Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 04 August 1965
• Citation: 45 Cal.Rptr. 892,236 Cal.App.2d 325
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CALIFORNLA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD et al., Defendants and Respondents, Sailors' Union of the Pacific et al., Plaintiffs in Intervention and Respondents. Civ. 22338

Page 892

45 Cal.Rptr. 892

236 Cal.App.2d 325

PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CALIFORNLA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD et al., Defendants and Respondents, Sailors' Union of the Pacific et al., Plaintiffs in Intervention and Respondents.

Civ. 22338

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 4, 1965.

Hearing Denied Sept. 29, 1965.

Richard Ernst, Peter B. Spruance, San Francisco, for appellants.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., of State of California, Clayton P. Roche, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for respondents California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Board et al.

John Paul Jennings, Jennings, Gartland & Tilly, San Francisco, for intervenors Sailors' Union of the Pacific et al.

SULLIVAN, Presiding Justice.

The main question confronting us in this case is whether a seaman who has terminated his employment as required by provisions of a collective bargaining agreement fixing limited tenure of employment under a system of job rotation is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits because 'he left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause' within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256. ¹ We hold that the employee did not thereby leave his employment voluntarily since at the time of his separation he did not in reality choose to quit. Nor do we believe he should be deemed to have left voluntarily on the theory that through the agency of his union he agreed to the contract provisions which eventually necessitated his displacement. We conclude that he is not precluded from receiving his unemployment benefits and that the judgment of the lower court upholding his eligibility to receive them should be affirmed.

This is an appeal by Pacific Maritime Association, Matson Navigation Company and Oceanic Steamship Company (hereafter referred to as the Association, Matson and Oceanic respectively) from a judgment denying their petition for a writ of mandate, and discharging an alternative writ of mandate, directing respondents California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and the named members thereof (hereafter referred to collectively as the Board) to reverse and set aside its decision ² upholding the granting of unemployment compensation benefits to claimants Sexton and Boykin and directing the Board and respondent Albert B. Tieburg, Director of the Department of Employment, to remove all charges to petitioners' reserve accounts made on the basis of the claims of said claimants and to make no similar charges on the basis of similar claims. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties and order of the court below, the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union and the Marine Firemen's Union, comprising the Pacific District of the Seafarers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (hereafter referred to collectively as the Unions) filed in the court below a complaint in intervention praying that the petition be dismissed. ³

The instant action (No. 536996 below)

The facts are not in dispute. Pacific Maritime Association represents employers in the maritime industry, including Matson and Oceanic, in negotiating, executing and administering collective bargaining agreements with the Unions. Claimant Edward R. Sexton was actively employed as a seaman by Matson until his employment terminated on January 2, 1963 and claimant Sam. H. Boykin as a seaman by Oceanic until his employment terminated on February 21, 1963. Both men were members of a pool of unlicensed seamen represented by nion of North America, AFL-CIO employment was terminated solely because of limited tenure provisions contained in the pertinent collective bargaining agreements entered into between the maritime employers and the maritime unions. At all material times the Unions were the duly certified collective bargaining representatives of the seamen.

Both claimants filed claims for unemployment compensation benefits with the Department of Employment which ruled that neither man was subject to the disqualification of section 1256 and that their employers' reserve accounts were not relieved of benefit charges under section 1032. ⁴ The employers filed notices of appeal to a referee of the Department of Employment, who upheld the lower administrative decisions in a consolidated proceeding. Another appeal to respondent Board led to another affirmance.

As the trial court found, the abovementioned limited tenure provisions were first made a part of the pertinent collective bargaining agreements beginning on or about January 1, 1959. ⁵ Prior to 1959, there had been in existence unilateral rules adopted by the Unions which provided for distribution of available work among their members. However, the court found that when such rules were unilateral, the employer was not required to terminate the seaman when his time was up nor was the seaman required to leave his employment, if still available to him. Under the limited tenure provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreements, the tenure of employment was fixed according to classifications of employees determined on a basis of seniority. ⁶

It is convenient at this point to note the disparate positions of the contracting parties with respect to the limited tenure provisions. Although petitioners do not question the validity or binding effect of any of the collective bargaining agreements, their position essentially has been, and is, that they opposed the demand of the Unions to include the limited tenure provisions in the agreements but finally agreed to their inclusion 'involuntarily.' They asserted below that the shipping rules limiting tenure of employment were both unnecessary and undesirable and in practical effect remained at all times a unilateral union rule.

The prior action (No. 506224 below)

On December 9, 1960, Pacific Maritime Association and seven of its members, ⁷ including Matson and Oceanic, petitioners herein, filed in the court below a petition for a writ of mandate seeking the same relief against the Board, its members and the Director of Employment as they do in the instant action except that the claims for compensation benefits were by different seamen covering different periods of unemployment. In such prior action, the Unions, intervenors and respondents herein, filed a complaint in intervention in the same capacity and for the same reasons as they have done in this one. Indeed, without entering upon a detailed comparison of the petitions, it is sufficient to say that except for the names of the claimants and the pertinent dates, the allegations of the petition in the prior action are practically the same as those of the petition in the instant one. ⁸ It is also sufficient for our present purposes to mention that in the prior action, petitioners alleged that they 'agreed in the give and take of collective bargaining' to acquiesce in the demands of the Unions for limited tenure provisions, whereas in the instant action they allege that such provisions were 'agreed to involuntarily.' It is apparent that in the prior action these petitioners raised the same issue of fact as they did in the instant one: whether the inclusion of limited tenure provisions in the same collective bargaining agreements was a mere involuntary 'acquiescence' to the demands of the Unions rather than the voluntary act of all contracting parties.

In the prior action (No. 506224) the court found in substance that the limited tenure provisions of the collective bargaining agreements were agreeable to, and desired by, both the maritime employers and the Unions and that the employment of each claimant was terminated by his employer 'under and by virtue of the provisions of his respective collective bargaining agreements set forth and quoted' in the petition. The court concluded 'That each of the seamen * * * did not leave his employer's employ voluntarily within the meaning of sections 1032 and 1256 * * * but left his most recent work involuntarily.' Judgment was entered accordingly, denying the petition for a writ of mandate and discharging the alternative writ. No appeal was taken and said judgment became final. ⁹

Findings and conclusions in the instant action (No. 536996)

As already mentioned, the trial court made findings as to the nature, purpose and effect of the limited tenure provisions of the bilateral shipping rules included in the collective bargaining agreements, their application to the specified claimants, and the termination of claimants' shipboard employment pursuant thereto. It was also found that essentially the same issues of fact and law were raised in the instant proceedings (No. 536996) as were raised and adjudicated in the prior proceedings (No. 506224). The court made alternate conclusions of law: (1) On the merits of the case, without consideration of the effect of the prior judgment in action No. 506224, it concluded that the decision of the Board affirming the payment of benefits to the two claimants should be upheld; (2) as to the effect of the prior judgment, it concluded that petitioners herein were estopped thereby from relitigating (a) the issue as to whether or not their acquiescence in the limited tenure provisions of the bilateral shipping rules was voluntary or (b) the issue as to whether seamen who leave their work by virtue of such provisions, leave their work voluntarily or involuntarily. Finally, the court concluded that the specified claimants were not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits and their employers' reserve accounts should not be relieved of charges therefor. Judgment was entered accordingly. This appeal followed.

As we indicated at the outset, the main question which we face is whether an employee who leaves work as required by the above limited tenure provisions incorporated in the pertinent collective bargaining agreements has left work 'voluntarily without good cause.' However, we must first decide whether peti...