Odom v. Odom

• Decision Date: 23 July 2018
• Docket Number: No. M2017-01702-COA-R3-CV,M2017-01702-COA-R3-CV
• Parties: GARY LEE ODOM v. RACHEL LEA ZAMATA ODOM
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

GARY LEE ODOM v. RACHEL LEA ZAMATA ODOM

No. M2017-01702-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

April 11, 2018 Session

July 23, 2018

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 15D-195

Phillip R. Robinson, Judge

In this divorce action, the wife was found to be in "willful, direct and summary contempt of court beyond a reasonable doubt," based on her responses to the trial court judge's questions during a motion hearing. The wife has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We decline to award to the husband his attorney's fees incurred on appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Daniel D. Warlick, Karla C. Miller, and Martin Stephen Sir, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rachel Lea Zamata Odom.¹

Jacqueline B. Dixon, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Gary Lee Odom.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises out of a divorce action involving the plaintiff, Gary Lee Odom, and the defendant, Rachel Lea Zamata Odom. The Third Circuit Court for Davidson County ("trial court") conducted a hearing in the pending divorce action on August 4,2017, regarding a motion to compel filed by Mr. Odom seeking responses to discovery.² Ms. Odom and her counsel were both present during the hearing, along with Mr. Odom's counsel.

During the course of the hearing, the trial court questioned Ms. Odom's counsel, and eventually Ms. Odom herself, concerning written discovery responses that the court deemed insufficient.³ The hearing transcript reflects that the trial court repeatedly stated that Ms. Odom was being evasive in her answers to the questions asked, which focused on income and expenses related to her law practice. As the hearing continued and the discussion grew lengthy, the trial court judge expressed frustration concerning Ms. Odom's lack of candor, and the court ultimately threatened to hold Ms. Odom in contempt of court for her failure to sufficiently answer.

When the written discovery issues were resolved with Ms. Odom's promise to provide additional documentation, Mr. Odom's counsel asked the trial court to direct Ms. Odom to answer certain questions that she had refused to answer during her earlier deposition. One such question was the location of her current residence and whether she had entered into a lease with regard to that residence. The court again opined that Ms. Odom's answers were evasive, at one point stating, "my patience is really gone with you, Counsel, so you either answer it right now or I'm putting you in the custody of the Sheriff . . . ." The record reflects that Ms. Odom did not answer the question until the trial court admonished her once again.

The next question posed to Ms. Odom concerned whether she had engaged in sexual relations with anyone since the parties' separation and, if so, the identity of such person(s). Ms. Odom replied that she had engaged in sexual relations since her separation from Mr. Odom but that she could not remember the identity of any person with whom she had sexual relations. Ms. Odom stated that she could "look through journal entries and provide that information for you." When the trial court pressed her for information, Ms. Odom responded: "Your Honor, do you want to place me under arrest for not giving those names today, not being able to remember them . . . ." Following a lengthy discussion between the trial court judge and Ms. Odom, during which the court provided Ms. Odom with numerous opportunities to respond, the court eventually held Ms. Odom in contempt. The trial court judge stated in the record that Ms. Odom was "looking me in the face [and] lying to me."

Later that day, the trial court entered an order finding Ms. Odom in "willful, direct and summary contempt of court beyond a reasonable doubt." The court imposed a sentence of three days' incarceration, and Ms. Odom was released on a $250 bond. Ms. Odom filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. Issues Presented

Ms. Odom presents the following issue for our review, which we have restated slightly:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by holding Ms. Odom in contempt of court for her inability or unwillingness to identify the individual(s) with whom she had engaged in sexual relations since her separation from Mr. Odom.

Mr. Odom presents the following additional issue for consideration:

2. Whether Mr. Odom should be awarded his attorney's fees incurred on appeal or awarded damages for a frivolous appeal, and whether all costs on appeal should be assessed against Ms. Odom.

III. Standard of Review

As this Court has elucidated with regard to a contempt finding by the trial court:

A determination of contempt is within the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to the provisions of the law. Robinson [v. Air Draulics Eng'g Co.], 377 S.W.2d [908,] 912 [(Tenn. 1964)]. Generally, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. One charged with criminal contempt is presumed innocent until found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. On appeal following a finding of contempt, however, the defendant must overcome the presumption of guilt by demonstrating that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings. Id. With respect to the trial court's determinations on questions of law, however, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000).

Watkins ex rel. Duncan v. Methodist Healthcare Sys., No. W2008-01349-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1328898, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2009).

This Court has further explained that "[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice." In re Brown, 470 S.W.3d 433, 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011)).

IV. Contempt of Court

"Contempts may be criminal or civil in nature depending on whether the purpose of the contempt is to coerce or to punish." State v. Turner, 914 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). This Court has previously distinguished between the two types of contempt of court as follows:

Civil contempt is intended to benefit a litigant while criminal contempt is punishment for an offense against the authority of the court. Civil contempt is imposed to compel compliance with an order, and parties in contempt may purge themselves by compliance. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is punishment for failing to comply with an order, and the contemptuous party cannot be freed by eventual compliance.

Duke v. Duke, No. M2013-00624-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 4966902, at *30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2014) (quoting Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 786 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)).

This Court has further determined that "the conduct involved and the sanctions imposed, not [] the labels of 'civil' or 'criminal' affixed by the parties or the trial court" characterize a contempt as criminal or civil. See Jones v. Jones, No. 01A01-9607-CV-00346, 1997 WL 80029, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1997) (citing Sherrod, 849 S.W.2d at 786-87). Additionally, this Court stated:

The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is to coerce the contemner to comply with a court's order. It is a remedial proceeding, Robinson v. Gaines, 725 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986), and is intended to benefit the party seeking the contempt order. State ex rel. Agee v. Chapman, 922 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Civil contempt sanctions are open-ended and terminate when the contemner complies with the court's order. In this sense, the contemner "carries the keys to the jail in his or her own pocket." State ex rel. Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 127, 191 S.W. 974, 974 (1917); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 716 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

On the other hand, the purpose of a criminal contempt proceeding is to vindicate the authority of the law and the court. State ex rel. Agee v. Chapman, 922 S.W.2d at 519; Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). It is a punitive proceeding intended to impose a fixed punishment for past actions. Sitton v. Finley, 743 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Punishment for criminal contempt is not conditional and must be served even if the contemner later complies with the court's order. Robinson v. Gaines, 725 S.W.2d at 694.

Jones, 1997 WL 80029, at *2.

With regard to sanctions for contempt, our Supreme Court has declared, "[p]unishment for civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance with the court's order and is imposed at the insistence and for the benefit of the private party." See Doe v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tenn., 104 S.W.3d 465, 473 (Tenn. 2003). By contrast, "criminal contempts are 'intended to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity and authority of the law, and the court as an organ of society,'" and punishment for criminal contempt is "both punitive and unconditional in nature and serves to adjudicate 'an issue between the public and the accused.'" See id. at 474. See also Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn. 1996) ("[T]he inherent power of courts to punish contemptuous conduct has long been regarded as essential to the protection and existence of the courts."). Sanctions for criminal contempt are generally "punitive and unconditional by nature" and thus should be administered "'when necessary to prevent actual, direct obstruction of, or interference with, the administration of justice.'" See Watkins, 2009 WL 1328898, at *3 (quoting Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng'g Co., 377 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. 1964)).

Contempt is further categorized into direct and indirect forms. "Direct contempt is based upon...