Ogburn v. State

• Citation: 270 S.W. 945,168 Ark. 396
• Decision Date: 30 March 1925
• Docket Number: 269
• Parties: OGBURN v. STATE
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

270 S.W. 945

168 Ark. 396

OGBURN v. STATE

No. 269

Supreme Court of Arkansas

March 30, 1925

Appeal from Miller Circuit Court; James H. McCollum, Judge affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

H. W. Applegate, Attorney General and John L Carter, Assistant, for appellee.

OPINION

HART, J.

Joe Ogburn prosecutes this appeal to reverse a judgment of conviction against him for violating § 7437 of Crawford & Moses' Digest. That part of the statute which is material in this case makes it unlawful for any person to have in his possession an automobile, the motor and serial number of which has been mutilated to the extent that same can not be read.

At common law a crime consisted of an unlawful act with evil intent, and in many statutory crimes both the intent and act may be required to constitute the crime. Many statutes however, which are in the nature of police regulations, impose penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them.

Motor vehicles have become frequent subjects of larceny, and the removal or change of the serial number is a convenient method for preventing identification and recovery. Then, too, one committing a crime and escaping in an automobile would be more difficult of apprehension if the serial number or identification mark should be removed. Hence statutes of this sort have been held valid as a legitimate and proper exercise of the police power. People v. Fernow 286 Ill. 627, 122 N.E. 155; People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, 123 N.E. 543, and State v. Randolph 192 Iowa 636, 185 N.W. 141. This principle has also been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States as properly coming within the police power. Rae Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699. Opinion by Taft, C. J., March 9, 1925.

Various statutes of this State prohibiting the doing of acts without requiring the allegation or proof of criminal intent have been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. For instance, in Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. State, 79 Ark. 349, 96 S.W. 189, it was held to be no defense to a statute making it unlawful to ship game beyond the limits of the State, that the express company and its agents had no knowledge that the package contained game.

Again, in Harper v. State, 91 Ark. 422, 121 S.W. 737, it was held that a sale by a licensed liquor dealer to a minor, though made in good faith and without reason to suspect that the purchaser was below age, was a violation of the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to minors.

We have also upheld our statute making it a felony for a person to keep an unregistered still, or stillworm in his possession regardless of intention as to its use. Earl v. State, 155 Ark. 286, 244 S.W. 333, and Hodgkiss v. State, 156 Ark. 340, 246 S.W. 506.

In Ring v. State, 154 Ark. 250, 242 S.W. 561, in construing the same statute, we held that, while the act of taking or holding possession of the still must be voluntary, the possession need not be permanent. It has been well said that, if it was necessary to show a criminal intent in cases of this sort, the statute would soon become a dead letter.

The main reliance of the defendant for a reversal of the judgment is that the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the verdict.

On the part of the State it was shown by a deputy sheriff of Miller County, Arkansas, that he arrested Joe Ogburn in that county while in the possession of a Ford car with a mutilated number. The arrest was made about sixty days before the trial of the case, which was on the 4th day of December, 1924. The deputy sheriff and another officer were in an automobile, and pulled over in front of the one driven by the defendant. The defendant speeded up his car, and hit the car of the deputy sheriff and burst one of its casings. The deputy sheriff examined the car, and the original serial number had been mutilated or changed so that it could not be read. The officer asked the defendant who the car belonged to, and he said it belonged to a friend, but refused to give his name. Two other persons were in the ear with the defendant, but the defendant told the officer,...