Pac. Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of L.A.

• Decision Date: 29 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. S187243.,S187243.
• Parties: PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

55 Cal.4th 783
288 P.3d 717
149 Cal.Rptr.3d 383

12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,078
2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,001

PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S187243.

Supreme Court of California

Nov. 29, 2012.

See 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, § 790.

149 Cal.Rptr.3d 386]Bien & Summers, Elliot L. Bien, San Rafael, Amy E. Margolin; Blum Collins and Craig M. Collins, Santa Monica, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bien & Summers, Elliot L. Bien, San Rafael, and Amy E. Margolin for Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Hart, King & Coldren, Robert S. Coldren, C. William Dahlin, Santa Ana, and Boyd L. Hill, Costa Mesa, for Laguna Terrace Park, LLC, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

R.S. Radford, Sacramento, for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gilchrist & Rutter, Richard H. Close, Thomas W. Casparian and Yen N. Hope, Santa Monica, for Carson Harbor Village, Ltd., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Jeri L. Burge, Assistant City Attorney, Kenneth T. Fong and Amy Brothers, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kirkland & Ellis, Robyn E. Bladow and Vidhya Ragunathan, Los Angeles, for Western Center on Law and Poverty as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Law Office of William J. Constantine and William J. Constantine for Golden State Manufactured–Home Owners League as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, John A. Saurenman, Assistant Attorney General, and Jamee Jordan Patterson, Deputy Attorney General, for California Coastal Commission as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Richards, Watson & Gershon, Rochelle Browne and Ginetta L. Giovinco, Los Angeles, for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Aleshire & Wynder, William W. Wynder, Sunny K. Soltani and Jeff M. Malawy, Irvine, for Palisades Bowl Residents' Association, Inc., and City of Carson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

WERDEGAR, J.

[288 P.3d 720

[55 Cal.4th 792]We hold here that the requirements of the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.; hereafter Coastal Act) and the Mello Act (Gov.Code, §§ 65590, 65590.1) apply to a proposed conversion, within California's coastal zone, of a mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership. In so holding, we reject the argument that such a conversion is not a “development” for purposes of the Coastal Act, and further reject the argument that Government Code section 66427.5, a provision of the Subdivision Map Act (Gov.Code, §§ 66410–66499.37), EXEMPTS SUCH CONVERSIONS FROM THE NEED TO COMPLY WITH OTHer state laws, or precludes local governmental agencies from exercising state-delegated authority to require compliance with state laws such as the Coastal Act or the Mello Act.

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment overturning a grant of [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 387]mandamus relief to Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC (Palisades Bowl).

BACKGROUND

The present controversy arose after the City of Los Angeles (the City) refused to accept Palisades Bowl's application to convert its 170–unit mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership because Palisades Bowl had failed to include applications for a coastal development permit or for Mello Act approval. Palisades Bowl declined to provide the applications, [55 Cal.4th 793]instead filing in the superior court a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief. Palisades Bowl argued that the proposed conversion was not a development subject to the Coastal Act, and that the City's action was in any event barred by Government Code section 66427.5, a provision that states substantive and procedural requirements for obtaining map approval for conversions of mobilehome parks from tenant occupancy to resident ownership. The trial court agreed with Palisades Bowl. It therefore issued a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the City to vacate its decision finding Palisades Bowl's application incomplete, to deem the application complete, and to evaluate the application for approval without considering whether it complied with either the Coastal Act or the Mello Act.

The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that the policy considerations behind the Coastal Act and the Mello Act are more extensive than those behind Government Code section 66427.5, and section 66427.5 therefore could not preclude the City from imposing conditions and requirements mandated by those acts on a subdivider seeking to convert to resident ownership a mobilehome park located in the coastal zone. It therefore entered judgment directing the trial court to vacate its peremptory writ of mandamus and enter judgment in favor of the City. We granted review.

DISCUSSION I.

We are concerned with the interplay between three separate statutory schemes, each furthering important state interests and each in some manner regulating development within California's coastal areas.

A. Coastal Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.)

The Coastal Act “was enacted by the Legislature as a comprehensive scheme to govern

[288 P.3d 721]

land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California. The Legislature found that ‘the California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource of vital and enduring interest to all the people’; that ‘the permanent protection of the state's natural and scenic resources is a paramount concern’; that ‘it is necessary to protect the ecological balance of the coastal zone’ and that ‘existing developed uses, and future developments that are carefully planned and developed consistent with the policies of this division, are essential to the economic and social well-being of the people of this state....’ ( [Pub. Resources Code,] § 30001, subds. (a) and (d).)” ( Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 565, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801, 685 P.2d 1152.) The Coastal Act is to be “liberally construed to accomplish its purposes [55 Cal.4th 794]and objectives.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30009.) Under it, with exceptions not applicable here, any person wishing to perform or undertake any development in the coastal zone must obtain a coastal development permit “in addition to obtaining any other permit required by law from any local government or from any state, regional,[149 Cal.Rptr.3d 388]or local agency....” ( Id.,§ 30600, subd. (a).)

The Coastal Act expressly recognizes the need to “rely heavily” on local government “[t]o achieve maximum responsiveness to local conditions, accountability, and public accessibility....” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30004, subd. (a).) As relevant here, it requires local governments to develop local coastal programs, comprised of a land use plan and a set of implementing ordinances designed to promote the act's objectives of protecting the coastline and its resources and of maximizing public access. ( Id.,§§ 30001.5, 30500–30526; Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1011, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 953 P.2d 1188.) Once the California Coastal Commission certifies a local government's program, and all implementing actions become effective, the commission delegates authority over coastal development permits to the local government. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30519, subd. (a), 30600.5, subds. (a), (b), (c).) Moreover, “[p]rior to certification of its local coastal program, a local government may, with respect to any development within its area of jurisdiction, ... establish procedures for the filing, processing, review, modification, approval, or denial of a coastal development permit.” ( Id.,§ 30600, subd. (b)(1).) An action taken under a locally issued permit is appealable to the commission. ( Id., § 30603.) Thus, “[u]nder the Coastal Act's legislative scheme, ... the [local coastal program] and the development permits issued by local agencies pursuant to the Coastal Act are not solely a matter of local law, but embody state policy.” ( Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 466.) “In fact, a fundamental purpose of the Coastal Act is to ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of local government.” ( Ibid.) Moreover, in certain areas, sometimes referred to as dual permit jurisdictions, an applicant must obtain a permit from the local entity and after obtaining the local permit, a second permit from the commission. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30600, 30601; Cal.Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13301, subd. (a).) Palisades Bowl's mobilehome park is located in a dual permit jurisdiction.

The Coastal Act does not specifically recite that it requires a permit for mobilehome park conversions, and Palisades Bowl contends it does not. We disagree. The act requires a coastal development permit for “any development” in the coastal zone. (Pub. Resources Code § 30600.) As relevant here, a “development” means a “change in the density or intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to, subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act ..., and any other division of land, including lot splits, except where the [55 Cal.4th 795]land division is brought about in connection with the purchase of such land by a public agency for public recreational use.” ( Id.,§ 30106.) The Subdivision Map Act defines “subdivision” as “the division, by any subdivider, of any unit or units of improved or unimproved land, or any portion thereof....” (Gov.Code, § 66424.) It specifically refers to the conversion of a rental mobilehome park to resident ownership as a form of “subdivision” ( id., § 66427.5), and refers to the applicant seeking to subdivide the...