Ordell v. Gaddis

• Decision Date: 28 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 48646-8,48646-8
• Citation: 662 P.2d 49,99 Wn.2d 409
• Parties: David J. ORDELL, William T. Lawrie, and Gary L. Brown, Appellants, v. The Honorable Stephen M. GADDIS, the Honorable Donald Niles, the Honorable F.A. Walterskirchen, the Honorable Charles Denny, and the Honorable James Mifflin, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 409

99 Wn.2d 409

662 P.2d 49

David J. ORDELL, William T. Lawrie, and Gary L. Brown, Appellants, v. The Honorable Stephen M. GADDIS, the Honorable Donald Niles the Honorable F.A. Walterskirchen, the Honorable Charles Denny, and the Honorable James Mifflin, Respondents.

No. 48646-8.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

April 28, 1983.

Ordell, Lawrie & Brown David Ordell, William T. Lawrie, G.L. Brown, Seattle, for appellants.

Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Seattle, Frederick A. Kaseburg, Deputy Pros. Atty., for respondents.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

This case concerns court commissioners and raises three main issues. First, can the superior court appoint commissioners pro tem. to sit in place of temporarily absent court commissioners who have been appointed pursuant to Const. art. 4, § 23 and RCW 2.24.010? Second, does Const. art. 4, § 23 limit each county to three court commissioners? Third, is a family law commissioner, appointed under RCW 26.12, a "commissioner" within the numerical limitation set by Const. art. 4, § 23?

The trial court held that the superior court had no authority to appoint pro tem. commissioners. Respondents cross-appeal that holding. The trial court also held that the family law commissioner did not violate the constitutional numerical limit of three commissioners per county. Appellants appeal that holding. We hold that pro tem. commissioners may be appointed and that a family law commissioner is not within the constitutional limitation.

The prosecutor, arguing on behalf of respondents, challenges the procedure employed by appellants and their standing. Appellants are attorneys whose practice is mainly in domestic relations matters. They sought a writ of prohibition against all functions performed by pro tem. commissioners and by the family law commissioner.

The prosecutor contends that only a quo warranto suit can challenge title to a public office, Manlove v. Johnson, 198 Wash. 280, 88 P.2d 397 (1939), and that only the prosecutor can initiate such challenge, Mills v. State ex rel Smith, 2 Wash. 566, 27 P. 560 (1891). Appellants do not challenge the personal qualifications of the involved commissioners. Instead they challenge the very legality, existence and jurisdiction of the offices themselves. This brings this action within the rule enunciated in Barnes v. Thomas, 96 Wash.2d 316, 318, 635 P.2d 135 (1981), and a writ of prohibition was the proper procedural mechanism.

Appellants have adequate standing to maintain this action. As attorneys they are officers of the court, their practice is largely before the officers whom they challenge, they have raised issues of serious public importance affecting substantial segments of the population. Before bringing this action they requested the prosecutor to initiate suit which invitation he declined. Thus, appellants are within the standing rule set forth in Washington Natural Gas Co. v. PUD 1, 77 Wash.2d 94, 96, 459 P.2d 633 (1969).

Turning to the merits, we first address the power of the superior court to appoint pro tem. commissioners to serve in the place of temporarily absent regularly appointed commissioners. We hold that the court has inherent power to appoint pro tem. commissioners to serve in the temporary absence of regularly appointed commissioners. We emphasize that this ruling deals only with the temporary appointment of pro tem. commissioners to sit in place of regularly appointed commissioners. The power of appointment stems from the inherent right of the court to provide for the efficient administration of justice. In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash.2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). Since there is no prohibition against such pro tem. commissioners, we believe it to be within the power of the superior court to continue an efficient program of assistance to the judges to allow the commissioner function to proceed in an orderly fashion when a regularly appointed commissioner is temporarily unavailable.

The next issue is whether Const. art. 4, § 23 limits the superior court judges to appointing three court commissioners per county. That section provides:

There may be appointed in each county, by the judge of the superior court having jurisdiction therein, one or more court commissioners, not exceeding three in number, who shall have authority to perform like duties as a judge of the superior court at chambers, subject to revision by such judge, to take depositions and to perform such other business connected with the administration of justice as may be prescribed by law.

Const. art. 4, § 23. An early decision of this court indicates that appointment of court commissioners was tied to counties, rather than to multi-county judicial districts. Howard v. Hanson, 49 Wash. 314, 95 P. 265 (1908). The court struck down a statute which provided that commissioners could only be appointed in counties that did not have a sitting judge....