Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n v. Sanders, 35659

• Decision Date: 18 May 1954
• Docket Number: No. 35659,35659
• Citation: 1954 OK 155,272 P.2d 379
• Parties: OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION v. SANDERS.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 379

272 P.2d 379

1954 OK 155

OKLAHOMA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION v. SANDERS.

No. 35659.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 18, 1954.

Rehearing Denied June 29, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The provisions of Section 15(g) of the Oklahoma Employment Security Act, 40 O.S.1941 § 224(g) that the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, means that such findings, to be conclusive, must be supported by substantial evidence.

2. A finding of fact made by the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission which is not supported by any competent evidence is not binding upon the district court on appeal.

Burton Duncan and Gerald S. Tebbe, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Gilliland, Withington, Shirk & Clifford, Oklahoma City, Wayne W. Bayless, Oklahoma City, of counsel, for defendant in error.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This is an action to review a decision of the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission, hereinafter called Commission, denying plaintiff's application for refund of contributions paid and an adjustment of his rate of contribution.

In April of 1944, Leo Sanders, plaintiff in the trial court, and referred to hereinafter as plaintiff, filed with such Commission an Employer's Quarterly Adjustment Report for each of the quarters ending March 31, 1942, June 30, 1942, September 30, 1942, December 31, 1942, March 25, 1943, June 30, 1943, and September 30, 1943, respectively. These reports were in the nature of amended Employer's Quarterly Contribution Reports and were filed for the purpose of obtaining a refund of overpayments of employer's contributions allegedly made by plaintiff to the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Fund.

Such Adjustment Reports for the quarters ending March 31, 1942 and June 30, 1942, alleged an error in the rate of contribution charged, while same for the other quarters above mentioned alleged error in the amount of taxable wages reported as well as error in the rate of contribution charged.

A hearing was had before Commission after which it entered its order in all respects denying Sanders the relief sought. Sanders thereupon appealed such decision to the district court which reversed the Commission to the extent of awarding Sanders a judgment for a refund in the amount of $17,228.15 on the ground of error in the amount of wages reported, but denied him any adjustment in the rate of contribution assigned to him. Both parties have appealed.

The Commission, as plaintiff in error, contends that its findings are binding on the district court and that such court was therefore in error in reversing the order of such Commission. This is based on the provisions of 40 O.S.1941 § 224(g) which reads as follows:

'In any judicial proceeding under this Section the findings of the Commission, or its duly authorized representative, as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to questions of law.'

We are not entirely without precedent in regard to the construction of this statute as we have heretofore on several occasions considered a similar provision of the workmen's compensation statute which provides that the decision of the Industrial Commission shall be final as to all questions of fact. In those cases we have held that a finding which is unsupported by competent evidence will be vacated as a matter of law. Special Indemnity Fund v. England, 204 Okl. 207, 228 P.2d 629; National Zink Co. v. Goines, 193 Okl. 460, 145 P.2d 183; American Iron & Machine Works v. Weatherman, 187 Okl. 260, 102 P.2d 604.

The Missouri court has considered their (identical) statute in the case of S. S. Kresge Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 1942, 349 Mo. 590, 162 S.W.2d 838, 840. In that case the court said:

'We said, as pointed out by the Commission, in A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission Mo. , 152 S.W.2d 184, 196, that the rule with respect to the facts in Workmen's Compensation Commission review proceedings obtains in Unemployment Compensation Commission review proceedings, viz.: "Findings of fact made by the commission, if sustained by sufficient competent evidence, are, absent fraud, conclusive on appeal * * *." In workmen's compensation cases we also have observed: Whether the facts found are so sustained is a question of law. Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 328 Mo. 112, 120(II), 40 S.W.2d 601, 604(II). If the evidence, although some, be not legally sufficient or lack sufficient probative force to sustain the award, the findings and award are not binding on the court and it is the duty of the court to set aside the award.'

The Supreme Court of the United States has likewise considered a similar statute in the case of Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126, and said in the opinion:

'The companies contend that the Court of Appeals misconceived its power to review the findings and, instead of searching the record to see if they were sustained by 'substantial' evidence, merely considered whether the record was 'wholly barren of evidence' to support them. We agree that the statute, in providing that 'the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive', * * * means...