Pace v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 89-14987

• Decision Date: 01 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-14987,89-14987
• Citation: 594 N.E.2d 187,62 Ohio Misc.2d 184
• Parties: PACE et al. v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.
• Court: Ohio Court of Claims

Page 184

62 Ohio Misc.2d 184

594 N.E.2d 187

PACE et al. v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.

No. 89-14987.

Court of Claims of Ohio.

Decided May 1, 1991.

Gerald R. Horning, Cleveland, for plaintiffs.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Mary J. Stepanic, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, for defendants.

RUSSELL LEACH, Judge.

On December 29, 1987, a snowplow, owned and operated by defendant, Ohio Department of Transportation ("ODOT"), struck a vehicle in which Michael Pace ("plaintiff") was a passenger. The impact caused plaintiff to strike the small finger of his left hand against the interior of the automobile. He also sustained various injuries to his neck and back. Plaintiff was transported to a nearby hospital where he received treatment for his injuries. Hospital records indicate that plaintiff's finger was swollen, but that he had incurred no more than a sprain.

Plaintiff went to the emergency room of the Kaiser Permanente Hospital on January 4, 1988, at which time, the treating physicians diagnosed the previously injured finger as infected. Over the next several days, physicians were unable to contain the scope or degree of infection. The tissues of the finger became necrotic, first at the tip, and this condition began to spread up the finger. Plaintiff was thereafter admitted to St. Luke's Hospital, where, on January 15, 1988, his finger was amputated.

On December 26, 1989, plaintiff filed suit against ODOT, contending that it was responsible for the loss of his finger as well as the attendant losses of wages, future economic value, and pain and suffering. He was joined in the action by his wife, whose complaint was for an alleged loss of consortium. The matter was tried before the court and is determined as hereinafter set forth based upon the evidence adduced by the parties.

At trial, the parties stipulated that the driver of defendant's snowplow negligently struck the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger. Consequently, the only issue before the court is whether defendant's negligence proximately caused the amputation of plaintiff's finger.

The law applicable to the instant circumstances is set forth in 22 American Jurisprudence 2d (1988), Damages, Section 281, as follows:

"[A] tortfeasor runs the risk that the person whom [sic ] he injures may be in such condition that the injury will be far more serious than had such person been strong. Thus, one who violates the duty, imposed by law, of exercising due care not to injure others may be compelled to respond in damages for all the injuries which he inflicts by reason of the violation of such duty, even if a particular injury may have been aggravated by or might not have happened at all except for the peculiar physical condition of the injured person. This is the rule that the defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him, or the 'thin skull' or 'eggshell skull' rule. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

This view is also set forth in the 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 502, Section 461, which states that:

"The negligent actor is subject to liability for harm to another although a physical condition of the other which is neither known nor should be known to the actor makes the injury greater than that which the actor as a reasonable man should have foreseen as a probable result of his conduct."

A more particular explanation is provided by Comment a to this section: "A negligent actor must bear the risk that his liability will be increased by reason of the actual physical condition of the other toward whom his act is negligent." See, also, Reeg v. Hodgson (1964), 1 Ohio App.2d 272, 278, 30 O.O.2d 293, 296, 202 N.E.2d 310, 315.

The preponderant evidence set forth by the parties indicates that a diabetic condition such as plaintiff's could easily metamorphose even a simple impact into a much more serious injury. The medical testimony was to the effect that diabetes interferes with the flow of blood to the major bodily organs, but especially to the extremities. Also, the capacity of the blood to carry oxygen to the cells is impaired by this disease, and markedly so as the amount of sugar in the blood increases. Additionally, when a trauma to an extremity, such as a finger or toe, causes swelling of the digit, the swelling creates internal hydraulic pressure that constricts the blood vessels and virtually eliminates circulation at the capillary level. The consequent suspension of the flow of oxygen to the damaged cells as well as the accumulation of cell debris in that area could easily result in cell death and necrosis of the affected tissues.

Medical records and testimony establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that when ...