Oliver v. Stufflebeam
Decision Date | 24 December 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 3D12–2159.,3D12–2159. |
Citation | 155 So.3d 395 |
Parties | Sarah OLIVER, Appellant, v. Heather Ann STUFFLEBEAM, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carlton Fields Jorden Burt and Cristina Alonso ; Elizabeth F. Schwartz, for appellant.
Shook Hardy & Bacon and Daniel B. Rogers, for appellee.
Shannon P. Minter of National Center for Lesbian Rights (San Francisco, CA.), pro hac vice for appellant.
Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and WELLS and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
This is an appeal by a same-sex couple from a sua sponte order entered in the court below, dismissing their petition for dissolution of their out-of-state marriage on the authority of section 741.212 of the Florida Statutes which states that same-sex marriages “are not recognized for any purpose in this state.” The couple, who are respectively appellant and appellee in this court, do not challenge the validity of the statute. Rather, they come to us in agreement on a particular interpretation of the statute, and ask us to place our imprimatur on that interpretation. It is quite apparent on the face of the record in this case that there is no controversy over the point on appeal between these parties. For this reason, we affirm the dismissal of this case in that the petition for dissolution of marriage lacks a case or controversy requiring the expenditure of judicial labor.
The facts of this case are undisputed and can be succinctly stated. Sarah Oliver and Heather Stufflebeam, both female, were married under the laws of Iowa on August 17, 2009. Sometime thereafter, they moved to Florida, where on May 29, 2012, Oliver filed an uncontested petition in the family court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, alleging their marriage was irretrievably broken and praying for a decree of dissolution. On July 12, 2012, after a hearing on the petition, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the petition with prejudice on the authority of section 741.212 of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits the recognition of a marriage between persons of the same-sex entered into in any jurisdiction “for any purpose.” Oliver, in an appeal in which her appellee partner joins, challenges that decision.
We begin by stating what this case is not about. This case is not about the constitutionality or merits of same-sex marriage. The parties did not raise the constitutionality of section 741.212 in the trial court or as a point on appeal before us. In fact, they urge us to reverse the decision below in order to avoid constitutional issues.1 The statute the parties wish us to “interpret” reads as follows;
§ 741.212, Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). Oliver and Stufflebeam argue that on plain reading, the statute by its terms applies only to marriages, not divorces. While seductive in its simplicity, their argument lacks support in either law or the rudiments of logic. Simply stated, one cannot dissolve a marriage where there is not a marriage to dissolve.
It has long been the law of this state that the granting of a divorce “concedes that a valid marriage in fact exists.” Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180, 138 So. 775, 777 (1932). Furthermore, the statute pursuant to which divorces are granted in this state requires a finding that a marriage is “irretrievably broken” before a dissolution of that marriage can be granted. § 61.052(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013) ( )(emphasis added); Nelms v. Nelms, 285 So.2d 50, 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) ”)(emphasis added); see also § 61.001, Fla. Stat. (2013) ( )(emphasis added). Where there is no valid marriage there can be no divorce.
Groover v. Groover, 383 So.2d 280, 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) ; see also Hall v. Maal, 32 So.3d 682, 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) () .
It is also true in this state, with just four exceptions, that every case must involve a real controversy as to the issue or issues presented.2 Dep't of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717, 720 (Fla.1994) (citing Interlachen Estates, Inc. v. Brooks, 341 So.2d 993 (Fla.1976) ). Where there is no case or controversy, there is no standing and the case cannot proceed. See Ferreiro v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 928 So.2d 374, 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ().
Florida has evidenced a strong public policy against the recognition of same-sex marriages, including most recently by a super-majority vote of its citizens. See Art. I, § 27, Fla. Const. (eff. January 6, 2009);3 Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re Florida Marriage Protection Amendment, 926 So.2d 1229, 1235 (Fla.2006) ( ). Subject to the enumerations of the Federal Constitution, the states “possess[ ] full power over the subject of marriage and divorce.” U.S. v. Windsor, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2691, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013) ( ); see also Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266, 274–75 (Fla.1973) (). Given Florida's exclusive right, subject only to the confines of our Federal Constitution, to define both marriage and its dissolution within this state and Florida's recognition of marriage as only between a man and a woman, same-sex couples do not have standing to seek in our courts the dissolution of a marriage that by Florida law does not exist. See Bashaway v. Cheney Bros., Inc., 987 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ( ).
Oliver and Stufflebeam reply that our decision traps them into the very marriage Florida seeks to prohibit.4 That is not so. An action for annulment of their marriage may well lie in the trial court. See generally Kuehmsted, 138 So. at 777 ( ); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ( ); Sack v. Sack, 184 So.2d 434, 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) ().
It is true that in granting an annulment, Florida typically determines “the validity of a marriage in accordance with laws of the place where the marriage occurred.” Johnson v. Lincoln Square Props., Inc., 571 So.2d 541, 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ( ). However, “[i]t should be noted that a court need not recognize as valid a marriage which is valid in the jurisdiction where consummated where recognition would...
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...that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized.”8 We note that in Oliver v. Stufflebeam, 155 So.3d 395, 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), the Third District affirmed the dismissal of a petition for dissolution of an out-of-state same-sex marriage. Howev......
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