Padilla v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 May 2019
• Docket Number: Case Number: 18-24988-CIV-MORENO
• Citation: 391 F.Supp.3d 1108
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: Santiago PADILLA and Murray L. Shames, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.

391 F.Supp.3d 1108

Santiago PADILLA and Murray L. Shames, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.

Case Number: 18-24988-CIV-MORENO

United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Division.

Signed May 21, 2019

Andrew Parker Felix, T. Michael Morgan, Morgan, Morgan, P.A., Orlando, FL, Paula R. Brown, Pro Hac Vice, Timothy G. Blood, Pro Hac Vice, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Fredrick Howard Lebron McClure, J. Trumon Phillips, DLA Piper LLP, Tampa, FL, Matthew A. Goldberg, Pro Hac Vice, William F. Kiniry, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, DLA Piper LLP, DLA Piper LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS

FEDERICO A. MORENO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Santiago Padilla and Murray Shames (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed a Class Action Complaint against Defendant Porsche Cars North America, Inc. ("Porsche"), seeking declaratory relief and damages for alleged violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA") and for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Florida law, based upon Porsche's alleged knowledge of an alleged safety defect in the cooling system of certain Porsche vehicle models. Porsche filed a Motion to Dismiss, asking the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' 3-count Class Action Complaint with prejudice under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, Porsche's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that Porsche sold its high-end performance vehicles as safe, despite knowing for more than a decade that it used a defective epoxy adhesive to join coolant pipes to the thermostat housing assembly. According to Plaintiffs, the "Cooling System Defect" occurs when the epoxy adhesive degrades, loosens, and eventually fails due to the contraction and expansion of coolant pipes caused by repeated heating and cooling over time; and when the epoxy adhesive fails, the cooling pipes separate from the thermostat housing assembly, causing a significant coolant leak that in turn causes the engine to overheat.

Plaintiff Padilla purchased his used 2011 Porsche Panamera from The Collection, a car dealership located in Miami, Florida. Plaintiff Shames bought his used 2011 Cayenne S from the Carmax in Tampa, Florida. Within two years of purchase, each high-end performance vehicle suffered the Cooling System Defect, which resulted in each Plaintiff having to pay thousands of dollars in repairs out of their pockets. After Shames's vehicle suffered the Cooling System Defect a second time, within seventeen months of the first occurrence, he wrote a letter to Porsche notifying them of the Cooling System Defect and demanded that Porsche pay for the repairs. When Porsche refused to pay, because the repairs were incurred outside the standard warranty period, Shames traded in his 2011 Cayenne S at a loss. Padilla apparently still owns his vehicle.

On November 29, 2018, Plaintiffs commenced this class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of all current or former owners and/or lessees of certain Porsche models that suffer from the Cooling System Defect. On January 28, 2019, Porsche filed a Motion to Dismiss the Class Action Complaint.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive dismissal, the Class Action Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. And those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. When ruling on Porsche's Motion to Dismiss, the Court must view Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accept Plaintiffs' well-pleaded facts as true. See St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am. , 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1986).

III. DISCUSSION

The Class Action Complaint asserts three claims against Porsche: (1) in Count I, violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Florida Statute Sections 501.201, et seq. ; (2) in Count II, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Florida law; and (3) in Count III, declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2201. Porsche seeks to dismiss each Count with prejudice. The Court addresses each Count in turn.

A. COUNT I – FLORIDA DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

In Count I, Plaintiffs assert one claim for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Porsche argues this FDUTPA claim should be dismissed with prejudice as barred by the statute of limitations.

1. Statute of Limitations

"A statute of limitations bar is ‘an affirmative defense, and ... [P]laintiff[s] [are] not required to negate an affirmative defense in [their] complaint.’ " La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc. , 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tregenza v. Great Am. Comms. Co. , 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993) ). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds "is appropriate only if it is ‘apparent from the face of the complaint’ that the claim is time-barred." Id. (citations omitted). When the time-bar is apparent from the face of the complaint, Plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading allegations sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. See Heuer v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. , No. CV 17-60018, 2017 WL 3475063, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2017) (citing Patel v. Diplomat , 605 F. App'x 965, 966 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying La Grasta and finding that, where the dates included in the complaint made the time-bar apparent, plaintiff was required to allege facts that supported tolling the statute of limitations)).

The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' claim under FDUTPA is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f) ; Speier-Roche v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am. Inc. , No. 14-20107-CIV, 2014 WL 1745050, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2014). A FDUTPA claim accrues "at the time of purchase or lease of a product, not upon discovery of an alleged defect." Id. (citing Matthews v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. , No. 12-60630-CIV, 2012 WL 2520675, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2012) ).

Here, Plaintiffs commenced this action on November 29, 2018. Plaintiffs Padilla and Shames allege they purchased their used vehicles in 2013 and 2014, respectively. (D.E. 1 at ¶¶ 13–14.) While Plaintiffs do not specify in the Class Action Complaint which month they purchased their respective vehicles, see id. , it appears the four-year limitations period has run on both claims. Regardless of what month Padilla purchased his vehicle in 2013, the limitations period ran on his FDUTPA claim in 2017. Whether the limitations period has run on Shames's FDUTPA claim requires closer inspection because he purchased his vehicle in 2014.

Porsche submits, as an exhibit to a declaration, a Vehicle Information Check from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles showing Shames purchased his vehicle in July 2014. (See D.E. 12-1.) Porsche requests that the Court take judicial notice of this Vehicle Information Check. (D.E. 13.) This Court has previously recognized that it "may take judicial notice of and consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or response, which are public records that are central to a plaintiff's claims, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment" so long as "such documents are public records that [are] not subject to reasonable dispute because they [are] capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy could not reasonably be questioned." Domond v. Peoplenetwork APS , No. 16-24026-CIV, 2017 WL 5642450, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Fla. June 16, 2017) (quoting Horne v. Potter , 392 F. App'x 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) ), aff'd , 748 F. App'x 261 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam )) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Court will take judicial notice of the Vehicle Information Check because Plaintiffs do not oppose Porsche's request (see D.E. 21 at 3), and because the Vehicle Information Check held by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is a public record that is not subject to reasonable dispute. See id. ; Townsend v. Crews , No. 14-24126-CIV, 2014 WL 6979646, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2014) (Moreno, J.) (taking judicial notice of "records which can be found online" on government website); see also Snyder v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of San Francisco (ERAC-SF) , 392 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (taking judicial notice of Department of Motor Vehicle records) (citing Shaghoian v. Aghajani , 228 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (same)). Therefore, Porsche's Motion for Judicial Notice (D.E. 13) is granted in part.¹

The Vehicle Information Check on Shames's vehicle reveals that it was purchased in July 2014. As such, the statute of limitations on Shames's FDUTPA claim ran in July 2018—four months before this action commenced in November 2018. Therefore, it is " ‘apparent from the face of the complaint’ that the [FDUTPA] claim is time-barred" under Section...