Osborne v. Osborne
Citation | 682 Utah Adv. Rep. 59,260 P.3d 202,2011 UT App 150 |
Decision Date | 12 May 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 20090891–CA.,20090891–CA. |
Parties | Teddy Eugene OSBORNE, Petitioner and Appellant,v.Negha Jean OSBORNE, Respondent and Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Teddy Eugene Osborne, Vernal, Appellant Pro Se.Negha Jean Osborne, Phoenix, Arizona, Appellee Pro Se.Before Judges DAVIS, VOROS, and CHRISTIANSEN.
¶ 1 Petitioner Teddy Eugene Osborne appeals the district court's October 14, 2009 order awarding Respondent Negha Jean Osborne a portion of Mr. Osborne's railroad retirement and awarding judgment to Ms. Osborne for alimony arrearages. We affirm.1
¶ 2 In January 2009, Mr. Osborne retired earlier than expected due to a disability. In May 2009, Ms. Osborne, who had relocated to Utah after the parties' divorce, moved the Third District Court in Utah to enter a qualified domestic relations order, which was necessary before the Railroad Retirement Board would allocate Mr. Osborne's retirement, and to enter an order awarding her alimony arrearages. On October 14, 2009, the district court entered a qualified domestic relations order entitled “Order Dividing Railroad Benefits” and an order awarding a money judgment in Ms. Osborne's favor (collectively, October 2009 Order). Mr. Osborne argues that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ms. Osborne's motion or to enter the October 2009 Order because the Circuit Court of Cleburne County, Arkansas did not transfer the case to Utah until November 2009. We disagree.
¶ 3 Before acting on Ms. Osborne's motion, and pursuant to Ms. Osborne's April 2009 request, the district court domesticated the Arkansas Decree of Divorce (Decree) as a judgment of Utah, pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, see generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B–5–301 to –307 (2008). Thereafter, the Decree “ha[d] the same effect and [was] subject to the same procedures, defenses, [and] enforcement ... as a judgment of a district court of [Utah].” Id. § 78B–5–302(3). The domestication of a foreign divorce decree in Utah enables Utah courts to enforce, but not modify, a decree. See id. § 78B–5–302; Bankler v. Bankler, 963 P.2d 797, 799–801 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ( ).
¶ 4 We determine that the district court's October 2009 Order merely enforced the Decree under Utah Law, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B–5–307 ( ). The Decree does not explicitly require a qualified domestic relations order to allow the distribution of the retirement funds, but it plainly states that upon Mr. Osborne's retirement, in lieu of alimony, Ms. Osborne is entitled to receive a “portion previously allocated for [her] by the Railroad [R]etirement [P]ension [P]lan.” The qualified domestic relations order merely effectuated the allocation of Tier II benefits to Ms. Osborne by instructing the Railroad Retirement Board to disburse the funds as the Decree allocated them. The district court therefore correctly enforced the Decree by entering the October 2009 Order.2
¶ 5 In a related argument, Mr. Osborne challenges the district court's alleged modification of the parties' Decree to provide for the allocation of his Tier II railroad retirement to Ms. Osborne. The parties' Decree provides, in part,
[Mr. Osborne] will grant a monthly support check to [Ms. Osborne] in the amount of $500 due and payable the first of each month.... Payments will continue until the death of either party, or upon the retirement of [Mr. Osborne], at which time that portion previously allocated for [Ms. Osborne] by the Railroad [R]etirement [P]ension [P]lan, will be paid in lieu of monthly support payments. The amount of monthly retirement will be comparable to the monthly payments for support.
¶ 6 Mr. Osborne contends that the language providing that upon his retirement the “portion previously allocated for [Ms. Osborne] by the Railroad [R]etirement [P]ension [P]lan ... will be paid in lieu of monthly support payments,” does not refer to his Tier II benefits, but rather to the indivisible Tier I divorced spouse benefit. “We interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation.” Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ¶ 18, 973 P.2d 431 (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999). “Where possible, the underlying intent of a contract is to be gleaned from the language of the instrument itself; only where the language is uncertain or ambiguous need extrinsic evidence be resorted to.” Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980); see also Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ¶ 19, 215 P.3d 933 ().
¶ 7 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its interpretation of the parties' Decree. The Tier II benefits described in the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (the Act), see generally 45 U.S.C. §§ 231–231v (2006), are akin to benefits under a defined benefit plan and were, thus, subject to division as contemplated by the Decree. See generally id. § 231a(b) ( ); id. § 231b ( ); id. § 231m(b)(2) ( ); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 573–75, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (, )superseded in part by statute, 45 U.S.C. § 231m(b)(2) (2006); In re Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 894 (Colo.Ct.App.2003) ( ). Conversely, as the district court determined, the divorced spouse benefit described in the Act is an automatic Tier I benefit to Ms. Osborne and is not a divisible marital asset. See 45 U.S.C. § 231a(c)(4) ( ); id. § 231m(a) ( ). See generally Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, ¶¶ 13–15, 22, 169 P.3d 765 ( ); Zappanti, 80 P.3d at 894 ( ).
¶ 8 The Decree provides that “[p]ayments will continue until the death of either party, or upon the retirement of [Mr. Osborne], at which time that portion previously allocated for [Ms. Osborne] by the Railroad [R]etirement [P]ension [P]lan, will be paid in lieu of monthly support payments.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Ms. Osborne would not have intended to replace her alimony benefit with a benefit she was already guaranteed to receive upon Mr. Osborne's retirement, i.e., the divorced spouse benefit. Furthermore, the phrase “[t]he amount of monthly retirement will be comparable to the monthly payments for support” implies that Mr. and Ms. Osborne had predetermined the amount of the benefit Ms. Osborne would receive. If so, they must have necessarily intended “the amount of monthly retirement” as a Tier II benefit. In contrast, had the parties intended the benefit to be a divorced spouse benefit, a Tier I benefit, they would not have been able to dictate the amount and it might or might not have been comparable to the alimony payment of $500 per month.3 We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its interpretation and enforcement of the domesticated Decree.
¶ 9 Mr. Osborne also argues that the district court improperly awarded Ms. Osborne a judgment of $5950 for unpaid alimony from August 1, 2008, through July 31, 2009. He contends that he did not owe alimony to Ms. Osborne during the six-month waiting period between his retirement in January 2009 and when he began receiving his retirement. The district court correctly interpreted and enforced the Decree, under its plain meaning, by concluding that Mr. Osborne owed Ms. Osborne alimony until she began receiving her distribution from the Railroad Retirement Pension Plan. To the extent that Mr. Osborne seeks to modify the Decree based on his disability, he cannot do so because he has not filed a petition to modify, see Utah R. Civ. P. 106 (...
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