Onyx Enters. Int'l Corp. v. Sloan Int'l Holdings Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-cv-2992-DDD-KLM |
| Parties | ONYX ENTERPRISES INT'L CORP., Plaintiff, v. SLOAN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CORP., JONATHAN SLOAN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and/or Motion to Transfer Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 [#7]1 (the "Motion to Dismiss"). Plaintiff filed a Response [#12] in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [#7], and Defendant Jonathan Sloan ("Sloan"), who proceeds as a pro se litigant,2 filed a Reply [#16] on behalf of himself only.
This matter is also before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants['] Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion to Transfer as to Sloan International HoldingsCorp. [#11]. Plaintiff filed the Motion to Strike [#11] asking the Court to enter an order striking Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [#7] to the extent it was asserted by Sloan International Holdings Corporation ("Sloan Corp."). No Response was filed.
Finally, this matter is also before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against Defendant Sloan Corp. [#36] (the "Motion for Default Judgment"). Defendant Sloan Corp. did not file a Response, but Plaintiff nevertheless filed a Reply [#45] in support of its Motion for Default Judgment [#36].
The Motions [#7, #11, #36] have been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1. See [#23, #39]. The Court has reviewed the Motions, the Response, the Replies, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss [#7] be GRANTED, that the Motion to Strike [#11] be GRANTED, and that the Motion for Default Judgment [#36] be DENIED.
Plaintiff is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Compl. [#1] ¶ 4. The company distributes and sells products through its e-commerce platforms. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff owns and operates the online e-commerce platform www.CARiD.com, where it distributes and sells automotive parts andaccessories. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff has been distributing and selling automotive parts and accessories under the CARiD brand since 2009 and is one of the largest online retailers in the nation. Id. Plaintiff also distributes and sells automotive parts and accessories through other brands including BOATiD, CAMPERiD, MOTORCYCLEiD, POWERSPORTSiD, RACINGiD, RECREATIONiD, STREETiD, TOOLSiD, and TRUCKiD. Id. ¶ 16.
Defendant Sloan Corp. is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located in Florida. Id. ¶ 5. Defendant Sloan Corp. operates and controls the website www.RIMSiD.com. Id. ¶ 6. Defendant Sloan is an individual who resides in Florida and is the owner of both Defendant Sloan Corp. and the website www.RIMSiD.com. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. On March 30, 2012, Defendant Sloan registered the domain name www.RIMSiD.com and began selling aftermarket automotive parts and accessories. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. On September 23, 2018, Defendant Sloan incorporated Defendant Sloan Corp., and Defendant Sloan Corp. assumed control and operation of www.RIMSiD.com. Id. ¶¶ 39-40.
On October 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Complaint [#1] against Defendants. Plaintiff asserts seven claims, seeking damages and injunctive relief. Id. Plaintiff claims the following alleged violations of the Lanham Act: (1) trademark counterfeiting and trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) unfair competition and false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (3) dilution, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); and (4) cybersquatting, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Id. ¶¶ 77-121. In addition, Plaintiff claims (5) trademark infringement and (6) unfair competition in violation of Colorado common law. Id. ¶¶ 122-130. Finally, Plaintiff claims (7) deceptive trade practices in violation of the Colorado ConsumerProtection Act. Id. ¶¶ 139-149. Defendants seek dismissal of all claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Motion to Dismiss [#7]. Plaintiff seeks an order striking Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [#7] as to Defendant Sloan Corp., see Motion to Strike [#11], and also seeks default judgment and a permanent injunction against Defendant Sloan Corp., see Motion for Default Judgment [#36].
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) is to determine whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over the named parties. "The district court is given discretion in determining the procedure to employ in considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction." Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Oaklawn Apartments, 959 F.2d 170, 174 (10th Cir. 1992). After the defendants file a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the United States, 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984). The Court will accept the well-pled allegations of the operative pleadings as true to determine whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008). The Court "may also consider affidavits and other written materials submitted by the parties." Impact Prods., Inc. v. Impact Prods., LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1189 (D. Colo. 2004). Conflicting facts "must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and the plaintiff's prima facie showing is sufficient notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving party." Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the Motion to Strike [#11], Plaintiff asks the Court to strike Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [#7] as to Defendant Sloan Corp., because Defendant Sloan, an individual, filed the Motion to Dismiss [#7] on behalf of both himself and Defendant Sloan Corp.
Defendant Sloan proceeds in this matter pro se and the court must liberally construe pro se filings. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules that govern other litigants. Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994). It is a "long-standing rule that a corporation must be represented by an attorney to appear in federal court." Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations and footnote omitted). "[A] corporation or other business entity can only appear in court through an attorney and not through a non-attorney corporate officer appearing pro se." Harrison v. Wahatoyas, L.L.C., 253 F.3d 552, 556 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Thus, Defendant Sloan has no authority to appear before the Court on Defendant Sloan Corp.'s behalf. Therefore, the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss [#7] should be stricken as to Defendant Sloan Corp.
Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Motion to Strike [#11] be granted, and that the Motion to Dismiss [#7] be further adjudicated only as to Defendant Sloan.
Plaintiff requests jurisdictional discovery "[t]o the extent the Court will find it helpful," so that an evidentiary hearing may be held on issues of fact pertaining to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [#7]. Response [#12] at 11. "When a defendant movesto dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, either party should be allowed discovery on the factual issues raised by that motion." Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 1975). However, "[t]o obtain jurisdictional discovery, a plaintiff must present a sufficient factual predicate for the establishment of personal jurisdiction." Water Pik, Inc. v. H2OFloss, No. 17-cv-02082-CMA-MJW, 2018 WL 1706276, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 9, 2018) (quotation omitted). In other words, Plaintiff must provide the Court with an indication of the type of information and discovery it thinks it may need to combat the dismissal. Smith v. United States, No. 13-cv-01156-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 6515677, at *3 (D. Colo. July 10, 2014).
Here, Plaintiff does not request any specific discovery it needs to determine the merits of the personal jurisdictional issues. See id.; Response [#12] at 11. Plaintiff does not identify unknown facts that would support its assertion that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Sloan. See Smith, 2014 WL 6515677, at *3; Response [#12] at 11. Rather, Plaintiff simply requests jurisdictional discovery with an evidentiary hearing without making any indication as to the type of information or discovery it needs to combat the dismissal. Smith, 2014 WL 6515677, at *3.; Response [#12] at 11.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery is denied.4
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State's authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts." Walden v. Fiore,571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)). "In determining whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court must determine (1) whether the applicable statute potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process on the defendant and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process." Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)). Colorado's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitution. Goodwin v. Bruggeman Hatch, No. 16-cv-00751-CMA-KLM, 2018 WL 2196057, at *3 (D. Colo. May 14, 2018). Under the due process clause, the party must have sufficient ...
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