Fentress County Beer Bd. v. Cravens
| Decision Date | 04 April 1962 |
| Citation | 356 S.W.2d 260,209 Tenn. 679,13 McCanless 679 |
| Parties | , 209 Tenn. 679 The FENTRESS COUNTY BEER BOARD, Appellant, v. Boyd C. CRAVENS, Appellee. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Neal & Craven, Jamestown, for appellant.
Maxey & Oakley, Livingston, Allen M. O'Brien, Springfield, for appellee.
This case involves a challenge of the constitutionality of Chapter 105, Public Acts of 1961, amending our beer statutes (1950 Code Supp. sec. 1191.14, now T.C.A. §§ 57-205, 57-209) so as to provide that an applicant, on compliance with all requirements of the law, shall be issued a permit to sell beer; and that if refused the permit, he may have such refusal reviewed by the statutory writ of certiorari.
On April 21, 1961, Boyd C. Cravens filed in the Chancery Court of Fentress County a petition for the statutory writ of certiorari, or certiorari in lieu of an appeal, seeking a review de novo of the action of the defendants, the Fentress County Beer Board, in refusing to issue him a permit to sell beer in that county on his premises located on U. S. Highway No. 127 some four miles from the city limits of Jamestown.
The petition alleged that on April 8, 1961, he filed with the Board an application for such permit which was in proper form and fully complied with the law in all respects; that he was legally entitled to be issued a permit; that the Board refused to issue him a permit and refused to grant him a hearing upon his application; and that in so doing, they acted illegally and arbitrarily; and he prayed that his petition be sustained and that he be issued the permit.
Defendant filed a demurrer, but made no return to the writ, since there had been no hearing or proceedings before them. The demurrer was overruled, and an answer filed, and the cause was heard upon proof adduced before the Chancellor. Petitioner was supported by a number of witnesses, including the Mayor of Jamestown and other leading citizens, all of whom said he had a good character. Defendants admitted this was true, and that they had refused to hear his application only because they were opposed to the sale of beer and would not issue a permit to anyone.
Chancellor Officer found that the facts stated in the petition were true; that petitioner's application complied with all the requirements of the law and he was entitled to have the Board issue him the permit; and that in refusing to do so, they acted 'illegally, arbitrarily, capriciously and without any legal right or authorization.' He accordingly entered a decree sustaining the petition and directing defendants to issue the permit to petitioner.
Defendants appealed in error and insist that under our statute (T.C.A. §§ 57-205, 57-209), prior to this 1961 amendment, petitioner had no legal right to a permit or to complain of their denial of a hearing on his application therefor; that his only remedy for review of their action was the common law writ of certiorari; and that this amendment, undertaking to give him such a right and afford him a review by statutory certiorari, was unconstitutional; that the Chancellor should have so held, and denied petitioner any relief.
Our statute (Acts 1933, ch. 69, now T.C.A. § 57-201) legalized the manufacture and sale of beer in Tennessee. But it provided no one could engage in such business without first obtaining a permit and a license from the local authorities (the city, if the business was to be therein, if outside the city, the quarterly court), and left a large discretion to such authorities in issuing and revoking permits. Wright v. State, 171 Tenn. 628, 636-638, 106 S.W.2d 866; Gatlinburg Beer Reg. Committee v. Ogle, 185 Tenn. 482, 487-8, 206 S.W.2d 891.
This statute (Acts 1933, ch. 69) was amended by chapter 53, Acts 1943 (1950 Code Supp., sec. 1191.14, now T.C.A. § 57-209), so as to provide that the action of such an agency in revoking such license or permit might be reviewed by the 'common law writ of certiorari', and that this should be the 'only method' of review. Putnam County Beer Board v. Speck, 184 Tenn. 616, 201 S.W.2d 991; Shelton v. Mooneyhan, 205 Tenn. 425, 431, 326 S.W.2d 825.
Construing section 1191.14, we held that it made a distinction between the issuance of a permit and the revocation of a permit; that the holder of a permit had a legal right to a hearing before it could be revoked, but an applicant for a permit had no legal right to complain of denial of his application without a hearing. State ex rel. Camper v. Pollard, 189 Tenn. 86, 89-91, 222 S.W.2d 374; Manuel v. Eckel, 199 Tenn. 234, 236, 285 S.W.2d 360; Chanaberry v. Gordy, 200 Tenn. 220, 224-225, 292 S.W.2d 18.
Thus, under our statute (1191.14; T.C.A. §§ 57-205, 57-209), the law was that when one's permit was revoked, his right of review was only by the common law writ of certiorari (1932 Code, sec. 8989; T.C.A. § 27-801)--a right limited to an examination of the transcript of the proceedings before the Board, and a determination of whether the Board had acted fraudulently, illegally, or exceeded its jurisdiction (Putnam County Beer Bd. v. Speck, supra; Boyd v. G. M. A. C., 205 Tenn. 658, 668, 330 S.W.2d 13); and that one whose application for a permit was denied had no remedy at all. State ex rel. Camper v. Pollard, supra.
So, the Legislature passed Chapter 105, Public Acts 1961 (effective February 24, 1961), T.C.A. §§ 57-205 and 57-209 in the three following particulars, to wit:
First. It amended § 57-205 by adding at the end of said section a new provision as follows:
Second. It amended section 57-209 by striking out of said section the following two sentences:
and by substituting in lieu thereof the following:
'The action of such agency in connection with the issuance of any order of any kind, including the revocation of a license or permit or the refusal to grant a license or permit under §§ 57-205, 57-208 and 57-209 [Tennessee Code Annotated, such action] may be reviewed by statutory writ of certiorari, with a trial de novo as a substitute for an appeal, said petition of a certiorari to be addressed to the circuit or chancery court of the county in which any such order was issued.'
Third. It further amended section 57-209 by striking out of section 57-209 the following sentence:
'Said action shall be reviewed by the circuit court solely upon the transcript of the proceedings before the revoking agency, and neither party shall be entitled to introduce new evidence in the circuit court.'
and by substituting in lieu thereof the following:
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