O.P-G. v. State
| Decision Date | 16 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D18-1304,3D18-1304 |
| Citation | 290 So.3d 950 |
| Parties | O.P-G., a Juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Maria E. Lauredo, Chief Assistant Public Defender, and Allen Kathir, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SALTER, MILLER, and GORDO, JJ.
Appellant, O.P-G., challenges his finding of guilt for disruption of a school function, in violation of section 877.13, Florida Statutes (2019). Appellant contends that the erroneous determination by the lower tribunal that off-campus conduct evidenced a statutory violation, along with the State's failure to assiduously heed its discovery obligations, necessitate reversal. For the reasons set forth below, we discern no error and affirm.
Two days after a deadly mass shooting claimed the lives of multiple students and staff members at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, law enforcement officers were alerted to a threatening comment posted online in response to a YouTube video featuring the aftermath of the incident. The post, rendered under the username "Ninja Roos," reflected In response, Sergeant Jose Canaves propounded an "exigent circumstances" request upon Google, and obtained subscriber information, in the form of an internet protocol address ("IP address"), for Ninja Roos. Thereafter, Comcast furnished the address of the subscriber at the time of the posting. A search of a student database revealed that O.P-G., a resident at the address, was enrolled as a student at Miami Lakes Middle School.
Detective Hector Martinez responded to Miami Lakes Middle School and interacted with various administrators. After he was informed of the threat, the school principal directed that students be funneled through a single entrance, and further ordered a "pat down" of all backpacks. Supervisory staff was added, security monitors were positioned throughout the school, and classes did not commence in a timely manner.
O.P-G. was removed from class and escorted to the main office of the school. Upon arrival, he volunteered he was aware that law enforcement was at the school "because of some postings [he] placed on the internet." O.P-G. provided a written confession, which was later suppressed by the lower tribunal. He was charged with disruption of a school function and the case proceeded to trial.
At trial, Detective Martinez testified that O.P-G., when asked by the assistant principal whether he made a posting under the pseudonym "Ninja Roos," responded affirmatively. The defense lodged a Richardson 1 objection, contending the admission had not been properly disclosed in discovery. The defense then withdrew the objection, as the prosecutor represented that the contents of the statement had indeed been furnished prior to trial. Questioning resumed and thereafter, the defense unsuccessfully argued the admission constituted an involuntary confession, in violation of Miranda.2 The defense then re-raised a Richardson objection, contending the State failed to disclose the assistant principal as a witness.3 Further inquiry ensued, and the trial court found no discovery violation and resumed the trial. Following the presentation of the evidence, the defense sought involuntary dismissal. The court denied the motion and found O.P-G. delinquent, as charged in the amended petition, withheld adjudication, and imposed a defined term of supervision.
Subsequent to trial, O.P-G. submitted a public records request to the Miami-Dade Schools Police Department which yielded a five-page supplement to a truncated offense incident report previously disclosed to the defense in discovery. Although the report did not reflect O.P-G.'s statement to the assistant principal, it contained other inculpatory evidence, including additional online threats purportedly penned by O.P-G. On the basis of the incomplete report, O.P-G. again sought involuntary dismissal. The lower court conducted a hearing and denied relief. The instant appeal followed.
"The standard of review that applies to a motion for judgment of dismissal in a juvenile case is the same standard that applies to a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal case." A.P.R. v. State, 894 So. 2d 282, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ( ) ; see also J.L.F. v. State, 887 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) ; M.N. v. State, 821 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (). Accordingly, "[o]ur review ... is de novo." J.W.J. v. State, 994 So. 2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing E.A.B., 851 So. 2d at 310 ). "A motion for judgment of dismissal should not be granted unless there is no legally sufficient evidence on which to base a guilty verdict." Id. (citing G.D. v. State, 497 So. 2d 1318, 1319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ). "We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the State." Id. (citing D.E. v. State, 904 So. 2d 558, 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ). Finally, "[u]nder Richardson, when a discovery violation is alleged, the standard of appellate review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining if a violation occurred and if so, whether it was inadvertent, and not prejudicial to the preparation of the defense." Mascolo v. State, 774 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
O.P-G. first asserts that the fact that the threat was dispatched into cyberspace from an off-campus location is fatal to the integrity of the court's finding of guilt, contending section 877.13, Florida Statutes, solely proscribes on-campus actions. Alternatively, he argues state regulation of his off-campus speech renders the applicable statutory scheme unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
In the seminal student speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 736, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held:4
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost [fifty] years.
Nonetheless, the Court recognized the necessity of balancing these rights with "the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id. at 507, 89 S. Ct. at 737 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the regulation of speech is permissible where the utterance at issue might reasonably lead officials to "forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities," or where it would "impinge upon the rights of other students." Id. at 509-14, 89 S. Ct. at 738-40.
In M.C. v State, 695 So. 2d 477, 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), this Court examined the constitutionality of section 877.13, Florida Statutes, penalizing the "disrupt[ion] or interfer[ence of] normal school functions or activities," in light of this precedent, and ultimately determined the statute was neither overbroad nor void for vagueness. We premised our conclusion upon the dispositive finding that the "statute prohibits deliberate or wilful activity at fixed times (i.e., when school administrators and students are engaged in normal school functions or activities) and at a sufficiently fixed place (i.e., on school board property)." Id. at 482. We further found the "statute was enacted specifically for the school setting, where the prohibited disturbances can easily be measured by their impact on the normal school functions and activities," thus, it was narrowly tailored. Id.
Accordingly, today, in adhering to our precedent, we only consider whether the statute indeed regulates off-campus conduct, and if so, whether that regulation passes constitutional muster.
Section 877.13, Florida Statutes (2019), provides, in relevant part:
In construing a statute, courts must examine the actual statutory language as "[t]he text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed." Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 22 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1997). If the statutory language is clear, "courts have no occasion to resort to rules of construction—they must read the statute as written, for to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power."5 Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So. 2d 989, 990-91 (Fla. 1996) (citation omitted).
Here, although " section 877.13(1) is limited to the disruption of activities ‘on school board property,’ "...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Romero v. State
...court should ‘first determine that the regulation is not "susceptible to a reasonable limiting construction." ’ " O.P-G. v. State, 290 So. 3d 950, 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citation omitted).II. True Threats "[A]s a general matter, ‘the First Amendment means that government has no power to re......
- Meinecke v. State
-
Vella v. Salaues
... ... motion where, as here, the proposed amendments to the complaint would be futile as the alleged facts were "insufficient as a matter of law" to state a cause of action. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir ... ...
- D.M.T. v. State