Octave ex rel. Octave v. Walker

Decision Date30 October 2014
Docket NumberNos. 38 WAP 2012,s. 38 WAP 2012
Citation628 Pa. 128,103 A.3d 1255
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court
PartiesSusan OCTAVE on behalf of James OCTAVE, an Incapacitated Person, and Susan Octave, Appellants v. David Wade WALKER, and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Appellees. Susan Octave on behalf of James Octave, an Incapacitated Person, and Susan Octave, Appellants v. David Wade Walker, and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Appellees.

David Albert Colecchia, Esq., Law Care, Greensburg, for Susan Octave and James Octave.

Jeanette Hsin Ho, Esq., Pietragallo, Gordon, Alfano, Bosick & Raspanti, L.L.P., Pittsburgh, for David Wade Walker.

Kemal A. Mericli, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, for Department of Transportation.

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

In this appeal, we are asked to consider whether appellants waived the mental health records privilege provided under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S. § 7111,1 by filing a negligence suit to recover for physical injuries sustained by James Octave upon being struck by a tractor-trailer driven by appellee David Walker.2 The incident occurred June 21, 2007; based on eyewitness reports, the state police concluded James attempted to commit suicide by jumping under the truck's trailer. On April 27, 2009, appellant Susan Octave, James's wife, filed a complaint in her own right and on behalf of James, an incapacitated person, against the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT), Walker, and a number of other parties based upon their purported negligence.3 The complaint alleged James suffered a number of mental and physical injuries as a result of the incident and sought damages.

Because the state police concluded James was attempting to commit suicide, appellees sought discovery information regarding his mental health history and access to his mental health records, which Susan refused to provide. Appellees filed a motion for leave to access and copy sealed files pertaining to James's involuntary commitments pursuant to the MHPA and a motion to compel the execution of authorizations pertaining to his mental health and involuntary commitment records and full and complete answers to Interrogatory No. 63.4 Thereafter, appellants filed an amended complaint, alleging James only suffered physical injuries as a result of the incident. The trial court issued an order disposing of appellees' motions, reasoning that because the amended complaint removed allegations pertaining to mental injuries, it did not place James's mental condition at issue. Walker filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied; the trial court certified the order for immediate appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).

Appellees appealed to the Commonwealth Court, contending the trial court erred when it denied them access to James's mental health records and involuntary commitment records. Specifically, appellees argued the MHPA's confidentiality provisions were waived by Susan because she placed James's mental health at issue by filing the complaint. In defense to the underlying negligence claim, appellees asserted James intentionally caused his own injuries by throwing himself under Walker's vehicle in an unsuccessful suicide attempt. Denying them access to the requested information, appellees argued, “ would be manifestly unfair, grossly prejudicial and an affront to the truth-seeking function of the courts as Susan Octave should not be permitted to bring suit against [appellees] while depriving them of information which could totally absolve them of liability.” Octave ex rel. Octave v. Walker, 37 A.3d 604, 607 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011).

The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded, finding Susan Octave directly put James Octave's mental history, especially as it pertains to his previous suicide attempts, or considerations or contemplations of suicide, [at issue] by filing a complaint alleging negligence by Walker and DOT in connection with the accident[,] and thereby waived the MHPA's confidentiality protections. Id., at 610. The court further reasoned the information sought “relates directly to the issue of DOT's and Walker's liability, the defenses raised by Walker and DOT, and is information which impacts upon causation[, which] ... is certainly critical in a trial of a negligence action, if not more so than damages.” Id.; see Gormley v. Edgar, 995 A.2d 1197, 1206 (Pa.Super.2010) (holding plaintiff waived Judicial Code's confidentiality protections for mental health records by seeking damages for anxiety); Kraus v. Taylor, 710 A.2d 1142, 1145 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding plaintiff waived MHPA's and Judicial Code's confidentiality protections for his drug and alcohol medical records by filing personal injury lawsuit seeking damages for permanent injury thereby placing his life expectancy at issue), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 560 Pa. 220, 743 A.2d 451 (2000) (per curiam ). Accordingly, the court concluded it would be “unfair and grossly prejudicial” to bar Walker and DOT access to James's history of suicidal attempts or contemplations, and held:

Susan Octave must provide a full and complete answer to Interrogatory No. 63 and provide all medical records requested by DOT and Walker ... to the trial court for an in camera review, so that the trial court may identify those records which pertain or relate, in any manner, to James Octave's history of suicidal attempts and/or contemplations, or desires or attempts to harm himself.

