P.H. Chadbourne & Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Bethel

• Decision Date: 17 November 1982
• Citation: 452 A.2d 400
• Parties: P.H. CHADBOURNE & CO. v. INHABITANTS OF the TOWN OF BETHEL 1 .
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 400

452 A.2d 400

P.H. CHADBOURNE & CO. v. INHABITANTS OF the TOWN OF BETHEL ¹.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 7, 1982.

Decided Nov. 17, 1982.

Petruccelli, Cohen, Erler & Cox, Joel C. Martin (orally), Preti, Flaherty & Beliveau, Robert F. Preti, Portland, for plaintiff.

Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, Geoffrey H. Hole (orally), Portland, Janet T. Mills, Dist. Atty., Auburn, for defendants.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ.

NICHOLS, Justice.

The Plaintiff, P.H. Chadbourne & Co., appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Oxford County) entered September 28, 1981, affirming a decision of the Oxford County Commissioners which decision had denied an abatement of the Plaintiff's property taxes in the Town of Bethel.

The Plaintiff's ground for appeal is twofold. First, it contends that the decision of the Oxford County Commissioners is unsupported by the evidence. Second, it contends that the Superior Court erred in holding that the "Chase Law," 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 563 and 564 (1978), was unconstitutional. Because we find the evidence before the county commissioners was sufficient to support their denial of a tax abatement, it is unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue.

We deny the appeal.

The Plaintiff, which owns forest land which it operates for the production of wood and wood products, applied to the Bethel assessors in 1978 for a tax abatement, requesting assessment under the Chase Law, 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 563 and 564 (1978). ² Following denial of the requested abatement by the town assessors, the Plaintiff appealed to the county commissioners who held an evidentiary hearing on January 13, 1979. At this hearing the Plaintiff presented evidence concerning the amount of tax imposed on the land, the annual monetary yield from the land resulting from timbering operations, the efficiency of the management of the land, and the incentive created by the tax burden to abandon operation of the land for wood production.

The county commissioners concluded that the Plaintiff had failed to meet the burden imposed by the Chase Law of showing that the tax created an incentive to abandon the land. Essentially this was a finding of fact by the commissioners, albeit a negative one. On appeal pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 844 (1978) and M.R.Civ.P. 80B, the Superior Court affirmed the county commissioners' finding that the Plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of proof. ³

The sole issue before us on this appeal is whether there was compliance with the Chase Law. That is strictly an evidentiary question.

When county commissioners have denied an abatement, as in this case, and the reviewing court is called upon to determine whether the negative conclusion is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the standard is: "whether the record contains 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support ... [that] conclusion.' " Bruk v. Town of Georgetown, 436 A.2d 894, 898 (Me.1981) (quoting In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736, 741 (Me.1973)).

To qualify for an abatement of property tax on forest land under the Chase Law, 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 563 and 564 (1978), a property owner must show, first, that notwithstanding efficient operation of the land, the land's after tax annual net return is inadequate in the light of the risks involved; and second, that the tax burden creates an incentive to strip or abandon the land or otherwise operate contrary to the public policy declared in the statute. Here the county commissioners found that the Plaintiff had failed to meet that burden of proof. From the evidence presented to the county commissioners, they were not compelled to reach any other conclusion.

Evidence had been presented that P.H. Chadbourne & Co. had considerably higher management costs per acre than the average operator of forest land for sustained timber production. From this evidence, the commissioners could have concluded that the Plaintiff's land was not managed efficiently. Similarly, the commissioners could have been unpersuaded by the evidence that the tax burden had created an incentive to strip or abandon the land. Last, the commissioners could reasonably have been unpersuaded by the evidence that because of the tax burden, the Plaintiff's net annual return on the property was inadequate in light of the risks involved. Eligibility for an abatement under the Chase Law required the taxpayer to establish all the above-mentioned elements. If the county commissioners found that Plaintiff had failed to meet its burden of proof on any one of these elements, they were warranted in denying the abatement.

