Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1953
• Citation: 68 So.2d 180
• Parties: OLD PLANTATION CORP. v. MAULE INDUSTRIES, Inc.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 180

68 So.2d 180

OLD PLANTATION CORP. v. MAULE INDUSTRIES, Inc.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

Oct. 30, 1953.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1953.

Carl A. Hiaasen and McCune, Hiaasen & Kelley, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Loftin, Anderson, Scott, McCarthy & Preston, Robert H. Anderson and D. P. S. Paul, Miami, for appellee.

DREW, Justice.

The principal question presented for our determination on this appeal is posed by appellant as follows:

'Does the two-year statute of limitation, relating to libel and slander (Section 95.11(6), F.S.A.) govern an action which seeks to recover damages directly caused by the wrongful, intentional and malicious disparagement and impairment of the vendibility of the title to real property, or is the statute of limitation governing the same Section 95.11(4), F.S.A., which provides:

"Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows:

* * *

* * *

"(4) Within four years.--Any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter." (Emphasis ours.)

The lower court held that the two-year statute was applicable and dismissed the complaint.

It will be noticed from the question presented that the words 'an action which seeks to recover damages directly caused by the wrongful, intentional and malicious disparagement and impairment of the vendibility of the title to real property' are used to designate the type of action rather than the more commonly used expression 'an action for slander of title.' At the bar of this Court counsel for appellant ably argued that the term used in his posed question and quoted above was a more apt and proper designation of the type of action than the ancient 'slander of title' designation. While we may agree that this argument is sound, the text-writers and the courts have used the expression interchangeably. For example, 33 American Jurisprudence, in Section 347 of the title 'Libel and Slander,' uses the phrase 'For Slander or Disparagement of Title.' The definition of 'Slander of Title' in 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 269, page 391, is as follows:

"Slander of title' may be defined as a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, or of some right of his, causing him special damage.'

In the case of Woodard v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 165 Or. 250, 106 P.2d 1043, 1045, 131 A.L.R. 832, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in passing on a very similar argument, said:

'Plaintiff contends that this is not an action for slander of title, but is an action on the case to recover damages for wrongful injury to his property. All actions for libel or slander are actions on the case, but not all actions on the case are for libel or slander. Regardless of what may be the proper name for this kind of action, we think it clear that it is based on false and malicious statements made concerning plaintiff's property.

'* * * An action for slander of title is based upon the false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, resulting in special damages. Cawrse v. Signal Oil Co., , 103 P.2d 729, 129 A.L.R. 174. The action is not for defamation of character of the person and is, therefore, distinguishable from ordinary libel or slander. As said in Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532, 27 P. 527, 528, 13 L.R.A. 707, 25 Am.St.Rep. 151: 'Although the term 'slander' is more appropriate to the defamation of the character of an individual, yet the term 'slander of title' has by use become a recognized phrase of the law; and an action therefor is permitted against one who falsely and maliciously disparages the title of another to property, whether real or personal, and thereby causes him some special pecuniary loss or damage.'

'In Potosi Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 36 Nev. 390, 135 P. 1078, 1082, it is said: 'The original application of the term 'slander' was applied more to words or utterances, the nature of which were defamatory to the character of an individual. The term, however, has been made applicable to utterances and words made with reference to property, whether real or personal.''

We conclude, therefore, that the question presented must be disposed of on the basis that the action in the lower court is an action for slander of title and must be governed by the provisions of law applicable to such actions.

While there is authority to the contrary (and we shall refer to this later), we conclude that the great weight of authority in this Country is that the Statute of Limitations applicable to libel and slander is equally applicable to actions for slander of title. The nearest we have approached deciding this question is in the case of Lehman v. Goldin, 160 Fla. 710, 36 So.2d 259, where we held that the law applicable to actions for slander of title was stated in Sections 624, 625 and 626 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts and referred to 33 Am. Jurisprudence, Libel and Slander, Section 343 et seq., page 310 et seq. This case did not involve the Statute of Limitations but we did deal with the questions of 'Slander of Title' and 'Libel and Slander' as the same in characterizing the action itself. In this connection it is said in 33 Am.Jur., Libel and Slander, par. 354 (page 30 of 1953 Cumulative Supplement Pocket Part):

'The view adopted in a majority of the several American jurisdictions where the question has arisen is that in the absence of a statute expressly referring to actions for slander of title, a statute of limitations relative to actions for libel and slander is equally applicable to actions for slander of title? Thus, the time within which an action for slander of title must be instituted has been held to be governed by a statutory provision relative to actions for slander (or for libel and slander), rather than by a statutory provision relative to actions for trespass upon real property, for injury to property, for injuries to personal property, or for any injury to the person or 'rights of another, not arising on contract,' and not 'especially enumerated' in any other section of the statute of limitations.'

53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 278(c), page 398, in discussing the applicability of a statute of limitation on libel and slander to an action for slander of title, said the following:

'The right of action for slander of title or property accrues from the time of publication. The time within which such actions must be commenced usually is regulated by statute. Although there is also authority to the contrary, such actions have been held to be governed by statutes...