Orr v. Sonnenburg

• Decision Date: 07 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 37A03-8801-CV-4,37A03-8801-CV-4
• Citation: 542 N.E.2d 201
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 665 Robert D. ORR, Governor of the State of Indiana; Dennis R. Jones, Mental Health Commissioner; et al., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Leo J. SONNENBURG, Gerald Harnett, and Dennis Sheffield, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated plaintiffs, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below).

Page 201

542 N.E.2d 201

29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 665

Robert D. ORR, Governor of the State of Indiana; Dennis R Jones, Mental Health Commissioner; et al Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Leo J. SONNENBURG, Gerald Harnett, and Dennis Sheffield, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated plaintiffs, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below).

No. 37A03-8801-CV-4.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Third District.

Aug. 7, 1989.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Robert S. Spear, Chief Counsel, David Michael Wallman, Section Chief, Federal Litigation, Indianapolis, for appellants.

Terrance L. Smith, Anthony De Bonis, Jr., Smith & De Bonis, East Chicago, for appellees.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Defendants-appellants Robert D. Orr, Governor of the State of Indiana; Dennis R. Jones, Mental Health Commissioner; et al. (hereinafter referred to as "State") appeal from a judgment in the sum of $27,954,852.68 entered on behalf of a class of 7,419 former patients of Indiana state mental institutions (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiffs").

The facts relevant to this appeal disclose that the State had a long-standing practice of requiring patients committed to state mental institutions to perform manual labor, without compensation, for the institutions in which those patients were confined. The state institutions that carried out this manual labor policy were Muscatatuck State Hospital, Fort Wayne State Hospital and Training Facility, Central State Hospital, Richmond State Hospital, Norman Beatty Memorial Hospital, New Castle State Hospital, Logansport State Hospital, Larue D. Carter Memorial State Hospital, Evansville State Hospital and Madison State Hospital.

On May 23, 1974, Leo Sonnenburg and Gerald Harnett filed suit to secure compensation for labor performed while they were patients in institutions for the mentally handicapped operated by the State. In addition to their individual claims, Sonnenburg and Harnett sought certification for a class action on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. The lower court certified the class of plaintiffs as follows:

" 'All patient workers who have labored in the State of Indiana Institutions for the Mentally Handicapped or Mentally Retarded from May 23, 1970 to December 31, 1974.' "

The case was tried to a special judge from April 20, 1987 through April 22, 1987, and from August 10, 1987 through August 12, 1987. A final judgment, in the form of a general judgment without findings of fact or conclusions of law, was entered on November 17, 1987. The special judge ruled (1) that the Plaintiffs had performed 8,735,891 hours of uncompensated work for the State during the class period; (2) that each member of the plaintiff class was entitled to compensation for his or her labor at $1.60 per hour for the hours worked in the state mental institutions, with an additional $1.60 per hour as prejudgment interest; (3) that the monetary award to the Plaintiffs totalled $27,954,852.68; and (4) that costs and attorney fees could be deducted from the fund established for the benefit of the plaintiff class.

The State challenges the judgment against it as contrary to law, arguing that no legal theory supports an award of compensation to the Plaintiffs for work they performed while committed to state mental institutions. The Plaintiffs respond that the trial court's judgment may be supported by any one of six different theories of recovery: (1) the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.; (2) the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; (3) the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) Article I, Sec. 21 of the Indiana Constitution; (5) Indiana's Patient Remuneration Law, IND.CODE Sec. 16-13-12.8-1 et seq. (repealed in 1985 and replaced by IND.CODE Sec. 16-13-23-1 et seq. (1988 Ed.)); and (6) unjust enrichment. This Court will affirm the trial court's judgment if it is sustainable on any theory or basis found in the record. Havert v. Caldwell (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 154, 157.

One of the theories of recovery upon which the Plaintiffs relied, and upon which the trial court's judgment may be sustained, is Article I, Sec. 21 of the Indiana Constitution. That provision states in pertinent part, "No person's particular services shall be demanded without just compensation." The "particular services" language of Article I, Sec. 21 has rarely been addressed by Indiana courts. When the provision is considered, however, a distinction is drawn between particular services and general services.

