Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance
Decision Date | 13 May 1999 |
Docket Number | No. S064923,S064923 |
Citation | 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 466,20 Cal.4th 371,975 P.2d 663 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 975 P.2d 663, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4463 Richard J. OBERHOLZER, a Judge of the Superior Court, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, Respondent |
Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard, James E. Friedhofer, San Diego, and Lisa K. Roberts, for Petitioner.
Jack Coyle, San Francisco, for Respondent.
This original writ proceeding presents the following issues: (1) whether the Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission) has authority to issue a confidential advisory letter (commonly known as a " stinger" letter); (2) whether the issuance of such a letter amounts to " discipline" that implicates a judge's right to due process of law; (3) whether such a letter may be issued based upon a perceived legal error committed by a judge; and (4) whether petitioner here, Judge Richard J. Oberholzer, committed sanctionable legal error in dismissing a criminal case after the People indicated they were not ready to proceed.
As we shall explain, we conclude that the Commission has authority to issue advisory letters, that such letters are a form of discipline, that the Commission's procedures comport with the requirements of due process of law, and that such letters may be based upon a perceived legal error, if such error clearly and convincingly reflects bad faith, bias, abuse of authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard of the law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty. In the instant case, petitioner's dismissal of a criminal action, following the People's declaration of unreadiness, did not constitute such sanctionable conduct.
Accordingly, we find that the Commission improperly issued its advisory letter to petitioner.
By letter dated December 6, 1996, the Commission invited petitioner to "comment regarding a report that is before the commission." In pertinent part, the inquiry letter contained the following summation:
assignment. On April 9, 1996, Deputy District Attorney John Somers, who was the trial attorney assigned to the case, reportedly advised you that another of his cases, People v. Hammock, had been assigned to Department 2 for trial and was expected to run until the middle of the following week. You then set a trial date of Thursday, April 11, 1996.
'The Court: That's the ruling of the Court.'
"In People v. Ferguson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1173 , the Court of Appeal reversed an order entered by you dismissing a criminal case that had been trailed from the original trial date when the DDA assigned to the case was unable to proceed on the date set for trial...."
By letter dated January 27, 1997, petitioner responded to the Commission's letter, in pertinent part contending that he had ruled correctly in dismissing People v. James. The response asserted that the deputy district attorney assigned to the case, John Somers, had known in advance that he would be unable to try the case on the assigned date, yet failed to move for a continuance in writing or orally on April 8, 1996.
The response also reviewed certain provisions contained within Penal Code section 1050, governing motions for continuance of a criminal trial. As set forth more fully in the margin, the statute requires that a noticed motion be filed at least two court days prior to the hearing sought to be continued, and within two court days of learning of a conflict in the scheduling of any court hearing. (Pen.Code, § 1050, subd. (b).) 1 A party's failure In his response letter, petitioner asserted that when the foregoing procedural requirements are not met by a prosecuting attorney seeking a continuance, witnesses' lives and schedules are disrupted, appropriate legal redress for victims may be impacted if witnesses are unavailable, defendants are left unable to prepare an opposition to the motion for continuance, and court clerks are denied the opportunity either to work out conflicts and priorities on their own or to expose a lack of true conflict. Relying upon sections 1050, subdivision (c), and 1050.5, petitioner argued that if the moving party fails to show good cause, the motion for continuance must be denied, and the movant's counsel may be subject to a monetary sanction and to the filing of a report with an appropriate disciplinary committee.
to comply with these statutory requirements is excusable upon a showing of good cause. (§ 1050, subd. (c).) If the party seeking the continuance is unable to [20 Cal.4th 378] demonstrate good cause for failing to comply with the notice requirements, the motion for continuance shall not be granted, and the court may impose sanctions as provided in section 1050.5. (§ 1050, subds. (c), (d).) 2
Petitioner's response emphasized the People's failure to properly request a continuance. Petitioner contended that Deputy District Attorney Somers appeared before him in Department 1, on April 8, 1996, and the jury trial was trailed to the following day. On April 9, the case was put over to April 11, because Somers was in trial on another case. Petitioner informed him that a new prosecutor would have to be assigned in People v. James. On April 11, Deputy District Attorney Elizabeth Anderson appeared before petitioner and stated that, on the previous day, Deputy District Attorney Carla Grabert had been reassigned to replace Somers as trial counsel in James. Petitioner sent the matter to trial before Judge Twisselman, who presided in department 8.
Petitioner believes that when the parties arrived in department 8, Chief Deputy District Attorney Dan Sparks appeared on behalf of the People, requesting a continuance. Judge Twisselman sent the parties back to department 1, where motions for continuance were considered. Petitioner sent the parties back to department 8, because a motion for a continuance had not been filed. He recalls that, "It is possible that on this trip Sparks indicated his desire to make a record." Petitioner believes that he informed the prosecutor that the proper place in which to make that record was before Judge Twisselman in department 8.
After the parties returned to department 8, Judge Twisselman called petitioner to discuss the case. They agreed that the matter should be heard in department 1. Deputy District Attorney Sparks thereafter informed petitioner that the People were not ready to proceed to trial, but that Deputy District Attorney Grabert would be ready to proceed on April 15. (The last day on which the trial could commence under the relevant statute was April 18, but section 1050, subdivision (g), permitted that deadline to be extended 10 days, until April 28.) Deputy District Attorney Sparks orally moved for a continuance, which was denied, as set forth in the following colloquy:
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