Odonnell v. Harris Cnty.
| Citation | 892 F.3d 147 |
| Decision Date | 01 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-20333,17-20333 |
| Parties | Maranda Lynn ODONNELL, Plaintiff—Appellee v. HARRIS COUNTY, Texas; Eric Stewart Hagstette; Joseph Licata, III; Ronald Nicholas; Blanca Estela Villagomez; Jill Wallace ; Paula Goodhart ; Bill Harmon; Natalie C. Flemng; John Clinton;Margaret Harris; Larry Standley ; Pam Derbyshire; Jay Karahan ; Judge Analia Wilkerson; Dan Spjut ; Judge Diane Bull; Judge Robin Brown; Donald Smyth; Jean Hughes, Defendants—Appellants Loetha Shanta Mcgruder; Robert Ryan Ford, Plaintiffs—Appellees v. Harris County, Texas; Jill Wallace ; Eric Stewart Hagstette; Joseph Licata, III; Ronald Nicholas; Blanca Estela Villagomez, Defendants—Appellants |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Alec George Karakatsanis, Esq., Elizabeth Anne Rossi, Civil Rights Corps, Washington, Rebecca Bernhardt, Austin, Arpit Kumar Garg, Daniel Volchok, Seth Paul Waxman, WilmerHale, L.L.P., Washington, Michael Gervais, Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., New York, Neal Manne, Alexandra Giselle White, Krisina Janaye Zuniga, Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., Houston, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.
Susanne Ashley Pringle, Texas Fair Defense Project, Austin, for Plaintiff–Appellee Loetha Shanta Mcgruder.
Stacy R. Obenhaus, Foley Gardere, Dallas, Katharine D. David, Philip J. Morgan, Mike Anthony Stafford, Husch Blackwell, L.L.P., Houston, for Defendants–Appellants.
Charles Justin Cooper, Michael Kirk, William C. Marra, John David Ohlendorf, Harold Reeves, Cooper & Kirk, P.L.L.C., Washington, Sheryl Anne Falk, John R. Keville, Attorney, Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., Houston, for Defendants–Appellants.
Murray Jules Fogler, Esq., Attorney, Fogler, Brar, Ford, O'Neil & Gray, L.L.P., Houston, for Amicus Curiae Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez.
Katherine R. Goldstein, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, L.L.P., New York, Nicole Wignall DeBorde, Esq., Bires, Schaffer & DeBorde, Houston, Michelle Simpson Tuegel, Hunt & Tuegel, P.L.L.C., Waco, for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Before CLEMENT and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.*
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The appellees' petition for panel rehearing is granted. The prior panel opinion, ODonnell v. Harris County , 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018) is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted:
Maranda ODonnell and other plaintiffs (collectively, "ODonnell") brought a class action suit against Harris County, Texas, and a number of its officials—including County Judges,1 Hearing Officers, and the Sheriff (collectively, the "County")—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ODonnell alleged the County's system of setting bail for indigent misdemeanor arrestees violated Texas statutory and constitutional law, as well as the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. ODonnell moved for a preliminary injunction, and the County moved for summary judgment. After eight days of hearings, at which the parties presented numerous fact and expert witnesses and voluminous written evidence, the district court denied the County's summary judgment motion and granted ODonnell's motion for a preliminary injunction. The County then applied to this court for a stay of the injunction pending appeal, but the motion was denied, and the injunction went into effect. Before this court now is the County's appeal, seeking vacatur of the injunction and raising numerous legal challenges.
For the reasons set forth, we affirm most of the district court's rulings, including its conclusion that ODonnell established a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims that the County's policies violate procedural due process and equal protection. We disagree, however, with the district court's analysis in three respects: First, its definition of ODonnell's liberty interest under due process was too broad, and the procedures it required to protect that interest were too onerous. Second, it erred by concluding that the County Sheriff can be considered a County policymaker under § 1983. Finally, the district court's injunction was overbroad. As a result, we will vacate the injunction and order the district court to modify its terms in a manner consistent with this opinion.
We need not conduct an exhaustive review of the facts. The district court's account is expansive: It comprised over 120 pages of factual findings, including not only the specific details of the County's bail-setting procedures, but also the history of bail and recent reform attempts nationwide.