Octave, at 610.

Senior Judge Kelley dissented, concluding since the amended complaint sought damages only for physical, not mental, injury, “it cannot be said that [Susan] directly placed her husband's mental condition at issue as the plaintiffs had in Kraus and Gormley. Id., at 613 (Kelley, S.J., dissenting) (citing Premack v. J.C.J. Ogar, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 140, 145 (E.D.Pa.1993) (“In a civil matter, however, there are numerous ways—other than an absolute bar—to ensure that both an individual's privacy and the truth-seeking function of the courts are sufficiently protected. First of all, an individual is always free to leave his or her mental condition out of a complaint—thus assuring continued confidentiality[.])). Further, Senior Judge Kelley noted, given the unambiguous MHPA provisions, he “d[id] not believe that an implicit waiver of its confidentiality provisions can be found based upon the mere filing of the instant amended complaint[,] especially since less intrusive means exist for Walker and DOT to contest causation—i.e., through the testimony of Walker and other eyewitnesses to the incident, and through the evidence that can be gleaned from the contents of the PSP files and the divorce and PFA records that are subject to discovery under the trial court's order.” Id. (citations omitted).

We granted allocatur to address the following issue:

Given the [petitioners] do not explicitly waive the protections of 50 P.S. § 7111, given the [petitioners'] Amended Complaint does not allege injuries to mental health, given the [respondents] raise the question of mental health and seek the [petitioner's] pre-collision mental health records, and given the [respondents'] claim of mental health relies exclusively on the conclusions of a third party, did the [petitioners] put mental health at issue and impliedly waive the protections of 50 P.S. § 7111 though [sic] the act of filing the within lawsuit?

Octave ex rel. Octave v. Walker, 619 Pa. 176, 58 A.3d 753, 754 (2012) (per curiam ) (alterations in original). Section 7111 does not explicitly state whether the protections it affords to mental health records can be waived; therefore, this case involves the proper construction of a statute, for which our standard of review is de novo and scope of review is plenary. Delaware County v. First Union Corporation, 605 Pa. 547, 992 A.2d 112, 118 (2010) (citation omitted).

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is ascertaining and effectuating the General Assembly's intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When attempting to determine such intent, this Court must presume the General Assembly did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. Id., § 1922(1). The practical results of a particular interpretation may also be considered. Id., § 1921(c)(4), (6).

Appellants contend, since the amended complaint does not seek damages for mental injury, they have not put James's mental health at issue and, thus, have not impliedly waived the MHPA's confidentiality protections. By holding such records are discoverable, appellants argue, the Commonwealth Court failed to follow this Court's clear mandate in Zane v. Friends Hospital, 575 Pa. 236, 836 A.2d 25 (2003), by, in effect, “hold[ing] privilege for mental health records may be waived if a lawsuit is filed and the mental health records are relevant to that lawsuit.” Appellants' Brief, at 13. According to appellants, the Commonwealth Court's decision “impliedly contemplate[s] a ‘balancing test’ of various factors to determine if the privilege has been waived, or alternatively[,] if the records should be provided regardless of the privilege, based on need.” Id. Such balancing test, appellants assert, has no basis in the clear language of the MHPA and violates this Court's holding in Zane.

While appellees do not dispute that James's mental health is not at issue in the damages realm, they highlight such is certainly at issue regarding causation, which is at the heart of appellants' negligence claim. “Whether a plaintiff's mental state bears upon the issue of damages, as in Gormley and Kraus, or on the issue of causation instead, as in this case, [DOT asserts,] surely has no bearing on the basic sense of fairness and justice which underlies those decisions.” Brief for Appellee, Department of Transportation, at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, DOT claims, “If anything, a case such as this one ... presents a stronger argument...

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