Oak Park, Inc. v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 14 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 11-05-00298-CV.,11-05-00298-CV.
• Citation: 206 S.W.3d 133
• Parties: OAK PARK, INC., Individually and d/b/a Desert Springs Medical Center, Appellant, v. James HARRISON, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

206 S.W.3d 133

OAK PARK, INC., Individually and d/b/a Desert Springs Medical Center, Appellant, v. James HARRISON, Appellee.

No. 11-05-00298-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eastland.

September 14, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Katherine K. Elrich, Charlie S. Reed, Michael L. Hurst, Hermes Sargent Bates, L.P., Dallas, for appellant.

Steve Hershberger, Midland, for appellee.

Panel consists of: WRIGHT, C.J., and McCALL, J., and STRANGE, J.

OPINION

TERRY McCALL, Justice.

Oak Park, Inc., Individually and d/b/a Desert Springs Medical Center brings this interlocutory appeal from an order denying its motion to dismiss James Harrison's suit for failure to file an expert report under Section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon Supp.2006). The sole issue on appeal is whether Harrison's claims against Desert Springs are health care liability claims under the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act set forth in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. ch. 74 (Vernon 2005 & Supp.2006). Because we conclude that Harrison's claims are health care liability claims, we reverse and render.

Factual Background

On October 7, 2004, Harrison was admitted to Desert Springs for inpatient detoxification treatment for addiction to prescription pain medications. The incident in question occurred that night. In his petition, Harrison alleged that, on October 7, 2004, at about 8:00 p.m., he asked a nurse if he could go outside to smoke. The nurse instructed Harrison to wait in a common area of Desert Springs until a counselor returned from a meeting. Harrison waited for the counselor by an exterior door in the common area. Harrison alleged that a female psychological patient was also in the common area and that, when the counselor unlocked the door and started to come into the room, the psychological patient attempted to escape. The staff at Desert Springs attempted to restrain the psychological patient. Harrison alleged that a melee ensued in which he was slammed into the wall by three nurses, a male counselor, and the psychological patient. Harrison alleged that he sustained serious bodily injuries as a result of the incident. He also alleged that a stimulator, which had been implanted into his body for treatment relating to a previous injury, was damaged in the incident.

Harrison pleaded common law negligence and premises liability claims against Desert Springs. He alleged that Desert Springs's negligence proximately caused the incident in question and his resulting injuries and damages. Specifically, Harrison alleged that Desert Springs had been negligent in the following respects: (1) in failing to keep such lookout as a person of ordinary prudence would have kept under the same or similar circumstances; (2) in failing to timely or properly segregate the psychological patient from him; (3) in failing to timely inspect the area in the vicinity of him and the psychological patient; (4) in failing to warn him of the psychological patient; and (5) in failing to provide security for him. Harrison alleged that employees, agents, or representatives of Desert Springs committed the above acts or omissions while in the course and scope of their employment with Desert Springs. As such, Harrison sought to impose liability against Desert Springs under a respondeat superior theory. Harrison also alleged that Desert Springs had reason to know that the psychological patient posed a danger to other patients, that the psychological patient posed a safety hazard to other patients, and that Desert Springs had actual or constructive notice of the safety hazard but that it failed to remove the hazard. Harrison alleged that each of these acts and omissions constituted negligence and proximately caused the incident in question and his resulting injuries and damages. Harrison sought to recover various personal injury damages, including past and future medical expenses, past and future physical impairment, past and future pain and suffering, and past and future mental anguish. He did not seek to recover any property damages for the alleged damage to the stimulator.

On June 17, 2005, Desert Springs filed a motion to dismiss Harrison's claims with prejudice. Desert Springs sought dismissal on the ground that Harrison had failed to serve an expert report as required by Section 74.351.¹ In a response to the motion to dismiss, Harrison asserted that his claims were not health care liability claims and that, therefore, the expert report requirements in Section 74.351 did not apply to his claims. Harrison stated that he was not complaining about the medical treatment provided to him. Rather, according to Harrison, "the dispute is one of safety of allowing a violent psychological patient to be in the same room as a patient who is attempting detoxification."

After a hearing on Desert Springs's motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that Harrison's claims did not constitute a health care liability claim. On September 27, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying Desert Springs's motion to dismiss. On October 14, 2005, the Texas Supreme Court issued its decision in Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842 (Tex.2005). Based on the Diversicare decision, Desert Springs filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's ruling on its motion to dismiss. The trial court entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration.

Desert Springs has filed this appeal from the trial court's order denying its motion to dismiss as permitted by TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (Vernon Supp.2006).² An amicus curiae brief generally supporting Harrison's position has been received from Federated Mutual Insurance Company, a workers' compensation insurance carrier that has provided workers' compensation benefits to Harrison.

Issue on Appeal

In a sole appellate issue, Desert Springs argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss because Harrison's claims constituted health care liability claims.

Standard of Review

Ordinarily, we review a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss filed under Section 74.351 under an abuse of discretion standard. Kendrick v. Garcia, 171 S.W.3d 698, 702-03 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005, pet. filed); In re Watumull, 127 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, orig. proceeding). However, when the issue, as in this case, involves the applicability of Chapter 74 to the plaintiff's claims and requires an interpretation of the statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 290 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Ponce v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 55 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied).³

Health Care Liability Claims

The expert report requirements set forth in Section 74.351 apply to health care liability claims. In a health care liability claim, the claimant must serve an expert report on each party or the party's counsel not later than the 120th day after the date the original petition is filed. See Section 74.351(a). Section 74.001(a)(13) defines "health care liability claim" as follows:

"Health care liability claim" means a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.

The sole dispute in this case is whether Harrison's claims are health care liability claims as defined in Section 74.001(a)(13). Desert Springs argues that all of Harrison's claims are, in substance, health care liability claims under the above definition. Harrison argues that his claims are common law negligence and premises liability claims that do not fall within the definition of health care liability claims.

A plaintiff cannot use artful pleadings to avoid the requirements of Chapter 74 when the essence of the suit is a health care liability claim. Garland Comty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex.2004). To determine whether a cause of action is a health care liability claim, we examine the underlying nature of the claim and are not bound by the form of the pleading. Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 847; Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex.1994). A cause of action is a health care liability claim if it is based on a claimed departure from an accepted standard of medical care, health care, or safety of the patient. Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 848. A cause of action alleges a departure from accepted standards of medical care or health care if the act or omission complained of is an inseparable part of the rendition of medical services. Id. The necessity of expert testimony from a medical or health care professional to prove a claim may also be an important factor in determining whether a cause of action is an inseparable part of the rendition of medical care or health care services. Id. A cause of action alleges a departure from accepted standards of safety if the acts or omissions complained of necessarily implicate the accepted standards of safety applicable to the health care provider. Id. at 855. Safety is defined as being "untouched by danger; not exposed to danger; secure from danger, harm or loss." Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1336 (6th ed.1990)). Professional supervision, monitoring, and protection of the patient population at a health care facility necessarily implicate the accepted standards of safety. Id.

Diversicare involved claims that Rubio, a nursing home resident, had been sexually assaulted by another resident of the nursing home. Rubio's daughter brought suit on Rubio's behalf against Diversicare, the owner of the nursing home. 185 S.W.3d at 845. In the petition, Rubio alleged that multiple incidents...