Ordahl v. Forward Technology Industries, Inc., No. CIV.02-1014 JRT/FLN.

• Decision Date: 04 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.02-1014 JRT/FLN.
• Parties: Dennis ORDAHL, Plaintiff, v. FORWARD TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

301 F.Supp.2d 1022

Dennis ORDAHL, Plaintiff, v. FORWARD TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.02-1014 JRT/FLN.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

February 4, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

M. William O'Brien and Justin D. Cummins, Miller O'Brien, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.

David P. Pearson and Anton J. Moch, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TUNHEIM, District Judge.

Plaintiff Dennis Ordahl ("Ordahl") was employed by defendant Forward Technology Industries, Inc. ("FTI") as a machinist until his employment was terminated in August 2000. Ordahl claims that he was unlawfully terminated by FTI in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA") and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). FTI asserts that Ordahl is not disabled and was never regarded or treated as disabled as that term is defined in the ADA. FTI further argues that Ordahl's employment was terminated for legitimate reasons and that even if Ordahl had remained employed at FTI, his employment would necessarily have been terminated on May 31, 2000 when the Plymouth facility where Ordahl worked was closed. They therefore request that any potential damages be limited accordingly.

I. BACKGROUND

At age 15 Ordahl suffered an accident that severed his vena cava vein and resulted in the amputation of his left hand and part of his arm. As a result of these injuries, Ordahl uses a prosthetic hand and suffers from a circulatory condition known as venous stasis disease.¹ Both conditions are permanent. According to Ordahl, his amputation affects his ability to bathe, dress, eat, grasp, and perform actions requiring manual dexterity, participate in recreational activities such as sports, and engage in physical touching and sexual activity. Ordahl's circulatory condition affects his ability to walk, stand, sit, and participate in recreational activities.

Ordahl was first employed by FTI in 1979 as a machinist, at which time Ordahl informed FTI of his impairments. According to Ordahl, during his tenure at FTI he worked on a variety of machines performing all of the main machining functions, and at the time of his dismissal was capable of operating any machine in the workshop. In 1998, FTI began purchasing new, more sophisticated machines that required less manual operation and more computer programming skill. According to Ordahl, he repeatedly requested computer training on the new machines, particularly the "Tacumi," but was turned down by management. According to Ordahl and a former FTI manager, the management did not think that Ordahl was a good candidate to operate the new machines because he did not have two hands. Eventually, shortly before he was terminated, management offered Ordahl part time computer related training.²

In 2000, FTI was sold to new owners who instituted a number of cost-cutting measures including extensive layoffs, closure of the Plymouth facility that Ordahl worked at, and outsourcing of various kinds of work. According to FTI, Ordahl's department, the machining department, had three product lines. With the close of the Plymouth facility, two of the product lines, cleaning and ultrasonic, were either outsourced or eliminated, and the relevant employees terminated. The remaining line, plastic welding, moved to a new facility in Cokato.

FTI terminated Ordahl's employment on August 8, 2000, allegedly for violating a company policy against working on personal projects at work while still on the clock. Ordahl denies having violated the policy, and asserts that his termination was improperly motivated by his disability.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir.1980). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir.2002).

B. ADA

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against any "qualified individual with a disability" because of that disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges discriminatory disparate treatment,³ the Court applies the familiar burden-shifting framework first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711-12 (8th Cir.2003). Under this framework, the plaintiff initially bears the burden of establishing each element of the prima facie case. Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir.1999) (en banc). The second step of the analysis requires the employer to "rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Id. at 1135. The third step traditionally "shifts [the burden] back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's non-discriminatory reason is pretextual." Id.

In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Supreme Court analyzed 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and concluded that a Title VII plaintiff need not present direct evidence of discrimination in order to either obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction or to establish liability in a mixed motive case. 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 2154-55, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). As this Court noted in Brown v. Westaff (USA), Inc., 2004 WL 67654 (D.Minn.2004), courts have attempted to discern the potential broader impact of Desert Palace, and have come to multiple conclusions. Some courts have persuasively reasoned that Desert Palace requires that the McDonnell Douglas framework be dropped in favor of the more straightforward process laid out in § 2000e-2(m). See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F.Supp.2d 987, 990-93 (D.Minn.2003). Noting that multiple federal anti-discrimination laws are patterned after Title VII and are evaluated similarly, this reasoning has been extended to other contexts, including the ADA. LeClair v. Wells Fargo Bank Iowa, N.A., 291 F.Supp.2d 873, 879-80 (S.D.Iowa 2003) (following Skomsky v. Speedway SuperAmerica, L.L.C., 267 F.Supp.2d 995, 998-1000 (D.Minn.2003)).

Other courts have determined that Desert Palace requires that McDonnell Douglas be modified, but not abandoned completely. See Brown v. Westaff, 2004 WL 67654, at *4-5; Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1195-97 (N.D.Iowa 2003); see also Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F.Supp.2d 854, 864-67 (M.D.N.C.2003) (following Dunbar in ADA context).

The Eighth Circuit has declined to reach the issue of whether Desert Palace alters the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis and continues to apply McDonnell Douglas. See Allen v. City of Pocahontas, 340 F.3d 551, 558 n. 5 (8th Cir.2003) ("Without reaching the issue as to whether the Supreme Court's refocus on the statutory language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 alters the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas, the result in this case remains the same."); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003) (noting that McDonnell Douglas is properly applied to disparate treatment cases under the ADA); Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 2004 WL 35070 (8th Cir.2004) (same).

As explained more fully in Brown v. Westaff, this Court believes that Desert Palace necessitates modifying the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework "so that it is framed in terms of whether the plaintiff can meet his or her ultimate burden to prove intentional discrimination, rather than in terms of whether the plaintiff can prove pretext." 2004 WL 67654, * 4-5 (quoting Dunbar, 285 F.Supp.2d at 1197). In other words, in order to survive summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff is no longer limited to demonstrating pretext, i.e. that the defendant's asserted reason was false. Rather, at step three, a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence, of any type, for a jury to conclude that the plaintiff's disability was a "motivating factor" for the employment action, even though the defendant's legitimate reason may also be true or have played some role.

1. Ordahl's prima facie case

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) that he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his...