The commissioners did not make express findings of which element or elements the Plaintiff failed to prove. We do not retreat in any respect from our declaration in Gashgai v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 390 A.2d 1080, 1085 (Me.1978), that "it is an indispensable prerequisite to effective judicial review that an agency's decision set forth the findings of basic facts as well as the conclusions of ultimate fact and conclusions of law derived therefrom." However, neither before the Superior Court nor on appeal to the Law Court has the Plaintiff sought any relief from the commissioners' failure to identify which of the several elements of the Plaintiff's required proof they found unpersuasive; the Plaintiff rather argues that, regardless of what element or elements were involved in the commissioners' finding of failure of proof, that finding was "devoid of evidentiary support." In this civil case, in particular, no reason exists for our departing from the customary rule that this Court will not on its own initiative entertain on appeal a nonjurisdictional contention that the affected party has not either asserted in the trial court or argued in brief or orally before us. See McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., 394 A.2d 264, 267 (Me.1978); Wildes v. Pens Unlimited Co., 389 A.2d 837, 841 n.6 (Me.1978).

In sum, the denial by the county commissioners of the Plaintiff's application for a tax abatement is supported by the record made before that agency.

The entry is:

Appeal denied.

Judgment affirmed.

McKUSICK, C.J., and GODFREY, ROBERTS, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ., concurring.

CARTER, Justice, dissenting.

Motivated by what I think to be significant institutional concerns of the courts in accomplishing their role of reviewing the decisions of governmental entities under M.R.Civ.P. 80B, I dissent from the result reached by the majority. I would remand this case to the Superior Court with instructions for further remand to the County Commissioners for the making of additional findings of fact. Because the factual statement set out in the majority opinion does not illuminate the factual predicates for those institutional considerations which are of concern to me, I shall briefly state facts additional to those contained in the majority opinion.

The opinion correctly states that the present appeal is from a judgment of the Superior Court entered on September 28, 1981. That judgment, however, represents the second occasion on which the case was before the Superior Court on a complaint under M.R.Civ.P. 80B for review of the action of the Oxford County Commissioners. Plaintiff had timely applied to the assessors of Bethel, Maine for an abatement of 1977 real estate taxes imposed on 4,107 acres of its woodland situated in that town. The assessors denied any abatement and plaintiff appealed that denial to the Oxford County Commissioners pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 844 (Supp.1982), which provides for an appeal from such decisions. A full evidentiary hearing was held before the County Commissioners on January 13, 1979, at which plaintiff and the town were represented by counsel. In a decision received by the plaintiff on March 26, 1979, the County Commissioners denied plaintiff's petition and, once again, refused the requested abatement. The County Commissioners made no findings of fact supporting that decision. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court under Rule 80B on April 20, 1979. In that complaint, the plaintiff attacked the decision of the County Commissioners as "contrary to the evidence presented at the aforesaid hearing [before the County Commissioners] ... arbitrary, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion" and asserted that it "was incorrect as a matter of law." The plaintiff did not challenge the Commissioners' failure to make findings of fact.

The case was briefed and argued for the first time to a justice of the Superior Court. On July 3, 1980, that justice remanded the case to the County Commissioners with instructions that the Commissioners make findings of fact. In his opinion, the justice stated:

[t]he County Commissioners failed to make any findings of fact. As a result it is impossible to determine if the abatement was denied because they found that the land in question was not forest land as defined; or because they found that the petitioner failed to prove its entitlement to an abatement; or because they considered the Chase Law to be unconstitutional. The issue raised is whether or not the County Commissioners are required to make findings of fact. A subsidiary issue is whether or not the Court can order the County Commissioners to make the findings of fact required by the statute.

In a precise analysis of the question posed, the justice reasoned that the equitable powers of the Court when proceeding on extraordinary writs authorized the Court's ordering the County Commissioners to make findings of fact that are sufficient to permit effective judicial review. He said:

while the County Commissioners are a Court, they are not a court of record at common law. Woodman v. Inhabitants of the County of Somerset, 37 Me. 29 (1854). At common law the distinction between a court of record, and one not of record had practical consequences. After a final judgment of a court of...