Skomsky v. Speedway Superamerica, L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 13 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 02-1297(PAM/RLE).,CIV. 02-1297(PAM/RLE).
• Citation: 267 F.Supp.2d 995
• Parties: Martin SKOMSKY, Plaintiff, v. SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA, L.L.C., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

267 F.Supp.2d 995

Martin SKOMSKY, Plaintiff, v. SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA, L.L.C., Defendant.

No. CIV. 02-1297(PAM/RLE).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

June 13, 2003.

Marcy S. Wallace, Cox, Goudy, McNulty & Wallace, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff.

Marko J. Mrkonich, Stephanie D. Sarantopoulos, Littler Mendelson, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MAGNUSON, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims. For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies the Motion in part.

BACKGROUND

On February 5, 1997, Douglas Muchow, a management employee of Defendant Speedway SuperAmerica Inc. ("SA"), hired Plaintiff Martin Skomsky as a delivery truck driver for SA's convenience store locations. On November 28, 2000, Skomsky suffered a stroke and was diagnosed with vertigo and high blood pressure as a result. Skomsky took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-19, 2631-34, 2651-54, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-87, from December 21, 2000 through March 15, 2001. Skomsky then requested and received personal leave up to and including June 10, 2001. During his leave, Skomsky kept SA informed of his treatment and prognoses.

On May 15, 2001, Skomsky's doctor, David Smith, completed a medical release form indicating that Skomsky was able to perform all of the duties of his previous job. Dr. Smith also indicated the following: "Martin can return to work, he is able to perform all job duties only limits are driving, car or van `no limits,' trucks Martin will have to feel his way as he tries this." (Sarantopoulos Aff. Ex. A-15.) Although somewhat unclear, the Court interprets this statement to mean that Skomsky was cleared to drive cars and vans. With regard to driving trucks, Dr. Smith concluded that Skomsky may or may not have to gradually take on full-time truckdriving duties through trial and error.

When Skomsky discussed the release form and his possible return to work with his supervisors, he expressed reservations about his abilities to drive the delivery truck alone on his first day back. In accordance with Dr. Smith's recommendation, Skomsky suggested that another SA employee accompany him on his first day back, just in case he was unable to complete any tasks. SA had allowed such "ride alongs" in the past to employees returning from lengthy disability leaves. Muchow relayed Skomsky's self-doubt and ride-along request to the human resources department. Muchow informed Skomsky that he was forwarding his request to human resources. Less than two weeks later, Marilyn Krenik, one of Skomsky's administrative supervisors, left a message on Skomsky's answering machine notifying him that SA had terminated his employment. Skomsky's request for a ride along had been denied, and SA did not allow Skomsky to attempt to return to work alone.

Shortly before Skomsky's termination, Muchow had encouraged him to apply for a job at the company's commissary warehouse. The position would not require driving a truck. Skomsky applied for the position on May 15, 2001, but SA had filled the position a week earlier.

Skomsky originally brought the current action alleging both disability and age discrimination. In addition, Skomsky pled a claim based on both actual disability and "regarded as" disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). SA has filed a summary judgment on all three distinct claims. At oral argument, Skomsky informed the Court that he had voluntarily dismissed the age discrimination and the actual disability claim. Therefore, only the "regarded as" disability claim remains. SA's Motion for summary judgment on this claim is based solely on a challenge to Skomsky's prima facie case of "regarded as" disabled. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Defendant moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), which provides that such a motion shall be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir.1996). The burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact rests on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995).

B. Recent Supreme Court Decision

Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, — U.S. —, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003), all of Gonzalez's claims for discrimination and retaliation would have been analyzed under the traditional burden-shifting paradigm articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this approach, once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant has the burden to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision. At that point, the burden would shift back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered legitimate reason for the employment action was a pretext for an illegitimate, discriminatory motive. The alternatives to the McDonnell Douglas pretext scheme are those articulated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 269-70, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

In Price Waterhouse, the four-justice plurality determined that mixed-motive eases required a different test than singlemotive cases. Id. at 240 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1775. Instead of requiring the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action and requiring the plaintiff to prove that the proffered reason is a pretext for discriminatory motive, the defendant would have to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiffs membership in a protected class. Id. at 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775. This test has come to be known as "the same decision test." In her concurring opinion, now considered the controlling opinion, Justice O'Connor narrowed the reach of the four-justice plurality by concluding that the defendant should bear the burden of proof in mixed-motive cases only where the plaintiff has first presented direct evidence that the employer's "decisional process has been substantially infected by discrimination." Id. at 269-70, 109 S.Ct. 1775.

Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit instructed lower courts i;o analyze cases under either the McDonnell Douglas or the Price Waterhouse paradigm depending entirely on whether the pJaintiff had presented direct or indirect evidence of discrimination:

The framework for evaluating a Title VII discrimination claim depends on the type of evidence presented in support of the claim. Where the plaintiff relies primarily on circumstantial evidence, courts apply a tripartite analysis as set forth in [McDonnell Douglas ]....

In some situations, however, a plaintiff can produce direct evidence that an illegal criterion was a motivating factor in the disputed employment decision.... In those cases, the plaintiff is relieved of the ultimate burden of persuasion and the so-called "mixed motive" analysis is applied.

Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc. 306 F.3d 636, 639-40 (8th Cir.2002) (citing Price Waterhouse, (generally) and Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 847-49 (8th Cir.2002)). Only rarely did plaintiffs present direct evidence of a discriminatory motive. Thus, application of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was much more common than the alternative burden-shifting scheme set forth in Price Waterhouse and revised by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Price Waterhouse, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 states that a plaintiff satisfies its burden of proof when he "demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In response, a defendant may avoid having to pay damages by proving an affirmative defense that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Thus, instead of requiring the defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and then shifting the burden of proof to plaintiff to prove that this proffered nondiscriminatory reason was false and a pretext for a discriminatory motive, the defendant bears the burden of proof on the "same decision test."

In Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir.2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099, 123 S.Ct. 816, 154 L.Ed.2d 766 (2003), the Ninth Circuit examined how the Civil Rights Act of 1991 affected the direct/indirect evidence distinction made by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence to Price Waterhouse. The Ninth Circuit questioned the validity of this distinction, noting that Congress intended to overrule the plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991:

The legislative history evinces a clear intent to overrule Price Waterhouse. In a subsection titled "The Need to Overturn Price Waterhouse," the report accompanying the 1991 Civil Rights Act reflects congressional concern that the "inevitable effect of the Price Waterhouse decision [was] to permit prohibited employment discrimination to escape sanction under Title VII."

Costa, 299 F.3d...