Olson v. Warm Prods., Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | A12-2226 |
| Parties | Mark Olson, as trustee for the next-of-kin of Samuel Olson for the estate of Samuel Olson, Appellant, v. Warm Products, Inc., d/b/a Window Quilt Insulated Shade Company, et al., Respondents, Laura Mattson, Respondent, Mark Gilbertson, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
St. Louis County District Court
Max H. Hacker, James S. Ballentine, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
James G. Onder (pro hac vice), Onder, Shelton, O'Leary & Peterson, LLC, St. Louis, Missouri (for appellant)
Daniel A. Haws, Stacy E. Ertz, Murnane Brandt, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents Warm Products, Inc.)
Frank Yetka, Rudy, Gassert, Yetka & Pritchett, P.A., Cloquet, Minnesota (for respondent Laura Mattson)
William L. Davidson, Timothy J. O'Connor, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Mark Gilbertson, et al.)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Stauber, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the district court's summary-judgment dismissal of his wrongful-death claims against respondents, arguing that the court erroneously concluded that his claims are barred by the ten-year statute of repose in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2012).1 Because we conclude that the statute of repose applies to appellant's product-liability claims, we affirm dismissal of those claims against respondent-company and respondent-former-landowner. But, because we conclude that the statute of repose does not bar appellant's premises-liability negligence claim against respondent-subsequent-landowners, we reverse the dismissal of that claim and remand for trial.
Respondent Warm Products Inc., d/b/a Window Quilt Insulated Shade Company and The Warm Company (Warm) is a wholesaler of components necessary to construct its "Warm Window system," including its roman shade, for which it manufactures fabricand purchases for redistribution all other components, including pull cords. Because its consumers are "primarily do-it-yourself home sewers" who buy "most of the product" from retailers, Warm provides instruction manuals on its shade construction.
From August 1986 to September 1998, Laura Mattson (Mattson) and her husband owned a resort. In 1994, Mattson purchased components to construct the Warm roman shade after seeing a "Warm Window display unit." Beginning in January 1995, following Warm's instruction manual, Mattson and her husband installed at least 13 Warm roman shades in their resort cabins. The installation involved wrapping the top of the shade around a wooden board and drilling at least three screws through the board into the wall above a window. In 1998, respondents Mark and Kimberly Gilbertson (Gilbertsons) d/b/a North Shore Cottages (the resort) purchased the resort from Mattson and her husband. Gilbertsons were aware of the roman shades and their cords and occasionally repaired parts of them related to the functioning of the cords.
In July 2009, Jenny Olson, her son Samuel Olson (Sam), and her friend stayed at the resort in a cabin in which a Warm roman shade was installed in the bedroom where Sam slept in a portable crib. Jenny Olson placed the pull cord of the roman shade over the top of the shade to prevent Sam from reaching it. During Sam's morning nap on July 16, Jenny Olson discovered Sam with the roman-shade cord around his neck. He was limp, had poor color, was rushed to a hospital, and died on July 17.
In March-April 2010, Sam's father, appellant Mark Olson, as trustee for the next-of-kin of Sam and for the estate of Sam, sued respondents Warm, Mattson, and Gilbertsons, alleging that the death of 16-month-old Sam on July 17, 2009, following hisstrangulation on July 16, was caused by a defective roman shade that Warm "designed, manufactured and prepared for assembly" and Mattson assembled and installed at the resort owned and operated by Gilbertsons. Olson asserted claims of strict products liability against Warm and Mattson and premises-liability negligence against Gilbertsons. Warm, Mattson, and Gilbertsons cross-claimed for indemnification and contribution. Olson moved to amend his complaint to allege breach of post-sale duty to warn against Warm and requested leave to assert a claim for punitive damages. Warm, Mattson, and Gilbertsons moved for summary judgment. Olson opposed the motion.
After considering the parties' arguments and evidence in the form of affidavits, exhibits, and deposition testimony, the district court granted summary judgment to respondents, dismissing Olson's claims based on the ten-year statute of repose in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a). The court declined to address additional summary-judgment grounds raised by Warm and Gilbertsons, and it did not rule on Olson's motion to amend his complaint.
This appeal follows.2
An appellate court "review[s] de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law." Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, LLC, 829 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. 2013). An appellate court "view[s] the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted." McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2013).
Warm argues that Olson's appendix contains documents inadmissible under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05. We disagree. Rule 56.05 requires that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits . . . be made on personal knowledge, . . . set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence," and "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Rule 56.05 further provides that "[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith." In the district court, Olson submitted all challenged documents, except a legislative report, as attachments to affidavits made by affiants alleging personal knowledge of that evidence. The absence of the legislative report from an affidavit did not render it inadmissible because it is legislative history, not evidence. See Black's Law Dictionary 635 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "evidence" as "[s]omething . . . that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact" (emphasis added)).
Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a), Statute-of-Repose Time Bar
Olson argues that the district court erroneously concluded that his claims were barred by the ten-year statute of repose in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a). An appellate court reviews de novo as a question of law the construction and application of Minn. Stat. § 541.051. Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn. 2010). Section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), sets forth the ten-year repose period that the district court applied to Olson's claims against Warm, Mattson, and Gilbertsons. Section541.051, subdivision 1(e) and (d), provide exceptions to the repose period, and Olson argues that the exceptions apply to Warm and Gilbertsons, even if Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a), is otherwise applicable.
Section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), generally bars accrual of wrongful-death claims against listed persons "more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction" of an "improvement to real property" arising from the improvement's "defective and unsafe condition." The persons listed in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a), include persons "performing or furnishing the . . . materials . . . of construction or construction of the improvement to real property or . . . own[ing] . . . the real property." The parties do not dispute that Sam's death occurred more than ten years after Mattson's 1994-95 purchase and installation of the roman shade at the resort and more than ten years after Gilbertsons' 1998 purchase of the resort from Mattson. And Olson does not dispute that Warm, Mattson, and Gilbertsons are persons specified in the statute. The parties dispute whether the roman shade is an improvement to real property and therefore subject to the ten-year statute of repose. Olson challenges the district court's determination that the roman shade is an improvement to real property and time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a).
We must decide whether Warm, Mattson, and Gilbertsons have satisfied their burden of demonstrating that the roman shade is an improvement to real property. See State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Aquila Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879, 886 (Minn. 2006) (). We conclude that Warm, Mattson, and Gilbertsons have satisfied their burden.
Appellate courts apply a "common-sense interpretation of the phrase 'improvement to real property,'" Siewert v. N. States Power Co., 793 N.W.2d 272, 286 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted), and should not strictly construe Minn. Stat. § 541.051, Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 871 n.3 (Minn. 2006). An "'improvement to real property'" is "a permanent addition to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs." Siewert, 793 N.W.2d at 286-87 (quotations omitted). The definition of "improvement to real property" includes "three main factors": "whether the addition or...
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