Oates v. State

• Decision Date: 03 June 2020
• Docket Number: A20A0282
• Citation: 355 Ga.App. 301,844 S.E.2d 239
• Parties: OATES v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

355 Ga.App. 301

844 S.E.2d 239

OATES

v.The STATE.

A20A0282

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 3, 2020

David T. Lock, for Appellant.

Meg E. Heap, District Attorney, Emily C. Puhala, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Mercier, Judge.

A jury found Cornell Oates guilty of rape, statutory rape, and child molestation. He appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to prove rape or venue, the trial court failed to take appropriate action after a witness made an improper remark, and the court made a harmful error in its jury instructions. Finding no basis for reversal, we affirm.

On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, with the defendant no longer enjoying a presumption of innocence. We neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, but determine only whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Williams v. State , 284 Ga. App. 255, 643 S.E.2d 749 (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).

So viewed, the evidence showed the following. On the morning of May 18, 2015, 13-year-old T. H. was living with her mother and Oates, who was her mother's boyfriend. T. H.’s mother left home at around 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. to go to work, and Oates entered T. H.’s bedroom, where T. H. was in bed. T. H.’s mother had phoned Oates and asked him to wake T. H. for school. Oates told the mother that T. H. was already up. T. H. asked Oates why he had lied to her mother, but he did not answer. Oates then touched T. H.’s buttocks, removed her underwear, put his mouth on her vaginal and anal areas, and put his penis in her vagina.

T. H.’s mother returned home that morning, but T. H. did not tell her what had happened. Later that morning, Oates approached T. H., kissed her on the mouth and told her, "I only did it because I love both of y'all." When Oates and T. H.’s mother left the house, T. H. phoned her grandmother and told her that Oates had raped her. T. H. added that Oates had been touching her inappropriately "for a while." The grandmother phoned the police and reported the allegations.

Police officers and the grandmother arrived at the house around noon. The grandmother drove T. H. to a hospital, where she was examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner and interviewed by a detective. The medical examination revealed reddening on T. H.’s vaginal area, which the nurse (an expert in sexual assault examinations) testified was consistent with T. H.’s allegations. The nurse collected swabs of specimens from T. H.’s mouth, vagina, cervix and anus.

Oates went to the police station, where he gave a statement in which he denied T. H.’s allegations and where detectives collected swabs of specimens from his mouth and penis. Testing at the Georgia Bureau of Investigation crime lab revealed that samples taken from T. H.’s vagina and cervix contained DNA profiles matching the samples taken from Oates.

At trial, Oates testified that he had "no idea" why T. H. would tell the story she told. He claimed that on the morning in question, he went to T. H.’s room, knocked on the door, and told her her mother wanted to talk to her on the phone. According to Oates, T. H. then talked to her mother briefly, after which he took the phone back from T. H., "went in the room," lay down and went back to sleep.

1. Oates contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed rape because the State failed to prove the element of force. We disagree.

OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1) pertinently provides: "A person commits the offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of ... [a] female forcibly and against her will[.]" Count 2 of the indictment alleged that Oates committed rape on or about May 18, 2015, by having carnal knowledge of T. H. forcibly and against her will.

As used in OCGA § 16-6-1 (a), "forcibly" means "with the use of ‘acts of physical force, threats of death or physical bodily harm, or mental coercion.’ " Ponder v. State , 332 Ga. App. 576, 580 (1) (b), 774 S.E.2d 152 (2015) (citation omitted).

[A]lthough the victim's age of [13] does not establish the required element of force, the State was required to present only minimal evidence of force because the victim was under the age of consent. In such a case, intimidation may substitute for force. Further, force may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Lack of resistance, induced by fear, is force, and may be shown by the victim's state of mind from her prior experience with the defendant and subjective apprehension of danger from him.

