Olive v. Maas
| Decision Date | 14 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. SC00-317.,SC00-317. |
| Citation | 811 So.2d 644 |
| Parties | Mark Evan OLIVE, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Roger MAAS, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in Capital Cases, et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Stephen F. Hanlon and Susan L. Kelsey of Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, FL; and Robert J. Shapiro of Holland & Knight, Tampa, FL, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Michael Pearce Dodson, General Counsel, Office of Legislative Services, Tallahassee, FL; and Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and Louis F. Hubener, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Robert Augustus Harper of Robert Augustus Harper Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Amicus Curiae.
We have for review a final judgment of a Leon County trial court certified by the First District Court of Appeal as being of great public importance and requiring immediate resolution by this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(5), Fla. Const.
Mark Evan Olive is a Florida attorney who routinely represents defendants on death row in postconviction proceedings. Pursuant to section 27.710, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), ("the Registry Act"), Olive sought appointment through the registry of attorneys who are available to represent defendants in postconviction capital collateral proceedings, and on September 1, 1998, Judge Donald R. Moran, Jr., Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, appointed Olive to represent death row defendant Anthony Mungin. On September 11, 1998, respondent Roger A. Maas, the Executive Director of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in Capital Cases, sent Olive the contract detailing the terms and conditions of appointment as counsel in postconviction capital collateral proceedings ("the contract"), pursuant to section 27.711, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). On February 22, 1999, Olive, through counsel, informed Judge Moran that due to "ethical concerns" he would not sign the contract. The letter advised in pertinent part:
Shortly thereafter, on March 2, 1999, respondent Maas wrote to Judge Moran suggesting that another attorney be appointed to represent Anthony Mungin, and he provided a list to Judge Moran which did not include Mr. Olive's name. On March 11, 1999, Judge Moran revoked Mr. Olive's initial appointment, and indicated that he would appoint a different attorney to represent Mr. Mungin.
Olive filed an action for declaratory relief in circuit court wherein he sought "a determination of his legal rights and professional duties" under the Registry Act and the contract.1 Olive's complaint named Mr. Maas, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in Capital Cases,2 and Robert F. Milligan, in his official capacity as Comptroller, as respondents. Florida Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth exercised his prerogative to appear and be heard as a party respondent. See §§ 16.01(5), 86.091, Fla. Stat. (1997).
The complaint alleged that Olive was "in doubt about his legal rights, duties, status and other equitable and legal relations under the Registry Act and the Contract." Count I sought a declaration that "strict application of the fee and costs limits in the Registry Act and Contract unconstitutionally curtailed the trial court's inherent power to ensure adequate representation." That is, Olive sought a determination that the limits on compensable hours and costs imposed by section 27.711 were unconstitutional in that they "prohibited" him from requesting compensation for time spent and costs incurred in excess of pre-established limits. In count II, Olive asserted that various limitations imposed by section 27.711 and in the contract would compel him to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. Finally, in count III, Olive complained that Maas had excluded him from the list of lawyers sent to Judge Moran after Olive declined to be limited by the terms of the form contract as proposed. Olive sought injunctive relief to prohibit Maas from excluding Olive in the future from the registry list of attorneys available to represent postconviction defendants.
Respondents filed motions to dismiss all counts of the amended complaint, and a memorandum of law asserting, inter alia, that Olive lacked standing to challenge the provisions of section 27.710, section 27.711, or the contract because "he had no contract, no client and no case to pursue." Respondents additionally maintained that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment because the claims were entirely speculative and not based on a present controversy, and that a permanent injunction was unwarranted. The circuit court judge denied respondents' motions to dismiss.
Olive then filed a motion for summary judgment on each of the three counts in the complaint. Following respondents' objection to Olive's motion, and Respondents' own ore tenus motion for summary judgment on all counts, the trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of the respondents as to counts I and II. As to count III, however, the trial court granted Olive's motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment which permanently enjoined Maas from excluding Olive from the registry list of available attorneys.
Olive timely filed his notice of appeal seeking review of the summary final judgment entered in favor of the respondents as to counts I and II of the amended complaint. Respondents cross-appealed the trial court's final order, seeking review of the permanent injunction. On Olive's suggestion, the First District Court of Appeal certified this case to us as one presenting questions of great public importance and requiring immediate resolution.
On review, Olive asks us to determine whether the capped fee schedule in the standard contract is void because it interferes with a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel (count I), and whether the contract is also void to the extent that it requires postconviction counsel to engage in what Olive terms to be "unethical" behavior (count II). Respondents/cross-appellants suggest that these issues need not be presently addressed because Olive lacks standing to seek, and the trial court jurisdiction to enter, a declaratory judgment as to these two counts. Specifically, respondents/appellees assert that Olive's claims rest entirely on speculative assertions and contingent events. We disagree.
Pursuant to chapter 86 of the Florida Statutes, a trial court:
§ 86.011, Fla Stat. (2000). Section 86.021, Florida Statutes (2000), further instructs:
Any person claiming to be interested or who may be in doubt about his or her rights under a ... contract ... or whose rights, status, or other equitable or legal relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under such statute ... [or] contract ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other equitable or legal relations thereunder.
Accordingly, we have noted in the past that "[t]he purpose of a declaratory judgment is to afford parties relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status, and other equitable or legal relations." Santa Rosa County v. Administration Commission, 661 So.2d 1190,1192 (Fla.1995). Given the repeated adherence by Florida courts to the notion that the declaratory judgment statute should be liberally construed,3 we conclude that Olive had standing to seek, and the trial court jurisdiction to enter, declaratory relief as to counts I and II.
The notion of a broad construction of the Declaratory Judgment Act was aptly stated in X Corp. v. Y Person, 622 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), where the district court reasoned:
The goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act are to relieve litigants of the common law rule that a declaration of rights cannot be adjudicated unless a right has been violated and to render practical help in ending controversies which have not reached the stage where other legal relief is immediately available. To operate within this sphere of anticipatory and preventive justice, the Declaratory Judgment Act should be liberally construed.
Id. at 1100 (citation omitted).
Particularly instructive on the issues of jurisdiction and standing, given the facts in this case, is our previous decision in Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla.1970). In that case, Holley, a circuit court judge, intended to become a candidate for nomination and election to the office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida. Having declared his intention to run, he was faced with the "resign to run" provision of the Florida Statutes. Wishing to not resign from his position as a circuit court judge unless he was successful in his quest to become a justice of this Court, he sought a declaration, pursuant to chapter 86, that the "resign to run" provision was unconstitutional. The trial court exercised its jurisdiction and declared the provision constitutional.
On appeal, the secretary of state maintained that the declaratory judgment...
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