Oil-mills v. Coffey

• Decision Date: 30 November 1887
• Citation: 4 S.E. 759,80 Ga. 145
• Parties: Atlanta Cotton Seed Oil-Mills v. Coffey.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

4 S.E. 759

80 Ga. 145

Atlanta Cotton Seed Oil-Mills

v.Coffey.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

November 30, 1887.

1. Negligence—Dangerous Premises—Presence by Invitation.

Defendant had given a quantity of cotton seed hulls to an Orphans' Home, the manager of which employed plaintiff to haul the hulls from the mill. Having received permission from the superintendent of the mill to remove the hulls, plaintiff was engaged in the work, when his horse stepped into a mud-hole containing caustic soda, which burned the horse so severely as to cause his death. The mud-hole was on a private way over defendant's land, used in approaching the mill from the public road. Held, that plaintiff was not a mere licensee, whom defendant was not bound to protect and warn against the dangerous substance, but that he was entitled to the care due one who had come on the premises at the invitation of the defendant, and the defendant was therefore liable to him in damages.¹

2. Same—Dangerous Premises—Dangerous Chemicals.

Plaintiff's horse stepped into a mud-hole on a private way over the land of defendant, used in approaching the mill from the public road, within a few feet from defendant's cotton seed oil-mill, and immediately thereafter showed signs of pain. On being examined by a blacksmith, something like a scald or burn was discovered above the hoofs of two of his feet. The horses hoofs and ankles were severely burned, and he died from the effects of the burns. It was in evidence that caustic soda is used in the mill for refining the oil, and that when dissolved in water, it will burn animal flesh. There was no evidence tending to show how the caustic soda got from the mill into the mud-hole. Held, that the jury were justified in inferring negligence on the part of the defendant in allowing the dangerous substance to get where it was.

3. Damages—Injury to Property—Death of Horse—Value or Hiring.

In an action for negligence, causing the death of a horse, it is error to charge that plaintiff is entitled to recover whatever the horse would have made for hire from the time of the injury to his death.

4. Continuance—Surprise—Amendment of Pleadings—Code Ga. § 3531.

Under Code Ga. § 3531, providing for a continuance in the case of ah amendment to the pleadings or proceedings, it is not improper to refuse such continuance when the counsel of the opposite party does not state that "ho is less prepared for trial than he would have been if such amendment had not been made, and how, and that such surprise is not claimed for the purpose of delay."

Error from superior court, DeKalb county; Kichard H. Clark, Judge.

Action by Coffey against the Atlanta Cotton Seed Oil-Mills for damages for the loss of a horse, caused by the negligence of defendant. The jury found for plaintiff; a motion for new trial was overruled, and defendant brings error.

Steward & Harper, W. L. Thomas, and J. H. Lumpkin, for plaintiff in error. H. C. Jones and Alexander & Turnbull, for defendant in error.

Simmons, J. Coffey brought his suit against the Atlanta Cotton Seed Oil-Mill for damages. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, and a motion was made for a new trial, and was overruled by the court; and the defendant excepted, and assigns as error the overruling of this motion.

It appears from the record in this case that the defendant in the court below had given to the Orphans' Home a quantity of cotton seed hulls, to be used as a fertilizer. The manager of the Orphans' Home employed Coffee to haul the hulls from the mill to the farm belonging to the Orphans' Home. It appears also that the defendant had sold at divers times to other persons quantities of these hulls, and that they had hauled them away from the mill. Coffey applied to the superintendent for permission to remove the hulls, and the permission was granted. There was a private way from the public road over the land of the defendant, by which Coffey and others approached the mill. In a few feet from the mill-house there was a ditch over which there was a small bridge. Near this bridge, and between it and the mill, was a mud-hole. Coffey's team had made one trip on the morning on which it was alleged his horse was injured. In making the second trip, the horse stepped into the mud, and immediately showed signs of pain. He was unhitched from the wagon, and carried to a blacksmith, who examined his feet, and discovered above the hoofs of two of his feet something like a scald or burn. In washing the feet, the water, when applied, produced something like the lather of soap. The record further discloses that, for the purpose of refining the oil, caustic soda was used; and the testimony showed that caustic soda, when dissolved in water, would burn animal flesh. There was no evidence going to show how the caustic soda got out of the mill-house into the mud; but there is no doubt, from the evidence in the case, that the horse's hoofs and ankles were severely burned by this caustic soda, and that he died from the effect of the burns. This, in substance, was the evidence upon the trial of the case.

We think that there was sufficient evidence to authorize the finding of the jury, taking into consideration the fact that the horse was injured within a few feet of the mill, that caustic soda was used in the mill, and would burn animal flesh, and the further fact that the defendant did not account, nor attempt to account, for its presence in the water or the mud near its mill. The jury were authorized to infer negligence on the part of the defendant in allowing the dangerous substance to get from the mill to where it was.

It was insisted in the argument of the case before us that while it may have been true that the horse was injured in the manner complained of in the declaration, yet the defendant was not liable, because Coffey was a mere licensee, and that the defendant owed him no duty to protect him or to warn him against this dangerous substance. We do not agree with the plaintiff in error in this view of the case. We do not think that Coffey was a mere licensee. The rule of law is that, "the owner or occupier of land who, by invitation, express or implied, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, is liable in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land or its approaches." Judge Cooley,...