Ostrander v. Linn

• Decision Date: 05 March 1946
• Docket Number: 46724.
• Citation: 22 N.W.2d 223,237 Iowa 694
• Parties: OSTRANDER v. LINN, Secretary of Agriculture.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

22 N.W.2d 223

237 Iowa 694

OSTRANDER v. LINN, Secretary of Agriculture.

No. 46724.

Supreme Court of Iowa

March 5, 1946

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1946.

John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Larson, Asst. Atty. Gen and Booker Smith, Co. Atty., of Fairfield, for appellant.

W R. Fimmen, of Bloomfield, and Thoma & Thoma, of Fairfield, for appellee.

MILLER Justice.

The record in this case was abbreviated, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, because of the fact that only a portion of the controversy, which was before the trial court, is involved in the appeal.

Plaintiff's petition in equity asserted: Plaintiff is engaged in the business of buying cream in Batavia, Iowa; defendant is the Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Iowa; plaintiff has a license to operate a cream station; on June 11, 1943, an inspector for the State Department of Agriculture filed an information before a justice of the peace in Jefferson County, Iowa, charging plaintiff herein with operating his cream station without posting the price differential for various grades of cream as provided by Sections 3100.23, 3100.24 and 3100.25, Code 1939 ^[1] ; plaintiff's purchases of cream were not for butter-making purposes but were exclusively for sale in the State of Illinois in the regular course of interstate commerce; accordingly, plaintiff does not maintain a price differential, pays only the first grade price for cream and does not post any differential in price paid; plaintiff expects to continue to purchase cream for re-sale on the same basis in interstate commerce; plaintiff's operations do not come within the contemplation of Sections 3100.23, 3100.24, 3100.25, Code 1939, and do not violate said statutes; defendant and his predecessor in office have, at divers times, filed separate informations against plaintiff, similar to the one now pending and defendant threatens to continue to file others, knowing that plaintiff's operations do not violate said statutes and will subject plaintiff to unfair, wrongful, harassing, oppressive, arbitrary acts; it is necessary and proper that there be a determination of the construction of said statutes, the proper application thereof to plaintiff's business, a declaration by the court of plaintiff's rights, status and legal relation thereunder. The prayer was for an injunction against defendant, his agents, representatives, or inspectors, from interfering with plaintiff's business and requiring the posting of price differentials, etc., that the court decree plaintiff's rights, status and legal relations with defendant as affected by said Sections 3100.23, 3100.24 and 3100.25, and for general equitable relief.

The answer admitted the identity of the parties, that plaintiff operated a cream station and the pendency of the criminal proceedings before the justice of the peace, but denied all other allegations of the petition and prayed that the petition be dismissed.

The cause came on for trial May 9, 1944, and resulted in the entry of a decree on Nov. 29, 1944. The record indicates that considerable evidence was introduced but none of it is before us. Aside from the petition and the answer, the only other parts of the record presented to us are the trial court's opinion, findings of fact, conclusions of law, decree, and the proceedings incident to perfecting the appeal and settling the record. This situation is accounted for by the fact that, in this court, the only assignment of error relates to the power of the court to enter a declaratory judgment. In this respect, certain matters appear to have been presented to the trial court which we must here assume without specific record to sustain our position.

While the record indicates that a temporary injunction was issued June 24, 1943 (prior to the effective date of our Rules of Civil Procedure), trial was had in accordance with said Rules. The trial court was warranted in applying the Rules of Civil Procedure to this action under the provisions of Rule 1(b) even if it was pending before July 4, 1943. We assumed that, if any steps were necessary below in that regard, they were taken. Hence we consider the case as though it were commenced after July 4, 1943. The trial court's opinion recites that defendant contended that, under the evidence and the allegations of the petition, the case was not one wherein a declaratory judgment should be entered and further that, if it was one in which it would be proper, such decree is not proper herein because of the pendency of the case in Justice of the Peace Court, which was instituted prior to the commencement of this case. This contention is not predicated on the fact that this action was pending July 4, 1943, but under the theory that even though the Rules of Civil Procedure applied herein, the entry of such a decree was not proper.

