Paige v. State

• Decision Date: 21 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. 18-164,18-164
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: H. Brooke PAIGE v. STATE of Vermont, et al.

205 A.3d 526

H. Brooke PAIGE

v.STATE of Vermont, et al.

No. 18-164

Supreme Court of Vermont.

October Term, 2018

December 21, 2018

Reargument Denied January 16, 2019

H. Brooke Paige, Pro Se, Washington, Plaintiff-Appellant.

Bernard D. Lambek of Zalinger Cameron & Lambek, PC, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee Washington Town School Board.

Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, and Philip Back, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendants-Appellees State of Vermont, et al.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Skoglund, Robinson, Eaton and Carroll, JJ.

EATON, J.

¶ 1. Plaintiff H. Brooke Paige, a taxpayer and resident of Washington, Vermont, appeals the civil division's dismissal of his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of Vermont and the Washington Town School Board. In his complaint, he asserted that Act 46, a 2015 state law related to education funding, spending, and governance, impermissibly coerced town residents into voting to merge school districts. He further alleged that Act 46 deprived town residents of local control of education and would result in unequal educational opportunities in violation of the Education and Common Benefits Clauses of the Vermont Constitution. We conclude that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action and therefore affirm the decision below.

¶ 2. In 2015, the Vermont Legislature enacted Act 46 to address a statewide trend of declining student enrollment and increased education costs. 2015, No. 46, § 1. The law was intended "to move the State toward sustainable models of educational governance" by encouraging local action to "maximize operational efficiencies through increased flexibility to manage, share, and transfer resources, with a goal of increasing the district-level ratio of students to full-time equivalent staff."Id. § 2. To achieve this goal, Act 46 established a multi-year process for merging existing school districts into newly created districts with preferred governance structures. The law contained financial incentives for districts to voluntarily merge. Id. § 6 (providing for decreased homestead property tax rate, merger support grant, and transition facilitation grant to districts that merged before July 2017); id. § 7 (providing for decreased homestead property tax rate and merger support grant to districts that merged between July 2017 and July 2019). The law directed the State Board of Education to order districts that had not acted by November 2018 to merge or realign where necessary. Id. § 10.

¶ 3. Plaintiff is a registered voter, taxpayer, and justice of the peace in the town of Washington. In May 2017, Washington residents voted to merge the Washington school district with that of the neighboring town of Orange pursuant to Act 46. That August, plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of State alleging that the merger vote violated Vermont and federal election laws because he and fellow Washington residents were coerced by Act 46 into voting for the merger. The Secretary dismissed the complaint, stating that administrative relief was unavailable because the merger vote was not a primary or general election in which a federal office appeared on the ballot.

¶ 4. In September 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the civil division against the State of Vermont, the Vermont Board of Education, Secretary of Education Rebecca Holcombe, Secretary of State James Condos, and the Washington Town School Board. In his amended complaint, he alleged that Act 46 deprived Washington residents of local control of education in violation of the Education Clause of the Vermont Constitution, ch. II, § 68 ; deprived town residents of the right to equal educational opportunities expressed in Brigham v. State (Brigham I ), 166 Vt. 246, 692 A.2d 384 (1997) ; and impermissibly coerced voters in violation of the Vermont Constitution and state and federal election laws. He asked the court to void the merger vote and order the Washington Town School Board restored to its previous governance structure. He also asked the court to reverse the Secretary of State's decision dismissing his administrative complaint. He sought an award of $10,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to the Washington Town School Board, and $1.00 in damages to him for bringing this action, plus costs.

¶ 5. The State moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court held that plaintiff had standing as a Washington taxpayer because he alleged that as a result of the merger, Washington residents would bear an increased financial burden due to the additional costs associated with the Orange school. However, it determined that plaintiff failed to state a claim that Act 46 violated the Education Clause or the Common Benefits Clause as interpreted in Brigham I, or that the law impermissibly coerced voters in contravention of Articles 8 or 18 of the Vermont Constitution or state or federal election statutes. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff's complaint and upheld the dismissal of his administrative action. Plaintiff appealed to this Court.

