Owyhee Cnty. v. United States

• Decision Date: 05 January 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-00070-CWD
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho
• Parties: OWYHEE COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO; GEM HIGHWAY DISTRICT, OWYHEE COUNTY; and THREE CREEK GOOD ROAD DISTRICT, OWYHEE COUNTY, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

OWYHEE COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO; GEM HIGHWAY DISTRICT, OWYHEE COUNTY; and THREE CREEK GOOD ROAD DISTRICT, OWYHEE COUNTY, Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-00070-CWD

United States District Court, D. Idaho

January 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Honorable Candy W. Dale, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 14.) The motion is fully briefed and at issue. Having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding delay, and because the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the motion will be decided on the record. Dist. Idaho L. Civ. Rule 7.1(d). For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion but will afford Plaintiffs leave to amend certain claims.

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BACKGROUND

This lawsuit concerns ninety-three rights-of-way that cross public lands in Owyhee County, Idaho. The public lands themselves are owned by the United States of America and managed by the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Plaintiffs assert the rights-of-way are public roads in accordance with the Act of July 26, 1866, codified as 43 U.S.C. § 932, (commonly referred to as “R.S. 2477”), and the Idaho Road Validation process, Idaho Code Section 40-203A. (Dkt. 1, 16.)^[1]

Plaintiffs are Owyhee County and two road districts located within Owyhee County - Gem Highway District and Three Creek Good Road District. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to “validate” and “declare the rights and other legal relations” of the rights-of-way as public roads under R.S. 2477 and Idaho law. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4.) The first and second claims for relief allege title to the roads is not disputed by the United States and, therefore, relief is appropriate under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Alternatively, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims for relief allege title to the roads is disputed by the United States and, therefore, seek relief under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a.

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The United States filed the motion to dismiss presently before the Court pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 14.) The United States seeks dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety, arguing claim one should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that all claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. 15.) The Court finds as follows.

STANDARDS OF LAW

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and may only hear cases as authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and statutes enacted by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, federal courts cannot consider claims for which they lack subject matter jurisdiction. See Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992).

The party invoking the Court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that the case is properly in federal court. McCauley v. Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001); Dunn & Black P.S. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007) (The party asserting a claim against the United States bears “the burden of establishing that its action falls within an unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress.”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Lack of sovereign immunity is a defense properly raised under Rule 12(b)(1). Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011).

A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. See White v. Lee,

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227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Defendant presents a facial challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. (Dkt. 15 at 5.) In a facial attack, the challenging party asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

When considering a “facial” attack made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). However, it is improper to rule on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion when the “jurisdictional issue and the substantive issues . . . are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1040; Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A court may not resolve genuinely disputed facts where ‘the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits.'”) (quoting Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077). In such a case, “the jurisdictional determination should await a determination of the relevant facts on either a motion going to the merits or at trial.” Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077.

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A suit must be dismissed if the complaint fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). To defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts “to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the factual

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content pleaded allows a court “to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all material factual allegations as true and draw any reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Id. However, the Court is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, '” or to credit “mere conclusory statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISCUSSION

The definitive issue on this motion is whether the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs' claims. The United States asserts claims one and two must be dismissed because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity for claims brought against the United States, and because the QTA is the exclusive remedy available to Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 15.) The United States argues remaining claims three, four, five, and six should be dismissed also because the Complaint fails to plead allegations establishing the conditions required for the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided under the QTA. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing claim one properly pleads a cognizable legal theory, and that subject matter jurisdiction exists on all claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act or, alternatively, under the QTA. (Dkt. 16.)

1. Claim One and Claim Two - Declaratory Judgment Act

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over certain specific types of actions brought against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346. “It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it [expressly and affirmatively] consents

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to be sued.” Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)).

“The waiver of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to federal-court jurisdiction.” Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a suit against the United States or one of its agencies. See Mills v. United States, 742 F.3d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 2014); McGuire v. United States, 550 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2008). A waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).

Claims one and two are brought against the United States under the Declaratory Judgment Act, asserting the United States does not dispute title to the roads as public rights-of-way under R.S. 2477. (Dkt. 1.) The Declaratory Judgment Act, however, does not waive sovereign immunity. Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1954) (“[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act is not a consent of the United States to be sued . . . .”); Burns Ranches, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 851 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1271 (D. Or. 2011). It “merely grants an additional remedy in cases where jurisdiction already exists in the court.” Brownell, 211 F.2d at 128; see also Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 771 F.3d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 2014) (“This statute does not create new substantive rights, but merely expands the remedies available in federal courts.”). Indeed, “the Declaratory Judgment Act does not by itself confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the Court is without jurisdiction over the claims brought against

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the United States under the Declaratory Judgment Act, regardless of whether title is undisputed as Plaintiffs allege. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”).

Moreover, as discussed further below, Plaintiffs' claims effectively seek to quiet title. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4) (“Plaintiffs bring this action to declare the rights and other legal relations” of the ninety-three roads identified in the Complaint as public rights-of-ways under R.S. 2477.). Such...