Olympia Waterworks v. Board of Equalization of Thurston County

• Decision Date: 13 March 1896
• Parties: OLYMPIA WATERWORKS v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THURSTON COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

44 P. 267

14 Wash. 268

OLYMPIA WATERWORKS v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THURSTON COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 13, 1896

Appeal from superior court, Thurston county; T. M. Reed, Jr., Judge.

The Olympia Waterworks appealed from the order of the board of equalization of Thurston county, and from a judgment for the company, and an order denying its motion to dismiss the appeal, the board of equalization appeals. Reversed.

Milo A. Root, for appellant.

Haight & Owings, for respondent.

HOYT C.J.

Certain property of the Olympia Waterworks was listed for purposes of taxation, and a valuation placed thereon by the assessor. Thereafter the board of equalization of the county, after notice to the water company, increased such valuation. From this decision the water company took an appeal to the superior court of the county.

Thereafter a motion to dismiss this appeal was made, and denied by the court, and the first question here presented is founded upon the denial of this motion to dismiss.

It is claimed, on the part of the county, that the action of the board of equalization in determining the value of property listed for taxation was final, and that from any order made in reference to such valuation no appeal would lie to the superior court. If this claim is well founded, the other questions presented in the briefs are immaterial; for, if no appeal would lie from the order of the board of equalization the superior court obtained no jurisdiction of the proceeding, and any order which it made or attempted to make would be null and void, and should be reversed and set aside. There is no dispute as to the proposition that the listing and valuing of property for the purposes of taxation by the assessor is political and not judicial, but it is claimed by the water company that the equalization of the valuation is in the nature of a judicial proceeding, and within the proper jurisdiction of the courts. There are some cases which so hold, and there are others, from courts of equal repute, which hold directly to the contrary. But, in our opinion, it is not necessary, for the purposes of this case, that we should decide as to the nature of the proceeding before the board of equalization. By an almost, if not quite, uniform course of decision, it has been held that the assessment and valuation of property for the purposes of taxation are entirely statutory, and that the right of the person or corporation whose property has been assessed to secure any review of its valuation was such, and only such as the law provided; that it was within the power of the legislature to provide what officer or board should be the final judge of the valuation to be placed upon the property listed for taxation. See People v. Lots in Ashley 122 Ill. 297, 13 N.E. 556; Attorney General v. Sanilac Sup'rs, 42 Mich. 72, 3 N.W. 260; McDonald v. City of Escanaba, 62 Mich. 555, 29 N.W. 93; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575. Hence an appeal would not lie from the decision of the board of equalization unless the right to such appeal had been conferred by statute.

It is not claimed, on the part of the water company, that there was any provision which authorized an appeal from the board of equalization as such, but it founds its claim upon a provision which authorized an appeal from all orders made by the board of county commissioners; its contention being that the board of equalization and the board of county commissioners were identical, and that, for that reason, the provision in the act providing for the general powers and duties of the board of county commissioners, which allowed an appeal from any order or decision made by it, applied to decisions made by the board of equalization. The contention on the part of the county is that the board of equalization and the board of county commissioners were two different and distinct bodies. This latter contention receives support from the language of the revenue act, which created the board of equalization and defined its duties. If it had been the intention of the legislature to have made it the duty of the board of county commissioners, as such, to equalize the assessment roll of the county, a single provision to that effect would have been all that would have been required. But the act contained more than such single provision. It contained provisions sufficient to create a separate board, the members of which should be the several county commissioners of the county, and to provide a clerk of such board, who should be the county auditor. Such provisions would have been entirely unnecessary if it had been the intention to cast upon the board of county commissioners the duty of equalizing the assessment roll, instead of providing a board of equalization to discharge that duty. The board of county commissioners was fully constituted at the time of the passage of the revenue act, and the fact that language was used sufficient to create a new board, and provide it with a clerk, tends strongly to show that such new board was to be created.

But the conclusion to which we have come as to the provision for an appeal from the decisions of the board of county commissioners makes it unnecessary for us to decide whether it was the board of county commissioners, or another board called the "board of...