Pace v. State, 75056
| Decision Date | 26 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 75056,75056 |
| Citation | 596 So.2d 1034 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Weekly S205 Bruce Douglas PACE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, and W.C. McLain, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Mark C. Menser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
Bruce Pace appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and affirm both the conviction and sentence.
On November 7, 1989, following a report from the victim's daughter that she had not heard from her father for three days, investigators commenced a search for Floyd Covington, a taxicab operator. They found Covington's bloodstained taxicab hidden in a wooded area that evening. Serology testing showed the bloodstains in the car to be consistent with Covington's blood type. A bloodstain pattern analyst testified that the bloodstains showed that someone sitting behind the steering wheel had been shot, with the shot coming from the passenger's side. Based on blood smears, the analyst concluded that the victim was moved from the driver's seat to the passenger's side of the car. Investigators found Covington's body in another wooded area approximately twelve miles from the taxicab on November 10, 1989. Covington had been shot twice in the chest, from distances of three to seven feet, with a shotgun. The medical examiner testified that either of the wounds would have caused death and that Covington had been shot two to seven days before the searchers found his body. A jury convicted Pace of first-degree murder and armed robbery and recommended that he be sentenced to death, which the trial court did.
On appeal Pace contends, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because it was circumstantial in nature and failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We deem it unnecessary to recite the facts linking Pace to this killing. We have reviewed the record and find the evidence sufficient to support the jury's determination of guilt.
Pace also complains of trial error in admitting an exculpatory statement he made to his stepfather and other statements he made to his cousin. The trial judge determined the statement to the stepfather incriminating due to its inherent admissions and unbelievability. We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling. See Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 940, 83 L.Ed.2d 953 (1985). In his statements to his cousin Pace expressed despair at being broke and said that he was going to remedy the condition "tomorrow" by doing something "he hated to do." These statements, when taken together with the other facts, were admissible. Swafford v. State, 533 So.2d 270 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1578, 103 L.Ed.2d 944 (1989).
Pace also complains about his thwarted efforts to cross-examine state witnesses concerning a third shotgun shell found at the scene following testimony about two other shells. The trial judge sustained the state's objection that such questioning exceeded the scope of direct examination. A trial judge may disallow cross-examination on matters not the subject of direct examination. Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332 (Fla.1982). However, in Coxwell v. State, 361 So.2d 148 (Fla.1978), we held it error for a trial judge to disallow cross-examination if facts sought to be elicited were germane to that witness' testimony and plausibly relevant to the theory of defense. In evaluating Pace's claim, we thus must determine whether the third shotgun shell was germane to testimony about the other shells and, if so, was it arguably relevant....
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Pace v. State
...(1985); Johnson v. State, 438 So.2d 774 (Fla.1983),cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1329, 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). Pace v. State, 596 So.2d 1034, 1035-36 (Fla.1992). On March 7, 1997, Pace filed an amended rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, raising twenty-one claims.2 The circ......
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Pace v. McNeil
...and death sentence to the Florida Supreme Court.7 The supreme court affirmed Pace's convictions and death sentence, Pace v. State, 596 So.2d 1034, 1035-36 (Fla.1992), and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari review, Pace v. Florida, 506 U.S. 885, 113 S.Ct. 244, 121 L.Ed.......
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Pace v. State
...to relief. Pace was sentenced to death following a jury's recommendation for death by a vote of seven to five. See Pace v. State, 596 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. 1992).1 His sentence of death became final in 1992. Pace v. Florida, 506 U.S. 885, 113 S.Ct. 244, 121 L.Ed.2d 178 (1992). Thus, Hurst ......
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Perez v. State, 2D05-3565.
...and plausibly relevant to the theory of defense.'" Bertram v. State, 637 So.2d 258, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (quoting Pace v. State, 596 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Fla.1992)). The purpose of cross-examination includes the attempt "(1) to weaken, test, or demonstrate the impossibility of the testimony ......