General services are those services which an individual owes to the government and for which the individual can demand no compensation. Twomley, The Indiana Bill of Rights, 20 Ind.L.J. 211, 248 (1945). General services include service on grand and petit juries, service in the militia, service on the sheriff's posse comitatus and service as a witness in a criminal trial when one has knowledge of facts material to the vindication of the rights of others. See Washington Nat. Bank v. Daily (1906), 166 Ind. 631, 642, 77 N.E. 53, 56-57.

In contrast, particular services are those services which are not required from every citizen for the general good of the State.

See Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick (1940), 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405;

Webb v. Baird (1854), 6 Ind. 13.

As a delegate to the Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1850 expressed:

"I take it that the word particular ... means, not that general service which every citizen is bound to render, but something specific--something that is required of him as an individual, in counter-distinction to what is required, generally, of all citizens."

Debates of Indiana Convention of 1850, Volume 1, p. 359.

The Plaintiffs in the instant case were required to provide a range of services during their commitment to state mental institutions. Job categories included grounds helper, clothing room helper, canteen helper, store room helper, clerical assistant, technical helper, barber-beautician, housekeeper and laundry assistant. The Plaintiffs' jobs were in addition to the normal personal housekeeping and policing duties assigned to each patient. Such services must be characterized as particular services, as opposed to general services required of the citizenry at large.

The State does not maintain that the Plaintiffs' labors constituted general services for which they may not demand compensation. Instead, the State urges this Court to find that the Plaintiffs waived their claim of a constitutional violation, because the theory was not raised by the pleadings. This Court's review of the record discloses that the Plaintiffs, during their opening statement, read Article I, Sec. 21 of the Indiana Constitution to the court, and they indicated that the focus of their case would be the violation of constitutional rights. Thus the claim was raised prior to the introduction of evidence, was at all times before the trial court, and was an issue tried by the implied consent of the parties.

Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 15(B);

see also State Exchange Bank of Culver v. Teague (1986), Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 262.

As an alternative contention, the State suggests that the use of patient labor without compensation may not be considered a violation of Indiana's constitution, because the practice has existed for approximately 80 years. The State directs this Court's attention to the statutes establishing state mental institutions.

E.g., IND.CODE Sec. 16-14-21-1 et seq. (repealed 1978) (establishing New Castle State Hospital);

IND.CODE Sec. 16-15-4-1 et seq. (repealed 1978) (establishing Muscatatuck Center).

Statutory references to state farms, industrial education, training and employment of institutionalized persons are construed by the State as a legislative endorsement of the prevalent practice of using patient labor without compensation. This Court is not persuaded that the long history of using uncompensated patient labor cloaks the practice with constitutionality. As the United States Supreme Court has observed:

"Historical acceptance without more would not alone have sufficed, as 'no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use.' " (Citations omitted.)

Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (1973), 413 U.S. 756, 792, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2975, 37 L.Ed.2d 948.

The State next asserts that reliance upon an uncompensated patient work force is nothing more than an exchange of labor for public relief. Within the context of poor relief assistance, there is a mandatory employment requirement. IND.CODE Sec. 12-2-1-10(a) (1988 Ed.). The reasons for imposing a mandatory employment requirement are two-fold. First, the applicant is given a sense that he or she is earning, at least in part, the relief which is obtained. In re Moore (1933), 97 Ind.App. 492, 493-494, 187 N.E. 219, 220. Secondly, the requirement operates as a reinforcement of the work ethic. Neither of these underlying policies applies to the circumstances surrounding an individual's commitment to a state mental institution. The State's attempt to draw an analogy between poor relief and the relief to be found in a state mental institution must be denied.

A final challenge to the Plaintiffs' recovery on constitutional grounds concerns the sufficiency of the evidence. According to the State, testimony from the Plaintiffs' witnesses was limited, fragmentary and confused. The State also suggests that the number of witnesses was inadequate, because only five of the ten mental institutions operated by the State were represented.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil case, the court on appeal must decide whether there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting the trial court's judgment. The reviewing court will neither weigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses, but it will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from...