Bail in Texas is either secured or unsecured. Secured bail requires the arrestee to post bond either out of the arrestee's pocket or from a third-party surety (often bail bondsmen, who generally require a 10% non-refundable premium in exchange for posting bond). Unsecured bail, by contrast, allows the arrestee to be released without posting bond, but if he fails to attend his court date and/or comply with any nonfinancial bail conditions, he becomes liable to the County for the bail amount. Both secured and unsecured bail may also include nonfinancial conditions to assure the detainee's attendance at future hearings.
The basic procedural framework governing the administration of bail in Harris County is set by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and local rules promulgated by County Judges. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 75.403(f). When a misdemeanor defendant is arrested, the prosecutor submits a secured bail amount according to a bond schedule established by County Judges. See Harris County Criminal Courts at Law Rule 9 (hereinafter , "Local Rule"). Bonds are then formally set by Hearing Officers and County Judges. Tex. Code. Crim. Pro. art. 2.09, 17.15. Hearing Officers are generally responsible for setting bail amounts in the first instance. This often occurs during the arrestee's initial probable cause hearing, which must be held within 24 hours of arrest. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 17.033 ; Local Rule 4.2.1.1. County Judges review the Hearing Officers' determinations and can adjust bail amounts at a "Next Business Day" hearing. Local Rule 4.3.1.
The Hearing Officers and County Judges are legally proscribed from mechanically applying the bail schedule to a given arrestee. Instead, the Texas Code requires officials to conduct an individualized review based on five enumerated factors, which include the defendant's ability to pay, the charge, and community safety. Tex. Code of Crim. Pro. art. 17.15. The Local Rules explicitly state the schedule is not mandatory. They also authorize a similar, individualized assessment using factors which partially overlap with those listed in the Code. Local Rule 4.2.4. Hearing Officers and County Judges sometimes receive assessments by Pretrial Services, which interviews the detainees prior to hearings, calculates the detainees flight and safety risk based on a point system, and then makes specific recommendations regarding bail.2
Despite these formal requirements, the district court found that, in practice, County procedures were dictated by an unwritten custom and practice that was marred by gross inefficiencies, did not achieve any individualized assessment in setting bail, and was incompetent to do so. The district court noted that the statutorily-mandated probable cause hearing (where bail is usually set) frequently does not occur within 24 hours of arrest. The hearings often last seconds, and rarely more than a few minutes. Arrestees are instructed not to speak, and are not offered any opportunity to submit evidence of relative ability to post bond at the scheduled amount.
The court found that the results of this flawed procedural framework demonstrate the lack of individualized assessments when officials set bail. County officials The court further found that, when Pretrial Services recommends release on personal bond, Hearing Officers reject the suggestion 66% of the time. Because less than 10% of misdemeanor arrestees are assigned an unsecured personal bond, some amount of upfront payment is required for release in the vast majority of cases.
The court also found that the "Next Business Day" hearing before a County Judge fails to provide a meaningful review of the Hearing Officer's bail determinations. Arrestees routinely must wait days for their hearings. County Judges adjust bail amounts or grant unsecured bonds in less than 1% of cases. Furthermore, prosecutors routinely offer time-served plea bargains at the hearing, and arrestees are under immense pressure to accept the plea deals or else remain incarcerated for days or weeks until they are appointed a lawyer.
The district court further noted the various ways in which the imposition of secured bail specifically targets poor arrestees. For example, under the County's risk-assessment point system used by Pretrial Services, poverty indicators (such as not owning a car) receive the same point value as prior criminal violations or prior failures to appear in court. Thus, an arrestee's impoverishment increased the likelihood he or she would need to pay to be released.
The court also observed that Hearing Officers imposed secured bails upon arrestees after having been made aware of an arrestee's indigence by the risk-assessment reports or by the arrestee's own statements. And further, after extensive review of numerous bail hearings, the court concluded Hearing Officers were aware that, by imposing a secured bail on indigent arrestees, they were ensuring that those arrestees would remain detained.
The court rejected the argument that imposing secured bonds served the County's interest in ensuring the arrestee appeared at the future court date and committed no further crime. The court's review of reams of empirical data suggested the opposite: that "release on secured financial conditions does not assure better rates of appearance or of law-abiding conduct before...
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