Orris v. Claudio

• Decision Date: 16 July 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-1070,79-1070
• Citation: 63 Ohio St.2d 140,406 N.E.2d 1381
• Parties: , 17 O.O.3d 85 ORRIS et al., Appellants, v. CLAUDIO et al.; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 140

63 Ohio St.2d 140

406 N.E.2d 1381, 17 O.O.3d 85

ORRIS et al., Appellants, v. CLAUDIO et al.; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Appellee.

No. 79-1070.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 16, 1980.

Syllabus by the Court

Where a policy of insurance contains reasonably specific language excluding other motor vehicles owned by the named insured from the uninsured motorist provision of the policy, such exclusion is valid, and not contrary to the public policy contained in R.C. 3937.18.

Plaintiff-appellant, William A. Orris, Jr., while riding his motorcycle in Sandusky, was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by one Amelia Claudio. Plaintiff allegedly sustained certain injuries as a result of such collision. At the time of the collision, plaintiff had an automobile liability insurance policy with defendant-appellee, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, which included uninsured motorist coverage.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County against Amelia Claudio and Aetna, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages. In such complaint, plaintiff alleged that Aetna had denied coverage to the plaintiff under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy.

The answer of Aetna set forth that the policy of insurance issued to plaintiff insured a 1971 Dodge automobile and did not include as an insured automobile the motorcycle being operated by plaintiff at the time of the accident.

The insurance policy issued by Aetna to the plaintiff contained the following language:

"Exclusions

"This policy does not apply:

" * * *

"Under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage,

" * * *

"(q) to bodily injury to an Insured while occupying a highway vehicle (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named Insured * * *."

Aetna filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court overruled Aetna's motion and granted summary judgment for plaintiff, finding, in pertinent part, that at the time of the collision Claudio was an uninsured motorist, and that:

"Reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion which is adverse to the defendant Aetna is that the uninsured motorist coverage provision of the policy in question applies to the plaintiffs for injuries sustained in the alleged collision."

The court found that there were issues of fact as to all other allegations in the complaint and determined that there was no just reason for delay.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court reversed the judgment of the trial court in a split decision and entered judgment for Aetna. The Court of Appeals held that the exclusion found in this policy was not repugnant to R. C. 3937.18, the uninsured motorist statute, nor contrary to the public policy of this state, and held that such an exclusion was a reasonable limitation on the obligation of insurance companies to provide uninsured motorist coverage.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Murray & Murray Co., L. P. A., Michael T. Murray and Kirk J. Delli Bovi, Sandusky, for appellants.

Flynn, Py & Kruse Co., L. P. A., and Raymond N. Watts, Sandusky, for appellee.

HOLMES, Justice.

We agree with the view taken by the majority of the Court of Appeals. It is beyond cavil that it is the public policy of this state that, unless there is an express rejection of uninsured motorist coverage by an insured, his automobile liability policy must provide such type of coverage. Abate v. Pioneer Mutual Cas. Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 161, 258 N.E.2d 429.

The case law in this state has generally pointed out that insurance companies could not lawfully insert provisions in uninsured motorist sections of the policy which would restrict coverage in a manner contrary to the intent of the statute. As an example, in Bartlett v. Nationwide Mutl. Ins. Co. (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 50, 294 N.E.2d 665, this court struck down a provision which would have reduced the amount payable to an insured to the extent of any sum received through workers' compensation law benefits paid to the insured.

Somewhat the same legal principle, in the instance of "other insurance," had been previously set forth in the case of Curran v. State Automobile Mutl. Ins. Co. (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 33, 266 N.E.2d 566.

Although the specific question presented in the instant cause has not previously been answered by this court, there have been instances where this court has held that there could be reasonable restrictions placed in uninsured motorist clauses without violating the public policy embodied in R. C. 3937.18. In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reddick (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 119, 308 N.E.2d 454, it was held that uninsured motorists coverage for "hit and run" accidents could be restricted to accidents where the injury resulted from physical contact between the unidentified vehicle and the insured, or the automobile occupied by the insured.

A review of cases from other jurisdictions shows a clear split of authority between those states which adhere to the principle that an exclusion from coverage of any automobile owned by the insured and not set forth in the policy would be contrary to the intent of uninsured motorist insurance, and those courts which have chosen to adhere to the principle that the fundamentals of contract law may prevail insofar as a specific exclusion of a vehicle not named within the policy.

Some of the cases which have adhered to the former view are: Mullis v. State Farm Mutl. Auto Ins. Co. (Fla.1971), 252 So.2d 229; Nygaard v. State Farm Mutl. Auto Ins. Co. (1974), 301 Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151; State Farm Mutl. Auto Ins. Co. v. Hinkel (1971), 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151; Bell v. State Farm Mutl. Auto Ins. Co. (W.Va.1974), 207 S.E.2d 147.

Some of the cases from other states which adhere to the view that an exclusion of other owned vehicles of the insured not set forth in the policy is a valid limitation on uninsured motorist coverage are: Rodriguez v. Maryland Indem. Ins Co. (1975), 24 Ariz.App. 392, 539 P.2d 196; Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Beekman (1978), 118 Ariz. 294 (Ct.App.), 576 P.2d 153; Holcomb v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1973), 254 Ark. 514, 495 S.W.2d 155; Detroit Auto Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Reynolds (1978), 81 Mich.App. 710, 265 N.W.2d 799; Barton v. American Family Mutl. Ins. Co. (Mo.App.1972), 485 S.W.2d 628; Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Baker (R.I.1978), 383 A.2d 1005; Hill v. Nationwide Mutl. Ins. Co. (Tenn.1976), 535 S.W.2d 327; Stagg v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.1972), 486 S.W.2d 399. Cf. Nunley v. Turner (1975), 57 Mich.App. 473, 226 N.W.2d 528; Shipley v. American Standard Ins. Co. (1968), 183 Neb. 109, 158 N.W.2d 238.

There is more than a modicum of validity to both points of view and the accompanying arguments presented by the parties herein. There is merit in the argument that pursuant to the public policy mandate of R. C. 3937.18 the uninsured motorist provision in an insurance policy must in effect provide a form of personal accident insurance to the named insured, and that such public policy will not permit insuring companies, by way of exclusions in their policies, to provide for anything else. We stated this, in effect, in Bartlett, supra.

However, we hold, as did the Court of Appeals below, that there is a preponderance of merit in the insurance company's argument that the terms of the contract of insurance must be given due consideration, and that weight must be given to what was contemplated by the parties as to the coverage of the policy. This is particularly so where the General Assembly has made the offering of uninsured motorist coverage mandatory, but has not made the purchase of such coverage mandatory. This remains a matter of contract between the insurance carrier and the insured.

Upon a review of all the considerations, we hold that where a policy of insurance contains reasonably specific language excluding other motor vehicles owned by the named insured from the uninsured motorist provision of the policy, such exclusion is valid, and not contrary to the public policy contained in R. C. 3937.18. As...