Odegaard v. Everett School Dist. No. 2, No. 22190-6-I

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Writing for the CourtCOLEMAN; PEKELIS, J., and WILLIAMS
Parties, 56 Ed. Law Rep. 320 Joanne ODEGAARD, Appellant, v. EVERETT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Respondent.
Docket NumberNo. 22190-6-I
Decision Date07 August 1989

Page 685

55 Wn.App. 685
780 P.2d 260, 56 Ed. Law Rep. 320
Joanne ODEGAARD, Appellant,
v.
EVERETT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Respondent.
No. 22190-6-I.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1.
Aug. 7, 1989.
Publication Ordered Oct. 12, 1989.

Page 686

Julian C. Dewell, Todd Startzel, Anderson, Hunter, Dewell, Baker & Collins, Everett, for Joanne Odegaard.

Lawrence B. Hannah, Joan Caplan, Clarke, and Perkins Coie, Bellevue, for Everett School Dist. No. 2.

COLEMAN, Chief Judge.

Dr. Joanne Odegaard appeals from the trial court order denying her application for a writ of certiorari. She sought review of [780 P.2d 261] the Everett School District's decision to transfer her from a principalship to a teaching position.

Odegaard was the principal of Hawthorne Elementary School in 1984-86. She took a sabbatical leave in 1986-87, and when she returned, she served as principal of Silver Lake Elementary School in 1987-88. On February 9, 1988, the Everett School District superintendent notified Odegaard that she would be demoted to a subordinated certified (teaching) position for the 1988-89 school year.

Odegaard requested a meeting with the District's board of directors pursuant to RCW 28A.67.073, which provides in part that a principal transferred to a teaching position

Page 687

"shall be given the opportunity to meet informally with the board of directors in an executive session thereof for the purpose of requesting the board to reconsider the decision of the superintendent." RCW 28A.67.073. Odegaard appeared at the March 7, 1988 meeting with her attorney and submitted a 17-page memorandum and 76 pages of exhibits to the board members. The Board informed Odegaard by letter of March 11 that it supported the superintendent's decision to transfer her to a teaching position based on the Board's concerns about her effectiveness as a principal and its belief that the transfer was in the best interests of the District.

Odegaard filed a motion in superior court requesting that the court issue a writ of certiorari or a writ of prohibition to review the legality of the District's actions. In her petition to the court and in oral argument on the motion, Odegaard also asked the court to exercise its inherent powers to review administrative decisions. On April 7, 1988, the trial court entered an order denying the request for the writs and dismissing Odegaard's action.

We first address appellant's argument that the trial court erred by refusing to issue a writ of certiorari to review the District's decision to transfer appellant to a teaching position. The statutory writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy. State ex rel. Gebenini v. Wright, 43 Wash.2d 829, 830, 264 P.2d 1091 (1953). The grounds upon which such a writ may be granted are delineated in RCW 7.16.040, which provides:

A writ of review shall be granted by any court ... when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void proceeding, or a proceeding not according to the course of the common law, and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.

All the statutory prerequisites must be present before a writ of certiorari may be granted. Bridle Trails Comm'ty Club v. Bellevue, 45 Wash.App. 248, 252, 724 P.2d 1110 (1986). The trial court in the instant case properly declined

Page 688

to issue the writ because the District's action did not involve the exercise of a judicial function.

This issue has been resolved by Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 97 Wash.2d 215, 643 P.2d 426 (1982). In the Williams case, the Seattle School District decided to eliminate certain principals' positions and transfer them to teaching positions. That transfer was accomplished by the same mechanism, RCW 28A.67.073, as was appellant's transfer. The employees in Williams sought superior court review of the decision to transfer them to teaching positions. Our Supreme Court held that those employees were not entitled to a writ of certiorari because a school district does not exercise a "judicial function" when transferring a principal to a teaching position by the mechanism of RCW 28A.67.073:

The writ of certiorari is available only for review of actions "judicial" in nature. Our courts have developed a 4-part test for determining whether administrative action is quasi-judicial. That test is:

(1) whether a court could have been charged with making the agency's decision; (2) whether the action is one...

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10 practice notes
  • Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., No. 522A02.
    • United States
    • North Carolina United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • April 2, 2004
    ...we do not decide the case on this basis, the [damages] limit may, indeed, violate the separation of powers") (emphasis added), modified 780 P.2d 260 As noted above, punitive damages hold "an established place" in North Carolina common law. Hinson, 244 N.C. at 27, 92 S.E.2d at 396. Nonethele......
  • Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., No. 20109
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • February 13, 1992
    ...annual wage of injured person; state constitutional right to jury trial; three strong dissenting opinions), modified on another point, 780 P.2d 260 (Wash.1989). See also Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.1988) ($500,000 for noneconomic and nonmedical economic damages, or, alternat......
  • Edmonds v. Murphy, No. 1480
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1989
    ...right to jury trial under state constitution); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989) (en banc), modified, 780 P.2d 260 (1989) (statute limiting, according to formula, noneconomic damages recoverable in personal injury or wrongful death actions violated right to jur......
  • Owens Corning v. Bauman, No. 744
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 1, 1999
    ...role in determining noneconomic damages may be more essential than determining economic damages), opinion amended by 112 Wash.2d 636, 780 P.2d 260 18. The decision that the jury should determine the factual issue of when the cause of action arose finds further support in the case sub judice......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
10 cases
  • Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., No. 522A02.
    • United States
    • North Carolina United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • April 2, 2004
    ...we do not decide the case on this basis, the [damages] limit may, indeed, violate the separation of powers") (emphasis added), modified 780 P.2d 260 As noted above, punitive damages hold "an established place" in North Carolina common law. Hinson, 244 N.C. at 27, 92 S.E.2d at 396. Nonethele......
  • Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., No. 20109
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • February 13, 1992
    ...annual wage of injured person; state constitutional right to jury trial; three strong dissenting opinions), modified on another point, 780 P.2d 260 (Wash.1989). See also Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.1988) ($500,000 for noneconomic and nonmedical economic damages, or, alternat......
  • Edmonds v. Murphy, No. 1480
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1989
    ...right to jury trial under state constitution); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989) (en banc), modified, 780 P.2d 260 (1989) (statute limiting, according to formula, noneconomic damages recoverable in personal injury or wrongful death actions violated right to jur......
  • Owens Corning v. Bauman, No. 744
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 1, 1999
    ...role in determining noneconomic damages may be more essential than determining economic damages), opinion amended by 112 Wash.2d 636, 780 P.2d 260 18. The decision that the jury should determine the factual issue of when the cause of action arose finds further support in the case sub judice......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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