Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville

Decision Date25 March 1986
Docket NumberNo. 67294,67294
Citation706 S.W.2d 440
PartiesPhyllis OBERKRAMER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ELLISVILLE, et al., Defendants-Respondents.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

John B. Kistner, Jr., St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Mary V. Schmidtlein, Carl I. Katzen, Terry W. Liberman, William R. Kirby (deceased), M. Jane Schweitzer, Parks G. Carpenter, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.

HIGGINS, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs, the widow and minor children of John Oberkramer, a Des Peres police officer, sued the cities of Ellisville, Ballwin, and Manchester and St. Louis County for the wrongful death of John Oberkramer. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, en banc, reversed and remanded. Two judges dissented. This Court granted transfer to consider whether the conduct alleged against municipal police officers engaged in a high-speed chase created the unreasonable risk of harm necessary to vicarious liability of the municipalities and county. Affirmed.

Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because their allegations showed negligence on the part of the pursuing police officers which proximately caused the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs further contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for leave to file a third amended petition under Rule 55.33(a).

Plaintiffs allege that on December 24, 1978, officer John Franey of the Ellisville Police Department, who was on duty and driving a police vehicle at the time, approached a white Chevrolet stopped at an electric traffic signal. The white Chevrolet was occupied by three juveniles, aged 13-15. Officer Franey activated the police vehicle's flashing red light in an attempt to stop the white Chevrolet for investigation. The Chevrolet violated the traffic signal and proceeded at a high rate of speed. A pursuit ensued with the vehicles reaching speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h. As the chase continued, officers from the cities of Manchester and Ballwin joined the pursuit. The decedent learned of the chase over his radio and placed his police vehicle as a roadblock on the side of the divided highway where the chase was occurring. As the decedent stood on the other side of the median, approximately 100 feet from his vehicle, the pursued vehicle approached the road block, swerved over the median into oncoming traffic lanes, and struck the decedent who died as a result of the injuries sustained.

The petition under consideration by this Court is plaintiffs' second amended petition. A first amended petition was dismissed by the trial court; plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in order for the plaintiffs to have an opportunity to plead further. Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 300 (Mo.App.1983). The Court of Appeals determined upon consideration of the first amended petition that while the risk of injury inherent in high speed pursuits will be tolerated in the interests of promoting law and order, a pursuit can become negligent if the utility of the conduct drops or where the circumstances raise the magnitude of the risk beyond acceptable levels. Id. at 292. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' sole allegation that the police officers were negligent in speeding at 100 m.p.h. after a traffic violator did not state a claim because extreme speed, in and of itself, is not sufficient to plead a violation of the duty of care prescribed by statute. Id. at 293. The court remanded to give plaintiffs an opportunity to allege facts raising the magnitude of the risk beyond that contemplated in section 304.022. Id.

Plaintiffs alleged these additional facts in their second amended petition:

(1) The pursued vehicle operated without headlights which limited its visibility;

(2) The pursued vehicle slowed and braked suddenly in an effort to cause pursuing police vehicles to lose control of their vehicles;

(3) The pursued vehicle left the roadway, lost control and crossed into the oncoming traffic lane, almost striking a westbound vehicle not involved in the pursuit;

(4) The pursued vehicle, on several occasions, crossed back and forth across the centerline of the roadway and into the oncoming traffic.

A petition is not to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Irby v. St. Louis County Cab Co., 560 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo.App.1977). Upon review of a dismissal of plaintiffs petition, all facts alleged are treated as true and the allegations are construed favorably to plaintiffs. Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Mo. banc 1978), cert. denied, Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co., 444 U.S. 831, 100 S.Ct. 60, 62 L.Ed.2d 40 (1979).

A police officer is required to observe the care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances. McKay v. Hargis, 351 Mich. 409, 88 N.W.2d 456 (1958); Roberson v. Griffeth, 57 N.C.App. 227, 291 S.E.2d 347 (1982). The legislature has authorized a driver of a police vehicle to exceed the maximum speed limit and disregard certain other traffic regulations as long as he does not endanger life or property:

(2) The driver of an emergency vehicle may:

(a) Park or stand irrespective of the provisions of sections 304.014 to 304.026;

(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;

(c) Exceed the prima facie speed limit...

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22 cases
  • Tice v. Cramer
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 28 Julio 1993
    ...113 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991); Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky.1952); Boyer, supra, 594 A.2d 121; Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 706 S.W.2d 440, 452 (Mo.1986); Lee v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 345, 307 N.W.2d 800 (1981); Peak v. Ratliff, 185 W.Va. 548, 408 S.E.2d 300 (1991). T......
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 21 Mayo 2007
    ...on the pleadings should be granted only "'if no factual development could possibly justify recovery'"); Oberkramer v. Ellisville, 706 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (omitting the words "beyond doubt" from the Conley formulation); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah ......
  • Travis v. City of Mesquite
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 20 Mayo 1992
    ...233 Kan. 737, 753, 666 P.2d 655, 668 (1983); Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589, 590-91 (Ky.1952); Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 706 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Mo.1986); Blanchard v. Town of Kearny, 145 N.J.Super. 246, 248, 367 A.2d 464, 465 (Law Div.1976); Roll v. Timberman, 94 N.J.......
  • Haynes v. Hamilton County
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 29 Agosto 1994
    ...Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky.1952); Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn.1992) (statutory immunity); Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 706 S.W.2d 440 (Mo.1986) (En Banc); Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 627 A.2d 1090 (1993) (statutory and common law immunity); Dickens v. Horner, 531 Pa.......
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