that the trial court should determine, as a matter of law, whether the contract of employment, i.e., the confirmation letter, was a contract of employment for a specific or definite term, or whether it was a contract of employment for an indefinite term (and thus terminable at will). Appellant contends that the trial court's determination that the contract was one of employment for a specific term was error, and we agree.

Both parties agree that it is settled law in Florida that an employment contract which does not contain a definite term of employment is terminable at the will of either party without cause. Knudsen v. Green, 116 Fla. 47, 156 So. 240 (1943); Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); Hope v. National Airlines, 99 So.2d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957); 21 Fla.Jur. Contracts § 6. The parties are also in accord that the duty of construing an employment contract, as with other contracts, is that of the court. Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, supra; Paddock v. Bay Concrete Industries, Inc., 154...