Oil City Discount Center, Inc. v. City of Yonkers

• Decision Date: 20 February 1967
• Citation: 53 Misc.2d 191,277 N.Y.S.2d 945
• Parties: OIL CITY DISCOUNT CENTER, INC. and Thomas R. McMinn, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF YONKERS, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 945

277 N.Y.S.2d 945

53 Misc.2d 191

OIL CITY DISCOUNT CENTER, INC. and Thomas R. McMinn, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF YONKERS, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Westchester County.

Feb. 20, 1967.

Thacher, Proffitt, Prizer, Crawley & Wood, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Francis B. Cline, Corp. Counsel, Yonkers, for defendant.

JOHN J. DILLON, Justice.

The action is for a declaratory judgment determining the validity and effect of ordinances enacted by the City of Yonkers which regulate and control the operation of gasoline stations. The plaintiff Oil City Discount Center, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Oil City, is the owner and operator of a self-service gasoline station located in the City of Yonkers. If the ordinances are valid, Oil City will have to cease doing business as a self-service station. The proof established that the station was constructed at a cost of approximately $120,000. and that it commenced doing business on or about May 17, 1962. The business received immediate and widespread public acceptance, apparently due to the reduced prices at which the gasoline was sold. This 'gasoline supermarket' has eight pumps, but unlike the conventional station it sells no accessories, such as tires and batteries, and furnishes no ordinary services to its customers, such as cleaning windshields and checking oil and water levels. It has no facilities for the servicing or repair of automobiles, and consequently is able to operate with fewer employees than a conventional gasoline station would require to service the same number of customers and to sell the same volume of gasoline. The volume of gasoline sold by the plaintiff is approximately ten times greater than that of an average gasoline station in the area.

On or about December 11, 1962, after Oil City had been in business for approximately seven months, and at a time when it must have been apparent that it was selling a large volume of gasoline, the City of Yonkers enacted General Ordinance No. 51--1962, which forbade anyone except a service station owner, lessee, operator or employee to pump gasoline. The ordinance was amended in December, 1963, to prohibit any person from pumping gasoline unless he first obtained annually a 'certificate of fitness' from the Bureau of Combustibles. In March of 1964, another ordinance was enacted which imposed virtually the same requirements as the earlier two. No attempt was made to enforce these ordinances against the plaintiff until October 13, 1965, at which time a police officer of the City of Yonkers served three of plaintiff's customers with summonses charging each of them with violation of Ordinance No. 8--1964--' failure to produce certificate of fitness.'

After issue was joined in this action, plaintiff made a motion for a temporary injunction restraining the city from enforcing the ordinances, and on December 27, 1965, Mr. Justice Nolan granted the motion. The issues of fact in this case and the controlling principles of law were stated in his decision as follows:

'The ordinance complained of was, presumably, enacted in the exercise of the police power and if it is a valid enactment in the interest of public safety it may properly prohibit the sale of gasoline in violation of its terms after its effective date (Cf. The City of New York v. Foster, 148 App.Div. 258, (133 N.Y.S. 152) affd. 205 N.Y. 593 (,98 N.E. 1100)). If it is a valid enactment it does not deprive plaintiffs of any vested right. All business and occupations are conducted subject to the police power (People ex rel. Armstrong v. Warden, 183 N.Y. 223, 226 (,76 N.E. 11, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 859)). But, although such legislation carries with it a strong presumption of validity, due process demands that it be reasonably related and applied to some actual and manifest evil, and the means adopted must be reasonably appropriate to the end sought to be accomplished. The City may not arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unreasonable restrictions thereon under the guise...