Id. at 581 (1) (b), 774 S.E.2d 152 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Only a minimal amount of evidence is required to prove force against a child. Ponder , supra at 581-582 (1) (b), 774 S.E.2d 152. Force may be inferred from intimidation arising from the familial relationship and may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Davenport v. State , 316 Ga. App. 234, 237 (1) (b), 729 S.E.2d 442 (2012) (force element of rape was shown where defendant had sexually assaulted his stepdaughter repeatedly when she was a child); Williams v. State , 304 Ga. App. 592, 593 (1), 696 S.E.2d 512 (2010). Oates was 49 years old at the time of the crimes, was the live-in boyfriend of T. H.’s mother, entered 13-year-old T. H.’s bedroom when she was in bed and no one else was home, and performed sex acts upon her. That same day, T. H. phoned her grandmother and told her that Oates had raped her and had previously touched her inappropriately, and she went to live with her grandmother. The jury was authorized to infer from the evidence - particularly Oates's age, T. H.’s age, Oates's history of touching her inappropriately, the familial relationship, and the fact that no one else was home at the time to protect her - that Oates had used force against the child in order to engage in sexual intercourse with her. The evidence was sufficient to prove that Oates was guilty of rape beyond a reasonable doubt. See Williams , supra at 256-257 (1) (a), (b), 643 S.E.2d 749.

2. Oates contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove venue in Chatham County because the State failed to present evidence showing the specific address at which the offenses allegedly occurred. We hold that the evidence was indeed sufficient to prove that the crimes occurred in Chatham County, where Oates was indicted and tried.

Venue is a fact that

the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in every criminal case. The State may meet its burden at trial using either direct or circumstantial evidence, and the determination of whether venue has been established is an issue soundly within the province of the jury. On appeal, [the appellate court] reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the venue evidence just like [it] review[s] a challenge to the evidence of guilt: we view the evidence of venue in a light most favorable to support the verdict and determine whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in the county where the defendant was indicted.

Worthen v. State , 304 Ga. 862, 865 (3) (a), 823 S.E.2d 291 (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). Notably, Oates cites no authority for his position that the State must prove the crimes occurred at a particular street address in order to establish venue.

T. H. testified that the crimes happened in her bed and that at that time she lived with her mother in Savannah, Chatham County, Georgia. Further, the lead detective in the case, an employee of the Savannah Police Department, testified that the home at which the crimes were committed was in Chatham County. Oates points to no evidence to the contrary. The evidence was sufficient. See Borders v. State , 299 Ga. App. 100, 101-102, 682 S.E.2d 148 (2009) ; see generally Worthen , supra at 866-868 (c), 823 S.E.2d 291 (jurors were entitled to make reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence regarding venue and, absent any indication that the location in question was not in the county alleged, were authorized to infer that the investigators acted within the scope of their territorial duties).

3. Oates contends that the trial court erred by failing to take corrective action after a detective testified that T. H. had been raped. He argues that because the prejudicial, conclusory statement invaded the province of the jury, the court should have ordered a mistrial or at least given curative instructions.

During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the detective why she had interviewed T. H. at the hospital instead of at the Coastal Children's Advocacy Center, when the "Chatham County child-abuse protocol" required interviews to be conducted at the Advocacy Center in cases of suspected child abuse. The detective replied, "[The protocol] says, ‘Unless compelling reasons exist to the contrary, children always should be interviewed at the Advocacy Center," the following then transpired:

Q: And compelling reasons would be what?

A: In this case?

Q: Uh-huh.

A: She had to have a sexual assault kit done in reference to what occurred to her. She was raped. So we do the interview --

(Emphasis supplied.)

Defense counsel objected "to the conclusion." The court did not expressly rule on the objection, but directed counsel to proceed. Defense counsel continued with his examination, without requesting a curative instruction or moving for a mistrial.

In context, the detective's testimony is most fairly seen as an attempt to explain her own conduct in interviewing T. H. at the hospital (in response to challenges by defense counsel) rather than an opinion on the ultimate issue of whether Oates had raped T. H. See generally Grier v. State , 305 Ga. 882, 885-886 (2) (a), 828 S.E.2d 304 (2019) (lay witnesses’ testimony that the defendant must have been the killer was rationally based on their perceptions and helpful to understanding their testimony).

Further,...