Oliver v. Teleprompter Corp., 64233
| Citation | 299 N.W.2d 683 |
| Decision Date | 17 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 64233,64233 |
| Parties | 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,502 Wayne OLIVER, Appellant, v. TELEPROMPTER CORPORATION, d/b/a Teleprompter of Dubuque, and Iowa Civil RightsCommission, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Stephen J. Juergens and Douglas M. Henry, of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens & Sudmeier, Dubuque, for appellant.
Leo A. McCarthy and Randal J. Nigg, of Reynolds, Kenline, Breitbach, McCarthy, Clemens, McKay & Naughton, Dubuque, for appellee Teleprompter.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Scott H. Nichols, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Civil Rights Commission.
Considered by LeGRAND, P. J., and UHLENHOPP, McGIVERIN, LARSON, and SCHULTZ, JJ.
In this appeal we must decide whether the General Assembly has prescribed a thirty-day time limit for judicial review of a finding of no probable cause or jurisdiction by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. More specifically, we must construe the last sentence of section 17A.19(3), The Code 1979: "In cases involving a petition for judicial review of agency action other than the decision in a contested case, the petition may be filed at any time petitioner is aggrieved or adversely affected by that action."
A civil rights complaint by Wayne Oliver against Teleprompter of Dubuque was pending before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. Oliver was represented by counsel who had corresponded with the commission. Oliver claimed that because of age and sex discrimination he was demoted in his job and then discharged, and that he should be reinstated in his job with back pay.
On January 30, 1979, the commission found no probable cause and lack of jurisdiction. On the same date, the commission sent its findings to Oliver by certified mail. Oliver's attorney learned of the finding on July 12, 1979.
On August 14, 1979, Oliver's attorney filed a petition in district court for judicial review and on the same date mailed copies of the petition to Teleprompter and the commission.
On September 12, 1979, Teleprompter filed a special appearance in that case on the ground that Oliver had to petition for judicial review within thirty days of the commission's decision on January 30, 1979, and did not do so. The district court sustained the special appearance on the ground that the proceeding before the agency was a request for a declaratory ruling, triggering a thirty-day limitation for judicial review. See § 17A.9, Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA). On Oliver's motion to reconsider, the district court adhered to its sustention on the ground that although a request for a declaratory ruling by the commission was not involved, (1) the proceeding involved a petitioner who was aggrieved or adversely affected by commission action, (2) the grievance of the petitioner occurred when the commission made its findings on January 30, 1979, (3) "it must be necessarily implied that a 30 day limitation runs from that time even within the meaning of the last sentence of Sec. 17A.19.3," and (4) more than thirty days elapsed between the commission's finding and Oliver's petition for judicial review. Oliver appealed to this court.
I. Since the parties apparently agree that Oliver did not seek a declaratory ruling by the commission, we need not consider the section relating to judicial review in those cases.
Several sections of the IAPA and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA) must be considered. The first sentence of section 17A.19(1) of the IAPA authorizes judicial review:
A person or party who has exhausted all adequate administrative remedies and who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any final agency action is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter.
Section 17A.19(3) provides the applicable time periods for judicial review:
If a party does not file an application under section 17A.16, subsection 2, for rehearing, the petition (for judicial review) must be filed within thirty days after the issuance of the agency's final decision in that contested case.... In cases involving a petition for judicial review of agency action other than the decision in a contested case, the petition may be filed at any time petitioner is aggrieved or adversely affected by that action.
Section 17A.16(2) provides for rehearings within an agency; no agency rehearing is involved here and we need not consider those provisions or the time limits in section 17A.19(3) relating to them.
The first sentence of the portion of section 17A.19(3) we have quoted speaks of a "final decision" in a "contested case." We construe the IAPA and the ICRA together to ascertain legislative intent. Wonder Life Co. v. Liddy, 207 N.W.2d 27, 32-33 (Iowa 1973). A finding of no probable cause is a "final decision" by virtue of section 601A.15(3)(c) of the ICRA: "If the hearing officer finds that no probable cause exists, the hearing officer shall issue a final order dismissing the complaint and shall promptly mail a copy to the complainant ...." (Emphasis added.) See also 240 I.A.C. § 1.116(a). But this proceeding does not come within the IAPA definition of a "contested case": "Contested case means a proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price-fixing, and licensing in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by Constitution or statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing." § 17A.2(2). Neither the Constitution nor the statutes require the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing for a probable cause determination. Estabrook v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 283 N.W.2d 306, 308, 311 (Iowa 1979). Hence the first sentence of section 17A.19(3) is inapplicable. The case comes under the second quoted sentence relating to "judicial review of agency action other than the decision in a contested case ...."
II. The problem then is this: under that second sentence, what is the time limit, if any, for filing a petition for judicial review? The sentence states that the petition may be filed "at any time petitioner is aggrieved or adversely affected by that (agency) action." In a no probable cause case like this one, the complainant may thus file "at any time" he is "aggrieved or adversely affected" by the agency action. When was Oliver aggrieved or adversely affected? He asserts that he was...
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...longer period to seek relief when statutory language arguably provides different deadlines for the same act. See Oliver v. Teleprompter Corp., 299 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Iowa 1980) (“We do not try to shorten periods of limitation by construction.”); Sprung v. Rasmussen, 180 N.W.2d 430, 433–34 (Io......
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