Old Colony Trust Co. v. Segal

• Decision Date: 14 September 1932
• Citation: 182 N.E. 578,280 Mass. 212
• Parties: OLD COLONY TRUST CO. et al. v. SEGAL et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

280 Mass. 212

182 N.E. 578

OLD COLONY TRUST CO. et al.

v.SEGAL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 14, 1932.

Petition by the Old Colony Trust Company and another in probate court to determine validity of claims of Kalman Segal and others.

Decree of probate court declining to assume jurisdiction affirmed.Lee M. Friedman, of Boston, for petitioners.

No argument nor brief for respondents.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a petition brought by administrators in a probate court praying for a determination of the validity of specified claims held by six persons named as respondents against the estate of their intestate. Prior to the bringing of this petition, each of the respondents had brought an action at law in the Superior Court against the administrators, within the period fixed by the statute of limitations, to enforce collection of the several claims described in the petition. In each of those actions trial by jury had been claimed and all the actions are pending. The several claims are based upon alleged contracts made by the intestate. It is plain that the Superior Court has jurisdiction of these actions at law. The contrary has not been argued. The question presented for decision is whether in these circumstances the Probate Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The petition is brought under G. L. c. 197, § 2. That section is in these words: ‘If an executor or administrator who has given due notice of his appointment does not within six months thereafter have notice of demands against the estate of the deceased sufficient to warrant him to represent such estate to be insolvent, he may, after the expiration of said six months, pay the debts due from the estate and shall not be personally liable to any creditor in consequence of such payments made before notice of such creditor's demand; and if such executor or administrator is in doubt as to the validity of any debt which, if valid, he would have a right to pay under this section, he may, with the approval of the probate court, after notice to all persons interested, pay such debt or so much thereof as the court may authorize.’

This section does not purport to deprive any other courts of jurisdiction. It confers additional but not exclusive jurisdiction on probate courts. Its main design is to enable executors and administrators to settle estates more expeditiously than might otherwise be possible, and at the same time to receive protection in paying claims of doubtful validity or questioned by persons interested in the estate. It provides alternative procedure. It does not extinguish pre-existing remedies open to parties. It leaves untouched every other provision of law for the adjudication of claims against estates. It would be contrary to sound canons of statutory construction to interpret this section as working so radical a change in the law as to deprive parties of the right to bring actions at law, with the concomitant privilege of claiming trial by jury, and to compel all persons having claims against the estate of a deceased person to resort to probate courts alone for adjusting demands, without explicit and unmistakable language. No such legislative mandate is expressed by the natural meaning of the words of this section. Ginzberg v. Wyman, 272 Mass. 499, 172 N. E. 614;Nathan v. Nathan, 166 Mass. 294, 44 N. E. 221.

Thus interpreted, the statute is not rendered useless, but has a considerable field for its operation. It enables executors and administrators, if all parties desire, to proceed at once for the determination of the validity of claims against their estates. It offers a means for accelerating the settlement of estates. Doubtless, in many instances, it would be for the advantage of creditors as well as fiduciaries to have the validity of claims determined in this way. See French v. Bray, 263 Mass. 121, 160 N. E. 424; Bray v. Bray, 263 Mass. 141, 160 N. E. 831.

Where different courts of the same sovereign power have concurrent jurisdiction of the same causes, the one whose jurisdiction is first duly invoked has authority paramount over other courts. It...