The trial court found the following facts: The institution of criminal prosecutions against plaintiff were not an unlawful abuse of authority; a license was issued to plaintiff to operate a cream station and has not been revoked; plaintiff has bought no cream for any purpose except to resell as cream, and all but eight lots were resold outside of Iowa; plaintiff bought cream on only one grade basis and paid current first grade price for it. Pursuant to such facts, the court made the following conclusions of law: Plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction, but such ruling shall not prejudice the effect of the court's declaratory judgment upon the criminal proceedings and shall be without prejudice to a future application for an injunction based upon such declaratory judgment; plaintiff is the holder of a cream station license and a 'Babcock Test license'; Sections 3100.23, 3100.24, and 3100.25 are not applicable to cream purchased by plaintiff for resale as cream wherever said resale is made. Pursuant to the foregoing, decree was entered, denying an injunction without prejudice as aforesaid and determining plaintiff's rights, status and legal relations to defendant under Sections 3100.23, 3100.24, 3100.25, Code 1939.

Defendant has appealed to this court but he does not here challenge the trial court's findings of fact or conclusions of law or the provisions of the declaratory judgment except as they pertain to the narrow contention that the court abused its discretion in entertaining jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment during the pendency of the criminal action before the justice of the peace, which was commenced before this action. Before considering the decisive question presented by this appeal, certain preliminary questions should be disposed of.

I. Although not a controverted proposition in this case, it may well be noted that generally the courts have held that declaratory judgment procedure may be employed to challenge police power statutes of the nature of those here involved, which forbid or require certain practices and provide penalties for noncompliance. See Annotations in 129 A.L.R. 751, 52 Yale Law Journal 445, 16 Am.Jur. (Cumulative Supplement) Declaratory Judgments, Sec. 28.1. Pursuant to such decisions we hold that declaratory judgment procedure was proper herein to determine plaintiff's rights, status and legal relations with defendant under Sections 3100.23, 3100.24, 3100.25, Code 1939.

II. Plaintiff contends that there was a lack of identity between the parties in the criminal action and this action. We disagree. The petition herein alleges that the criminal action was instituted by defendant as head of the Department of Agriculture through one of his inspectors. Defendant concedes that this is correct. The action is here brought against defendant as a representative of the state. Realistically, the controversy in each instance is between the plaintiff herein and the Department of Agriculture.

III. The trial court stated in its opinion that the issues in the criminal case were not the same as those presented herein, stating as follows: 'In the criminal action in the justice of the peace court the only charge is the failure to post the price differential. Under the statute it is not required to post a price differential unless such a price differential is maintained on the various grades of cream, and a price differential on various grades of cream is not required to be maintained unless the cream buyer is buying on the basis of two or more grades. Therefore, it would appear that the identical issues are not involved in both of the cases.' We cannot agree. The basis for declaratory judgment relief herein would be the basis for the defense in the criminal action.

IV. Plaintiff contends that the proposition here asserted was not raised by defendant in the trial court. Again, we do not agree. The trial court's opinion shows otherwise, the court stating as follows: 'The defendant argues that this case under the evidence and allegations of plaintiff's petition is not one wherein a declaratory judgment should be rendered, and further claims that if it is one in which originally it would be proper to render a declaratory judgment, that such judgment is not proper now because of the pendency of the case in the justice of the peace court which was instituted prior to the commencement of this case.'

V. This brings us to the decisive issue of the case which the attorney general states thus: 'There is really only one question remaining to be decided in this action and that is,--Did the court abuse its discretion in entertaining jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering a declaratory judgment when it appeared by plaintiff's own petition that there was pending before the justice of the peace in the same county an action between the same parties involving the same subject-matter and in which all of the issues could have been determined?' We hold that there was no such...