Odegaard v. Everett School Dist. No. 2, 22190-6-I

• Decision Date: 07 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 22190-6-I,22190-6-I
• Citation: 55 Wn.App. 685,780 P.2d 260
• Parties: , 56 Ed. Law Rep. 320 Joanne ODEGAARD, Appellant, v. EVERETT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 685

55 Wn.App. 685

780 P.2d 260, 56 Ed. Law Rep. 320

Joanne ODEGAARD, Appellant, v. EVERETT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Respondent.

No. 22190-6-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 1.

Aug. 7, 1989.

Publication Ordered Oct. 12, 1989.

Julian C. Dewell, Todd Startzel, Anderson, Hunter, Dewell, Baker & Collins, Everett, for Joanne Odegaard.

Lawrence B. Hannah, Joan Caplan, Clarke, and Perkins Coie, Bellevue, for Everett School Dist. No. 2.

COLEMAN, Chief Judge.

Dr. Joanne Odegaard appeals from the trial court order denying her application for a writ of certiorari. She sought review of the Everett School District's decision to transfer her from a principalship to a teaching position.

Odegaard was the principal of Hawthorne Elementary School in 1984-86. She took a sabbatical leave in 1986-87, and when she returned, she served as principal of Silver Lake Elementary School in 1987-88. On February 9, 1988, the Everett School District superintendent notified Odegaard that she would be demoted to a subordinated certified (teaching) position for the 1988-89 school year.

Odegaard requested a meeting with the District's board of directors pursuant to RCW 28A.67.073, which provides in part that a principal transferred to a teaching position "shall be given the opportunity to meet informally with the board of directors in an executive session thereof for the purpose of requesting the board to reconsider the decision of the superintendent." RCW 28A.67.073. Odegaard appeared at the March 7, 1988 meeting with her attorney and submitted a 17-page memorandum and 76 pages of exhibits to the board members. The Board informed Odegaard by letter of March 11 that it supported the superintendent's decision to transfer her to a teaching position based on the Board's concerns about her effectiveness as a principal and its belief that the transfer was in the best interests of the District.

Odegaard filed a motion in superior court requesting that the court issue a writ of certiorari or a writ of prohibition to review the legality of the District's actions. In her petition to the court and in oral argument on the motion, Odegaard also asked the court to exercise its inherent powers to review administrative decisions. On April 7, 1988, the trial court entered an order denying the request for the writs and dismissing Odegaard's action.

We first address appellant's argument that the trial court erred by refusing to issue a writ of certiorari to review the District's decision to transfer appellant to a teaching position. The statutory writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy. State ex rel. Gebenini v. Wright, 43 Wash.2d 829, 830, 264 P.2d 1091 (1953). The grounds upon which such a writ may be granted are delineated in RCW 7.16.040, which provides:

A writ of review shall be granted by any court ... when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void proceeding, or a proceeding not according to the course of the common law, and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.

All the statutory prerequisites must be present before a writ of certiorari may be granted. Bridle Trails Comm'ty Club v. Bellevue, 45 Wash.App. 248, 252, 724 P.2d 1110 (1986). The trial court in the instant case properly declined to issue the writ because the District's action did not involve the exercise of a judicial function.

This issue has been resolved by Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 97 Wash.2d 215, 643 P.2d 426 (1982). In the Williams case, the Seattle School District decided to eliminate certain principals' positions and transfer them to teaching positions. That transfer was accomplished by the same mechanism, RCW 28A.67.073, as was appellant's transfer. The employees in Williams sought superior court review of the decision to transfer them to teaching positions. Our Supreme Court held that those employees were not entitled to a writ of certiorari because a school district does not exercise a "judicial function" when transferring a principal to a teaching position by the mechanism of RCW 28A.67.073:

The writ of certiorari is available only for review of actions "judicial" in nature. Our courts have developed a 4-part test for determining whether administrative action is quasi-judicial. That test is:

(1) whether a court could have been charged with making the agency's decision; (2) whether the action is one which historically has been performed by courts; (3) whether the action involves the application of existing law to past or present facts for the purpose of declaring or enforcing liability; and (4) whether the action resembles the ordinary business of courts as opposed to that of legislators or administrators.

Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State Personnel Bd., 23 Wn.App. 142, 145-46, 594 P.2d 1375 (1979).

The procedural apparatus of RCW 28A.67.073 is only a shadow of a judicial hearing. When a superintendent transfers an administrator to a "subordinate certificated position", he or she must notify the employee of the reasons for the transfer and identify the position to which the administrator will be transferred. The administrator may then request "to meet informally with the board of directors in an executive session thereof for the purpose of requesting the board to reconsider the decision of the superintendent." Furthermore,

At such meeting the administrator shall be given the opportunity to refute any facts upon which the determination was based and to make any argument in support of his or her request for reconsideration. The administrator and the board may invite their respective legal counsel to be present and to participate at the meeting. The board shall notify the administrator in writing of its final decision within ten days following its meeting with the administrator.

RCW 28A.67.073. From this statute, respondents infer that a "hearing" must be convened to "review the Superintendent's exercise of administrative discretion." (Italics omitted.) Brief of Respondents, at 10. From the statute, respondents derive a right of counsel, board responsibility to interpret the statute, determination of individual rights, and the making of a verbatim record. Thus, they conclude that the statute involves the ordinary business of the courts.

Respondents' inferences from the statute are not well supported by the language of the statute. No hearing is required; the statute provides only for an informal meeting with the board. While counsel may be present and participate in the meeting, the statute does not indicate that formal legal representation with direct and cross-examination is permissible. The board need only interpret the statute to the extent it must decide whether the superintendent's decision was in the "best interests of the district." No findings of fact need be rendered; no reasons need be articulated; no verbatim record is required. The board's...