Owens v. City of Phoenix
| Decision Date | 15 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA-CV,1 |
| Citation | 180 Ariz. 402,884 P.2d 1100 |
| Parties | Thomas J. OWENS, an unmarried man, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 92-0294. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
The main issue presented by this appeal is when a cause of action accrues, for the purpose of commencing the running of statutes of limitations, in a suit seeking city relocation assistance and payments after the City of Phoenix (City) purchased the condemned property.
Thomas J. Owens (Owens) brought an action against the City seeking relocation expenses, damages for negligence, and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983). The trial court ruled that the claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The trial court also held that Owens had failed to state a claim under § 1983. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the City, and Owens timely appealed. We reverse.
The City cross-appeals from the trial court's ruling that Owens' lawsuit was not barred by a failure to exhaust his administrative remedies or by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm the trial court's rulings on the cross-appeal.
Owens owned real property at 1708-1712 East Mohave in Phoenix that he used for non-residential business purposes (the "business property" or "displacement property"). The business property was acquired by the City as part of its West Approach Land Acquisition Project (the "WALA Project"), in which the City acquired a block of land west of Sky Harbor International Airport. As a result of the acquisition, Owens was entitled to relocation payments and assistance for the move of his equipment and other personal property from the displacement property to his new business site (or "replacement property") pursuant to both the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, (the "Federal Relocation Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601 through 4655, and the Arizona Relocation Act, A.R.S. §§ 11-961 through 11-974.
The City began negotiating with Owens for the purchase of his business property on July 10, 1985. On August 13, 1985, the City sent Owens a "Determination Letter," which indicated that he might be eligible for the following relocation benefits:
1. Actual reasonable moving and related expenses in an amount to be determined upon submission of appropriate documentation, and site search expenses of up to $500; or
2. An in lieu payment of $2,500 to $10,000, with the amount to be determined upon submission of documentation establishing eligibility for an in lieu payment. 1
Although the Determination Letter provided that eligibility for these relocation benefits was dependent upon Owens' "timely submission of required documentation," it did not specify the documents needed, nor did it indicate a deadline for their submission. The Determination Letter stated that July 10, 1985 (the date on which the negotiations for the purchase of the business property began) constituted Owens' "eligibility date" for relocation assistance. The letter further provided that "[a]ny appeal must be filed and/or requested within 30 days of the receipt of this letter to be valid." Owens did not file an appeal in response to the Determination Letter.
On May 13, 1987, while the parties were still negotiating the purchase of Owens' business property, Owens filed a complaint against the City in Maricopa County Superior Court (the "1987 Complaint"), alleging claims on behalf of both himself individually and as part of a class action. Owens' individual claims focused on his residential property, which was also being acquired by the City as part of the WALA Project. 2 The class action was brought on behalf of the following parties:
All current owners, and all previous owners who have sold property within the described area to the city, since the date on which the [City] first began consideration of a consolidated plan for the future acquisition of properties bounded on the east side by 24th street, the south by the Maricopa Freeway, the North by the Southern Pacific Railroad right of way and on the west by 14th Street, which date is believed by the Plaintiff ... to have been not earlier than 1974.
Both Owens' residential property and his business property fell within the above property boundaries. Accordingly, the class action did pertain to Owens' business property.
The 1987 Complaint alleged that the City had violated various state and federal laws, including the relocation acts. However, the 1987 Complaint sought relocation assistance and payments solely for expenses associated with Owens' residential property. The class action focused on the City's alleged abuse of the condemnation procedures. The 1987 Complaint was dismissed with prejudice on August 7, 1987, without a class being designated.
The City obtained a final order of condemnation on Owens' business property on November 13, 1987. Subsequent to the entry of that order, Owens and the City made numerous attempts to reach an agreement with respect to Owens' relocation benefits. These included several letters by the City to Owens seeking additional documents to determine his eligibility for an in lieu payment. The City also sent him numerous letters complaining about his lack of cooperation and warning that his continual refusal to allow the City's move consultant onto his business property to estimate moving costs could "place us [the City] in the unwanted, unnecessary and even awkward position of having to deny eligibility for relocation payments."
On March 1, 1988, Owens sent the City an "Intent to Move Notice" indicating that he would be off the business property by March 31, 1988, and claiming that he was entitled to advance hardship payments for the move because of the City's continual refusal to provide him with relocation assistance. On April 8, 1988, Owens filed an "Incident Report" claiming that the City had not provided him with relocation assistance for his business property. On June 9, 1988, Owens filed another "Incident Report" contending that the City had never responded to his April 8, 1988, appeal as required by the City's own appeal procedures.
When the parties were unable to reach an agreement with regard to Owens' move, Owens undertook an unauthorized self-move, which he completed on March 6, 1989. The City designated his move date, March 6, 1989, as his "vacate date" and the City's "control date" over the business property. In Owens' relocation file, the City indicated that Owens had until September 6, 1990, to make a claim for relocation benefits, eighteen months after his move date.
On January 8, 1990, Owens filed another "Incident Report" with the City, seeking post-displacement damages under the relocation statutes. The City received this claim but never responded to it. As a result, Owens filed the complaint underlying the present action on April 6, 1990. He subsequently amended his complaint to assert three claims against the City: a claim for relocation payments and assistance under both the Federal and Arizona Relocation Acts; a claim for deprivation of his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and a claim for negligent deprivation of his relocation benefits.
The City moved for summary judgment, or dismissal, arguing that all of the claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; that Owens had failed to state a § 1983 claim; that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and that the dismissal of his 1987 Complaint barred this lawsuit under the doctrine of res judicata.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, ruling that all three claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court further held that Owens failed to state a § 1983 claim. The trial court rejected the City's remaining arguments.
Following denial of Owens' motion for new trial/motion for reconsideration, he filed this appeal, seeking reversal of the trial court's determination that his claims were time-barred and that he failed to state a § 1983 claim. The City cross-appealed from the court's rejection of its res judicata and administrative remedies arguments. The following issues are presented:
1. Were any or all of Owens' claims barred by the applicable statutes of limitations?
2. Has Owens stated a valid § 1983 claim?
3. Are Owens' claims barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies?
4. Are Owens' claims barred by the doctrine of res judicata?
The statutes of limitations, administrative remedies, and res judicata issues were resolved by summary judgment. This court reviews the entry of summary judgment to determine if the appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was taken. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 388, 710 P.2d 1025, 1043 (1985). We review questions of law de novo. Libra Group, Inc. v. State, 167 Ariz. 176, 179, 805 P.2d 409, 412 (App.1991).
Owens' § 1983 claim was dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim. This court will affirm a dismissal for failure to state a claim only if the allegations of the complaint do not state a cause of action recognized by law. Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 186, 677 P.2d 1292, 1294 (1984). Again, the material allegations of the complaint are assumed to be true and are treated in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in...
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