People ex rel. Armstrong v. Warden of City Prison of New York

• Decision Date: 05 December 1905
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. ARMSTRONG v. WARDEN OF CITY PRISON OF NEW YORK.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

183 N.Y. 223

76 N.E. 11

PEOPLE ex rel. ARMSTRONG

v.WARDEN OF CITY PRISON OF NEW YORK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 5, 1905.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Habeas corpus proceedings by the people, on the relation of James J. Armstrong, against the warden of the city prison of the city of New York. From an order of the Appellate Division (95 N. Y. Supp. 1152,107 App. Div. 617), affirming an order dismissing the writ and remanding relator to custody, relator appeals. Affirmed.

Charles E. Le Barbier, for appellant.

William Travers Jerome, Dist. Atty. (Robert S. Johnstone, of counsel), for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

The courts below have dismissed a writ of habeas corpus sued out by the relator to inquire into the cause of his imprisonment and to be discharged therefrom. The defendant made return to the writ to the effect that he detained the relator in his custody by virtue of a warrant of commitment made by one of the city magistrates of the city of New York on the 31st day of March, 1905, and a copy of the warrant was annexed to the return and made a part thereof. After a hearing upon the petition, the return, and the writ, the court decided that the relator was properly committed, and the order was affirmed on appeal.

There is no dispute whatever about the facts, and the relator's contention raises simply a question of law. He was detained upon the warrant of commitment by virtue of a judgment or order made by the committing magistrate on the hearing of a complaint against him for violation of a statute. The statute is chapter 432 of the Laws of 1904, and is entitled ‘An act to regulate the keeping of employment agencies in the cities of the first and second class where fees are charged for procuring employment or situations.’ The statute contains ten sections and purports to regulate the business of employment agencies in the cities mentioned in the title in various ways not necessary here to enumerate. The question in this case turns upon the second section, which reads as follows: ‘No person shall open, keep or carry on any such employment agency in the cities of the first and second class, unless every such person shall procure a license therefor from the mayor of the city in which such person intends to conduct such agency. Any person who shall open or conduct such an employment agency without first procuring such license, shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars, or on failure to pay such fine, by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days. Such license shall be granted upon the payment to said mayor of a fee of twenty-five dollars annually for such employment agency in cities of the first and second class.’ It is admitted that the relator kept an employment agency in the city of New York, and was engaged in that business without having procured any license from the mayor, or having complied in any respect with the provisions of the statute.

The relator insisted in the courts below, and insists in this court, that the statute upon which the commitment is based is voed, as in conflict with the state and federal Constitutions. It is argued that it is in conflict with the equal rights clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution, since it applies only to cities of the first and second class. But it seems to be well settled in this court and in the federal court that the equality within the contemplation of...