¶ 6. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim that Act 46 violates chapter II, § 68 of the Vermont Constitution.¹ We conclude that plaintiff lacks standing to assert his claim, and therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's action. See Sorge v. State, 171 Vt. 171, 174 n.*, 762 A.2d 816, 818 n.* (2000) (explaining that Supreme Court may affirm correct result for reasons other than those stated by trial court).

¶ 7. Standing is a necessary prerequisite to a petition for declaratory judgment. Doria v. Univ. of Vt., 156 Vt. 114, 117, 589 A.2d 317, 318 (1991). The standing requirement derives from Article III of the United States Constitution, which provides that federal courts only have the power to decide "actual cases or controversies." Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 76–77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) ; U.S. Const. art. III. Vermont has adopted this case-or-controversy requirement. See In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524, 529, 64 A.2d 169, 172 (1949) ("The judicial power, as conferred by the Constitution of this State upon this Court, is the same as that given to the Federal Supreme Court by the United States Constitution; that is, the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction." (quotation omitted) ).

¶ 8. "An element of the case or controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must have standing, that is, they must have suffered a particular injury that is attributable to the defendant and that can be redressed by a court of law." Parker, 169 Vt. at 77, 726 A.2d at 480. The standing doctrine protects the separation of powers between the branches of government by ensuring that courts confine themselves to deciding actual disputes and avoid intervening in broader policy decisions that are reserved for the Legislature. Id.

¶ 9. To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must allege injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Brigham v. State (Brigham II), 2005 VT 105, ¶ 16, 179 Vt. 525, 889 A.2d 715 (mem.). In other words, the plaintiff "must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Parker, 169 Vt. at 78, 726 A.2d at 480. The alleged injury "must be an ‘invasion of a legally protected interest,’ not a generalized harm to the public." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). Further, the injury "must be reasonably expected and not based on fear or anticipation." Brod v. Agency of Nat. Res., 2007 VT 87, ¶ 9, 182 Vt. 234, 936 A.2d 1286.

¶ 10. A plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish his or her standing "[o]n the face of the complaint."

Town of Cavendish v. Vt. Pub. Power Supply Auth., 141 Vt. 144, 147–48, 446 A.2d 792, 794 (1982). "Because standing is a necessary component of the court's subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence can be raised at any time." Unifund CCR Partners v. Zimmer, 2016 VT 33, ¶ 19, 201 Vt. 474, 144 A.3d 1045. Whether plaintiff has standing is a legal question that we review without deference to the decision of the trial court. Taylor v. Town of Cabot, 2017 VT 92, ¶ 9, 205 Vt. 586, 178 A.3d 313.

¶ 11. We addressed the issue of standing to challenge a state education law in Brigham II, 2005 VT 105, 179 Vt. 525, 889 A.2d 715. In that case, a group of public-school students and a group of taxpayers from the towns of Whitingham, Wilmington, and Andover challenged the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1997, also known as Act 60. The students alleged that Act 60 failed to protect their right to an equal educational opportunity under the Vermont Constitution because it left their schools with less money to fund instruction and curriculum or make necessary renovations. The taxpayers alleged that they paid disproportionately high state and local education taxes compared to similarly situated taxpayers of other Vermont towns. They also alleged that because the State was inadequately funding education under Act 60, they were forced to pay higher education taxes than other taxpayers who owned property of the same value and had identical adjusted gross incomes. We held that both the students and taxpayers met the elements of standing because they had adequately alleged that the law injured them personally and their injuries would be redressed if they prevailed on the merits of their claims. Id. ¶ 17.

¶ 12. Here, plaintiff alleged that he is a resident and taxpayer of the town of Washington; has faithfully attended town meetings and school-board meetings since becoming a resident in 1988; and currently serves as a justice of the...