Padilla-Garcia v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 01 November 1999
• Docket Number: P,PADILLA-GARCI,No. 99-1193,99-1193
• Citation: 212 F.3d 69
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2000) SANTAlaintiff, Appellant, v. JOSE GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ, In his Personal Capacity and in his Official Capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Mayaguez; MUNICIPALITY OF MAYAGUEZ; REINALDO TORRES; EDGARDO LUGO, In his Personal Capacity and in his Official Capacity; Z, Y, W PERSONS, Who also conspired to discriminate against plaintiff depriving her of protected rights for wrongful termination of employment contract, Defendants, Appellees. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 69

212 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2000)

SANTA PADILLA-GARCIA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. JOSE GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ, In his Personal Capacity and in his Official Capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Mayaguez; MUNICIPALITY OF MAYAGUEZ; REINALDO TORRES; EDGARDO LUGO, In his Personal Capacity and in his Official Capacity; Z, Y, W PERSONS, Who also conspired to discriminate

against plaintiff depriving her of protected rights for wrongful termination of employment contract, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 99-1193

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Heard November 1, 1999

Decided May 15, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Francisco R. Gonzalez for appellant.

Sigfredo Rodrguez-Isaac, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice, with whom Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor General, and Edda Serrano-Blasini, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief, for appellees Hon. Jose Guillermo Rodrguez, Reinaldo Torres and Edgardo Lugo.

Juan Rafael Gonzalez-Munoz, with whom Gonzalez Munoz & Quinones Tridas was on brief, for appellees the Municipality of Mayaguez, Hon. Jose Guillermo Rodrguez, Reinaldo Torres and Edgardo Lugo, in their official capacity.

Before: Torruella, Chief Judge, Wallace,^* Senior Circuit Judge, and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

This First Amendment case addresses political discrimination within a political party -- specifically, whether direct support for members of a rival faction within a political party is sufficiently political to serve as the basis for a political discrimination claim. The appellant, Santa Padilla-Garca, worked for the municipality of Mayaguez until she was informed by the new mayor and members of his administration (collectively "the appellees") that her contract would not be renewed. She alleges that the decision not to renew her contract came about because she supported the former mayor and his preferred successor and because she spoke out against the new administration. As a result, she claims that her First Amendment rights were violated because (1) the appellees discriminated against her on the basis of her political beliefs, and (2) they infringed on her freedom of speech.

The district court granted summary judgment for the appellees on both claims. The court concluded that the appellant failed to make a prima facie case of political discrimination because her association with the former mayor was personal, rather than political, in nature. See Padilla-Garca v. Rodrguez, No. 94-1659, at 15 (D.P.R. Oct. 15, 1998) (opinion and order granting summary judgment) [hereinafter "Opinion"]. Although the constitutionality of political patronage is a complicated and controversial area of jurisprudence in which we normally refrain from taking an expansive view, in this case, we construe the Supreme Court's decisions that address political patronage to require a different result than that reached by the district court. By establishing that she was a well-known supporter of the new mayor's rivals within the party and had actively campaigned against him in a hotly contested primary election, the appellant created a dispute of fact as to whether her relationship with the new mayor's factional opponents was a "political" association protected by the First Amendment.

Additionally, the district court erred when it dismissed the appellant's free speech claim because she could not show that her protected expression was "the 'substantial or motivating factor'" in the decision not to renew her contract. Opinion at 21. The proper standard under Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), is whether the protected conduct constitutes a factor in the adverse employment decision.

Based on the facts of this case, viewed in a light most favorable to the appellant, we must reverse the district court's judgment for the reasons discussed below.¹

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are briefly summarized below in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-appellant. Padilla-Garca was appointed "Chief of Planning" for the Office of Economic and Community Development ("O.D.E.C.O.") in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, on June 25, 1991 by then-Mayor Benjamn Cole. She signed a contract specifying that her employment was effective from July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992 and indicating that her contract was of fixed duration and would only be renewed at the prerogative of the municipality. On July 3, 1992, her appointment was extended to June 30, 1993, subject to the availability of funds for the O.D.E.C.O. program.

In November 1992, Jose Guillermo Rodrguez was elected mayor. Although Cole and Rodrguez are both members of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), Cole represents a different faction than that of Rodrguez. Padilla-Garca was commonly associated with Mayor Cole and his administration and well known for participating in the primary campaign against Mayor Rodrguez. Nevertheless, Padilla-Garca was appointed to be a member of the transition committee, during which time she experienced several incidents of humiliation and harassment which she attributes to her role in the previous administration. She also had a running conflict with the new administration regarding compliance with rules and regulations.

On May 27, 1993, Padilla-Garca was informed that her employment with the city would not be renewed because her duties would be subsumed by the new Municipal Planning Office. She brought this suit on May 13, 1994 against the Municipality of Mayaguez and Jose Guillermo Rodrguez, Reinaldo Torres, Edgardo Lugo, and Luis Rodrguez-Fernandez, in their individual and official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, unconstitutional discrimination based on her political beliefs, and an impermissible infringement on her freedom of speech. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on October 15, 1998. Padilla-Garca appeals from summary judgment on her First Amendment claims only.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the district court's summary judgment de novo, "viewing 'the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'" Euromotion, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 136 F.3d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also Morris v. Government Dev. Bank, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994).

III. POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION

It is now well established that political patronage restrains freedom of belief and association, core activities protected by the First Amendment. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 354 (1976). In a trilogy of cases, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 354; Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 516 (1980); and Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990), the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of political patronage and collectively held that non-policymaking² public employees are protected from adverse employment decisions based on their political affiliation. Justice Brennan's opinion in Elrod emphasized the right to associate with the political party of one's choice as a basic constitutional freedom. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356. This right flows naturally from the principle that "'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'" Id. at 357 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).

In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, the Court established a two-part burden-shifting analysis for evaluating free speech claims, which has also been applied in the political discrimination context. See Rodrguez-Ros v. Cordero, 138 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1998); Acevedo-Daz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 1993). First, the plaintiff must show that she engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, and that this conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment decision. If she does so, then the defendant is given the opportunity to establish that it would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff's political beliefs - commonly referred to as the Mt. Healthy defense. See 429 U.S. at 287.

A. Appellant's Prima Facie Case

The plaintiff's burden under Mt. Healthy goes directly to causation. To prevail she must point to evidence in the record that would "permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the challenged personnel action occurred and stemmed from a politically based discriminatory animus." Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Rodrguez-Ros, 138 F.3d at 24; Vazquez v. Lopez-Rosario, 134 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1998). This showing requires more than merely "juxtaposing a protected characteristic - someone else's politics - with the fact that plaintiff was treated unfairly." Correa-Martnez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 1990); see, e.g., Rodrguez-Ros, 138 F.3d at 24 (evidence demonstrating that defendants were politically active and were aware of plaintiff's opposing views).

Thus, there are two components to Padilla-Garca's prima facie case: 1) that an affiliation with Mayor Cole and the rival primary candidate was a motivating factor for her non-renewal, and 2) that the affiliation was political. The district court granted summary judgment for the appellees on the political discrimination claim because it determined that the appellant's affiliation was not political. The court concluded that "[w]hile it is probable that Padilla has made a showing that she suffered discrimination in the form of the municipality's failure to rehire her," Opinion at 15, she had not shown that the decision "was premised on politics and not simply her personal associations," id. at 17. The appellant...