Olmstead v. Lamphier
| Decision Date | 23 July 1918 |
| Citation | 104 A. 488,93 Conn. 20 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | OLMSTEAD v. LAMPHIER et al. |
Case Reserved from Superior Court, Litchfield County; Joel H Reed, Judge.
Proceedings by Ralph Olmstead against E. P. Lamphier and others, under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pub. Acts 1913, c. 138) to obtain compensation for personal injury. There was an award by the Compensation Commissioner, and the defendant named appeals. Reserved by the superior court upon an agreed statement of facts for the advice of this court. Judgment advised dismissing appeal.
Harold J. Quinlan, of Hartford, for appellant.
Wilson H. Pierce, of Waterbury, for appellee.
On September 26, 1916, the claimant suffered the injuries described below by being thrown from a horse. His left leg was so lacerated that it had to be amputated above the knee. His shoulder was so injured as to cause a partial incapacity equal to one-half total incapacity from the date of the injury to the time of the hearing, May 9, 1917, and it continued thereafter. The commissioner included in his award compensation at the rate of $7.50 a week for 182 weeks credit to be taken for payments made, including a sum advanced for an artificial leg. Also, $3.75 a week for the partial incapacity resulting from an injury to the shoulder, to continue during such incapacity, not to exceed the time provided by law. Also, $115, being the price of an artificial leg. The respondent appealed from so much of the award as gave compensation for the partial incapacity to the shoulder and that for the price of an artificial leg.
The questions submitted on the reservation were the following: (1) Whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Connecticut imposes a legal duty upon the appellant to purchase for the appellee an artificial leg in accordance with the provisions of section 7B of that act, as amended in 1917, as a part of the surgical service and aid therein provided for. (2) Whether or not, under the provisions of said act, upon the foregoing facts, the appellant, respondent, is legally obliged to pay to appellee, claimant, compensation for partial incapacity arising from the injury to claimant's (appellee's) shoulder, in addition to the specific indemnity for the loss of the appellee's leg.
In Franko v. Schollhorn Co., 104 A. 485, just decided, we construed section 11 of our act as providing one form of compensation during total incapacity and another for the permanent loss of a member of the body. The injury to the shoulder was a distinct injury, resulting in total incapacity; the loss of the leg was also a distinct injury, resulting in partial incapacity. For each injury, under our construction of this section, the injured employé was entitled to compensation. The fact that each injury resulted from one accident did not make of these a single injury. Nor did the act intend that compensation for the loss of a member should be in lieu of all compensation for other injuries resulting from one accident. The superior court in New Haven county, in Foley v. Demarest & Company, pointed out with great force that a contrary construction, carried to its logical conclusion, might limit the compensation in a case of total incapacity to practically nothing. For example: An injury attended with blood poisoning might incapacitate for an entire year, and the injured person would be entitled to compensation for that period, provided no amputation were necessary; but, if such injury was attended with the loss of a small toe of the phalanx of the fourth finger, compensation would be limited to from six to thirteen weeks. Our act does not permit double compensation, and hence the trial court was correct in making these awards consecutive; the award for the total incapacity to precede in payment that for the partial incapacity.
The agreed facts on the reservation fall far short of those found by the commissioner. Who furnished the surgeon, or, if the employer, whether he found the artificial leg " reasonable or necessary," does not appear in the agreed facts. The commissioner found as a fact, upon evidence, that " surgical aid" included an artificial leg. There is no such finding in the agreed facts. We are left with the bald question whether surgical aid or service includes the furnishing of an artificial leg.
There is no specific provision for the furnishing of medicines or any material or apparatus required by the physician. Yet it is clear that all these are included in the term " medical aid or service." It must also be clear that all necessary...
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State v. Mobley, 6-337571
...term "medical treatment" is broad and general and includes treatment pertaining to the science of medicine. Cf. Olmstead v. Lamphier, 93 Conn. 20, 23-24, 104 A. 488 (1918). "Medicine" is "the science and art dealing with the maintenance of health and the prevention, alleviation or cure of d......
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Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co.
...of the Workers' Compensation Act. Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 570, 590 A.2d 914 (1991); Uva v. Alonzy, supra; Olmstead v. Lamphier, 93 Conn. 20, 104 A. 488 (1918). Under the majority's construction of the statute, the plaintiff will receive double compensation for a portion of his di......
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McFarland v. Dept. of Development Svcs., No. 29525.
...Cos., 281 Conn. 656, 660, 916 A.2d 803 (2007); see also Ancona v. Norwalk, 217 Conn. 50, 56, 584 A.2d 454 (1991); Olmstead v. Lamphier, 93 Conn. 20, 23, 104 A. 488 (1918). We therefore reverse the decision of the board affirming the decision of the commissioner as to the amount of the award......
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