Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. A06-1007.,A06-1007.
• Parties: Erin J. OSBORNE, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Alexia Ray Osborne Riley, et al., Appellants, v. TWIN TOWN BOWL, INC., d/b/a Jerry Dutler Bowl, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

730 N.W.2d 307

Erin J. OSBORNE, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Alexia Ray Osborne Riley, et al., Appellants, v. TWIN TOWN BOWL, INC., d/b/a Jerry Dutler Bowl, Respondent.

No. A06-1007.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

April 24, 2007.

Kenneth R. White, MacKenzie Gustafson, Ltd., St. Peter, MN, for appellants.

Steven E. Tomsche, Daniel P.H. Reiff, Bryan B. Carroll, Tomsche, Sonnesyn Tomsche, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by HALBROOKS, Presiding Judge; TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge; and ROSS, Judge.

OPINION

TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge.

In this civil-damage action, appellants Erin J. Osborne, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Alexia Ray Osborne Riley, Michael R. Riley Sr., Marie A. Riley, and Kelly M. Riley challenge the summary judgment entered in favor of respondent Twin Town Bowl, Inc. d/b/a Jerry Dutler Bowl on the issue of proximate cause. Because the undisputed facts do not support a proximate-causal relationship between the decedent's intoxication and his drowning, we affirm.

FACTS

After drinking with friends, Michael Riley Jr. left Jerry Dutler Bowl. Shortly thereafter, about 1:30 a.m., on April 20, 2001, a state trooper clocked Riley driving 74 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone. Based on the radar reading, the trooper turned around, speeded up, and activated his squad car's emergency lights and siren. He followed as Riley took an exit ramp, maneuvered as if to avoid the trooper, took a right turn, drove on the shoulder, and pulled over on a bridge across the Minnesota River.

When the trooper approached the vehicle and Riley opened the window, the trooper smelled alcohol. Riley failed a variety of field sobriety tests; a preliminary breath test indicated his alcohol concentration was .18.

The trooper informed Riley that he was going to place him under arrest for driving while intoxicated. When he turned his back on Riley to put the breath-test equipment back into his patrol car, the trooper heard Riley say, "I'm out of here." The trooper turned around and saw Riley on the bridge barrier. The trooper yelled, "No," but Riley jumped. The parties agree that Riley jumped to escape arrest. The river was swollen and far above flood levels; Riley's body was recovered several months later.

Appellants are Riley's daughter, girlfriend, parents, and sister. Their civil-damage complaint alleges that respondent caused Riley's death. Appellants obtained a postmortem report by psychologist George V. Komaridis, Ph.D., that concluded that Riley's inebriation played "a substantial part in bringing about his decision to jump." Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of causation was denied, but, after additional discovery, its motion for summary judgment on the causation issue was granted.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in ruling as a matter of law that the decedent's intoxication was not a proximate cause of his drowning?

ANALYSIS

"On appeal from summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and (2) whether the [district] court[ ] erred in [its] application of the law." State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990).

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.

Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993) (citation omitted). When the district court grants summary judgment based on the application of a statute to undisputed facts, the result is a legal conclusion reviewed de novo by the appellate court. Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn.1998).

The statute at issue here is the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, which provides:

A spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecuniary loss by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another person, has a right of action in the person's own name for all damages sustained against a person who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally selling alcoholic beverages.

Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (2006). To state a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must prove that the intoxication was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, Brainerd Lodge No. 1246, 253 Minn. 347, 363, 91 N.W.2d 794, 806 (1958). A "direct causal relationship between the intoxication and the injury" is required. Kryzer v. Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 494 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn.1992).

The sole issue before the district court and this court on appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence of proximate cause for the action to survive summary judgment. Although proximate cause generally is a question of fact for the jury, "where reasonable minds can arrive at only one conclusion," proximate cause becomes a question of law and may be disposed of by summary judgment. Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. 1995).

Kryzer is the controlling caselaw on the issue of proximate cause in a civil-damage action.¹ In Kryzer, an intoxicated person injured her wrist while she was being removed from a bar by the bar's employee. 494 N.W.2d at 35. The supreme court reinstated the district court's judgment of dismissal of the action based on the lack of a causal connection between the person's intoxication and her broken wrist. The Kryzer court stated that the person's "intoxication may have been the occasion for her ejection from the legion club, but it did not cause either her injury or that sustained by the plaintiff [her husband]." Id. at 37. The Kryzer court reiterated its rejection of a "but for" test to show proximate cause between the intoxication and the injury. Id.

In civil-damage cases, courts must distinguish "between the occasion and the cause of an injury." Id. For its holding, the Kryzer court relied on Nelson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 74, 14 N.W. 360 (1882), cited with approval in Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 37. There, a railroad's failure to erect a fence may have been the "occasion" for a chain of events leading to an escaped mule running along an unfenced track and eventually breaking its leg. But the mule's act of stepping into a hole, not the railroad's failure to fence, was the direct and natural cause of the mule's broken leg. Nelson, 30 Minn. at 76, 14 N.W. at 361. Similarly, in civil-damage actions, a patron's intoxication must be more than the occasion for the injury, it must be the direct cause of the injury.² Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 35. Accordingly, intoxication was not the cause of injuries when an overserved, intoxicated patron encouraged a third party to fight another, who was injured in the fight, Crea v. Bly, 298 N.W.2d 66 (Minn.1980), cited with approval in Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 38, or when an overserved, intoxicated person assaulted the passenger in his car, who then was injured while exiting the vehicle to avoid the assault. Kunza v. Pantze, 531 N.W.2d 839 (Minn.1995) (summarily reinstating summary judgment entered in favor of bar on issue of proximate cause and citing Kryzer), rev'g 527 N.W.2d 846 (Minn.App.1995).

Appellants argue that Riley's intoxication directly caused his death. The district court concluded, as a matter of law, it did not. We agree with the district court.

Events occurring between Riley's intoxication at Jerry Dutler Bowl and his drowning preclude the conclusion that the intoxication caused the drowning. First, Riley drove 24 miles over the speed limit and was stopped for speeding. No evidence indicates that Riley's speed-limit violation or that the trooper's decision to stop Riley for speeding was directly caused by the intoxication. In fact, the trooper stated that Riley's speed was the only reason he stopped him. Only after these events, did the trooper smell alcohol, test Riley, and then advise him he was under arrest. The parties do not dispute that Riley jumped off the bridge to "escape arrest."³ Absent evidence that Riley's intoxication was the reason for his speeding, the trooper's stop, or Riley's fleeing arrest, these actions constitute breaks in the chain of causation between Riley's intoxication and his drowning.

No genuine issue for trial exists "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). "[T]he party resisting summary judgment must do more than rest on mere averments." Id. at 71. "[W]hen the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on an element essential to the nonmoving party's case, the nonmoving party must make a showing sufficient to establish that essential element." Id.; see also Schroeder v. St. Louis County, 708 N.W.2d 497, 507 (Minn.2006) (clarifying that "summary judgment is inappropriate if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an issue and presents sufficient evidence to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions" (emphasis in original)); Nicollet Restoration v. St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn.1995) (stating that nonmoving party obligated to present "specific admissible facts" on summary judgment). "[W]hen determining whether a genuine issue of material fact for trial exists, the court is not required to ignore its conclusion that a particular piece of evidence may have no probative value, such that reasonable persons could not draw different conclusions from the evidence presented." DLH, Inc., 566 N.W.2d at 70.

In response to respondent's motion for...