Pack v. Royal-Globe Ins. Companies
| Decision Date | 04 May 1970 |
| Docket Number | ROYAL-GLOBE |
| Citation | 224 Tenn. 452,457 S.W.2d 19,2 Pack 452 |
| Parties | , 224 Tenn. 452 David M. PACK, Commissioner, Department of Insurance and Banking, Appellant, v.INSURANCE COMPANIES, Appellees. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., and C. Hayes Cooney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellant.
James F. Neal, Nashville, for appellees.
Royal-Globe Insurance Companies, a related group of insurance companies, of which the appellees are members, made application to the Commissioner of the Department of Insurance and Banking, for a twenty-five (25%) per cent rate increase for private passenger automobile liability insurance to be written in Tennessee. The filing amounted to a statewide upward deviation from existing bureau rates. The request for the increased rate was filed in December 1967, pursuant to T.C.A. § 56--603 et seq. This request was denied.
In September 1968, the Insurance Rating Board, of which petitioners Royal-Globe Insurance Companies are members, filed a request for a premium rate increase on behalf of all its members. This request was denied in October 1968. On March 3, 1969, the Commissioner denied the proposed upward deviation for the reason that the statistics furnished by the companies did not justify the filing or increase requested. Thereupon the Insurance Companies requested, and were granted, a hearing as provided by statute, which hearing was held on May 5, 1969, when petitioners, the Insurance Companies presented oral and written evidence purporting to support the requested increase rate.
On June 4, 1969, the Commissioner, by letter, affirmed his previous denial of the increase rate requested, stating that he had reviewed the filing, together with the testimony given at the hearing, and that the evidence offered in support of the requested rate increase was not sufficiently preponderant to merit an affirmative decision.
Thereafter, the Insurance Companies filed their petition in the Circuit Court at Nashville for the common law writ of certiorari to review the rulings of the Commissioner.
The case was heard before Honorable James M. Swiggart, Judge, upon the petition, the answers and the transcript of the proceeding before the Commissioner.
The trial judge entered an order finding that the Commissioner's orders of denial of May 8, 1969 and June 4, 1969, were 'legally insufficient' and said orders were vacated and set aside,
Upon the Court granting the common law writ of certiorari the Commissioner filed a lengthy answer to the petition and also to a motion by the Insurance Companies for a summary judgment in their favor. The Commissioner stated in his answer, in substance, that based upon matters contained in the filing, the testimony of witnesses at the hearing and upon the entire record, his opinion was that the proposed revision of automobile liability and property damage rates did not meet the applicable requirements contained in T.C.A. § 56--602(4) that rates must be fair, reasonable, adequate and not unfairly discriminatory. He denied that his findings were without support. He admitted that he was required to consider past and prospective loss experience within and outside the state. That he considered and weighed the fact that petitioners did not include in the filing any evidence of loss experience outside the state; that he found that the 'inflationary trend factor', a material factor relied upon in the filing as a means of having prospective loss experience which was not shown to a reliable, rather than a conjectural means of showing prospective loss experience as a basis for its requested rate revision.
That the annual statement filed for the year 1968 reflected an aggregate net income of $3,672.50 after federal income tax of $4,838,614.00, together with dividends to stockholders in the amount of $13,293,032.00 during the same period. He denied that his disapproval of the proposed rates was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, and without support in the record.
He denied that he erroneously concluded that he could consider dividends paid to stockholders in passing on proposed rates and states that T.C.A. § 56--602(1) authorizes and directs him to consider this factor under the factor of reasonable margin for profit. That at the hearing petitioners were allowed to present all the evidence they desired to present in support of their finding.
In further response to the remand David M. Pack filed an answer in which he stated that he vacated the office of Commissioner of the Department of Insurance and Banking on September 3, 1969, and was on the same date appointed Attorney General and Reporter of the State of Tennessee. That on September 5, 1969, Milton P. Rice was appointed Commissioner of the Department of Insurance and Banking, and that he has no express legal authority to decide the question proposed by the Court by amending or modifying the previous ruling by former Commissioner Pack.
On December 2, 1969, the Trial Judge filed a written opinion in the case which was made a part of the record, and on December 9, 1969, entered judgment in which he held:
And it was the further judgment of the court that: 'the filing of Petitioner dated February 17, 1969, be, and the same hereby is, deemed approved by the Commissioner.' From which judgment the Commissioner prayed, and was granted an appeal to this Court.
The first question we are to determine is whether this Court has jurisdiction.
In King v. King, 164 Tenn. 666, 51 S.W.2d 488, it was held that 'The jurisdiction of this Court, * * * extends to all cases determined in the trial court on demurrer or Other method not involving a review or determination of facts.' (Emphasis supplied).
As the issue here neither involves a review nor a determination of the facts, we hold this Court does have jurisdiction of the case. Long v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 209 Tenn. 435, 354 S.W.2d 255; T.C.A. § 16--408; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Comm., 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233; In Re Williams' Estate, 213 Tenn. 707, 378 S.W.2d 775. We hold this Court does have jurisdiction of the appeal.
The first assignment is that the Court erred by retaining jurisdiction of the case after holding that the Commissioner's ruling, after a public hearing (T.C.A. § 56--603(g)) was 'legally insufficient.' This assignment of error is overruled. Such practice was followed in Long v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 209 Tenn. 435, 354 S.W.2d 255. 'If a board or commissioner has failed to make an essential finding and the record on review is insufficient to provide the basis for a final determination, the proper procedure for the court is to remand the case for further proceedings before the board.' 42 Am.Jur. p. 689, § 248; So. Bell T. & T. Co. v. Tenn. Public Service Comm., 202 Tenn. 465, 304 S.W.2d 640.
The next five assignments of errors will be considered together, and are: (2) the court erred in finding that appellees were denied a fair hearing; (3) that the Commissioner's conclusions or reasons for denying the rate filing did not meet the applicable statutory requirements; (4) because appellant's conclusions were not supported by any evidence in the record; (5) that appellant's rulings were illegal and arbitrary; and (7) that appellant's rulings were not made according to the applicable law, and the rate filing was deemed approved as a matter of law.
The case was in the trial court on the common law writ of certiorari, and a review there was limited to a determination whether the inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233, and only questions of law will be reviewed. Southern Bell T. T. Co. v. Tenn. Public Service Commission, 202 Tenn. 465, 304 S.W.2d 640; Boyd, Commissioner v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 Tenn. 658, 330 S.W.2d 13; Fentress County Beer Board v. Cravens, 209 Tenn. 679, 356 S.W.2d 260; Reddoch v. Smith, 214 Tenn. 213, 223, 379 S.W.2d 641.
T.C.A. § 56--603(a) provides that * * *' And § 56--603(c) ...
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