Como Oil Co., Inc. v. O'Loughlin
| Decision Date | 21 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 64139,64139 |
| Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 130 COMO OIL COMPANY, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. Celestine O'LOUGHLIN, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Samuel Tyler Hill of Hill, Neale & Riley, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioners.
Roy W. Allman, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.
This case is before us based upon conflict between O'Loughlin v. Como Oil Co., 434 So.2d 367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), and several decisions of this Court. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. The issue here is whether the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defense on a punitive damages count in a negligence action. We find the directed verdict proper under the facts of this case and quash O'Loughlin.
O'Loughlin suffered serious personal injuries in a gasoline explosion and fire at a marina. The conflagration occurred when a Como Oil Company truck driver overfilled an underground gasoline storage tank. Hot asphalt caused part of the resulting gasoline "lake" to vaporize, and an electric spark ignited the gasoline vapors. O'Loughlin was burned and thrown into the water by the explosion. She brought a negligence action seeking compensatory and punitive damages from Como Oil, its driver, and insurer. The driver could not be served and was dropped from the case.
After O'Loughlin rested her case at trial, Como Oil moved for a directed verdict in its favor on punitive damages. O'Loughlin argued that she had presented sufficient evidence to go to the jury on punitive damages because the evidence established that the Como Oil truck had dirt and grime on the outside, had leaks, and lacked a safety grommet on the filler nozzle; that the driver failed to have or use a dip stick to measure the gasoline level in the underground tanks before pumping the gasoline; that the driver was responsible for permitting between fifty and three hundred gallons of gasoline to overflow an underground tank while he watched the flow meter on the truck rather than the actual filling operation; and that Como Oil ran a "shabby" operation. The trial court granted the directed verdict, finding that the evidence showed gross negligence but not willful and wanton conduct so as to support punitive damages. The district court reversed and remanded for a new trial on punitive damages. It found that an adequate basis existed for the jury to find that the driver's gross negligence could be imputed to Como Oil because of its failure to maintain its equipment and to train and equip the driver in the proper handling of a hazardous substance.
Como Oil contends that the district court erred in finding gross negligence as a basis for punitive damages. We agree.
We recently addressed this issue in White Construction Co. v. Dupont, 455 So.2d 1026 (Fla.1984). In White we held that the degree of negligence necessary for punitive damages is willful and wanton misconduct equivalent to criminal manslaughter. The required misconduct goes beyond gross negligence. The district court erred in finding evidence of gross negligence sufficient to create a jury question on punitive damages. We hold that under no view of the evidence does Como Oil's conduct reach the willful and wanton level necessary to support an award of punitive damages. The trial court correctly directed a verdict for Como Oil on this issue.
Accordingly, we quash the district court decision under review and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
I agree with the majority that gross negligence, as a term of art, is legally insufficient to support punitive damages. Nevertheless, the ultimate question for this Court is not whether the district court failed to use the correct "magic words," but whether it erred in reversing the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant/petitioner on the issue of punitive damages. 1 Congregation Temple De Hirsch v. Aronson, 128 So.2d 585 (Fla.1961). My reading of the evidence persuades me that the district court decision should be approved.
In conducting its review of the directed verdict, the district court followed, as should we, the well-established rule that an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant. Teare v. Local Union No. 295, 98 So.2d 79 (Fla.1957); Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v. Dorner, 159 Fla. 538, 32 So.2d 321 (1947). This Court appeared to have recognized in Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla.1976), that there are no clear and distinct definitional lines between different degrees of negligence that can be measured with mathematical precision. Justice England, speaking for a majority of the Court aptly recognized:
Our jurisprudence reflects a history of difficulty in dividing negligence into degrees. The distinctions articulated in labeling particular conduct as "simple negligence" "culpable negligence", "gross negligence", and "willful and wanton misconduct" are best viewed as statement of public policy. These semantic refinements also serve a useful purpose in advising jurors of the factors to be considered in those situations where the lines are indistinct. We would deceive ourselves, however, if we viewed these distinctions as finite legal categories and permitted the characterization alone to cloud the policies they were created to foster.
Ingram, 340 So.2d 922, 924 (footnotes omitted). Identical conduct, in different settings, can and does result in different degrees of liability. Thus, under our system of justice, where the line is indistinct, the wisest course is to leave the question in the hands of the jury. See our discussion in Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16, 19 (Fla.1959).
The uncontroverted evidence is that Como Oil was to deliver two thousand gallons of gasoline to a marina. The marina had two underground tanks, each of which had a capacity of two thousand gallons. After pumping a portion of the delivery amount into one tank, the driver connected to the second tank and pumped the remainder. 2 The...
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