Painter v. Mead Corp.

• Citation: 129 S.E.2d 482,258 N.C. 741
• Decision Date: 27 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Parties: Blanche P. PAINTER, Widow, Tolvin Edgar Painter, deceased, and Blanche P. Painter, Administratrix of the Estate of Tolvin Edgar Painter, deceased, Employee, Claimant, v. The MEAD CORPORATION, Employer, Self-Insurer, Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 482

129 S.E.2d 482

258 N.C. 741

Blanche P. PAINTER, Widow, Tolvin Edgar Painter, deceased and Blanche P. Painter, Administratrix of the Estate of Tolvin Edgar Painter deceased, Employee, Claimant, v. The MEAD CORPORATION, Employer, Self-Insurer, Defendant.

No. 18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 27, 1963

Hall, Thornburg & Holt, by W. Paul Holt, Jr., Sylva, for defendant, appellant.

J. Charles McDarris, Frank D. Ferguson, Jr., Waynesville, for plaintiff, appellee.

HIGGINS, Justice.

Our Workmen's Compensation Act, G.S. § 97-38, provides for payment of benefits to the dependents of an employee whose death results proximately from the accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, unless 'death was occasioned * * * by the willful intention of the employee to * * * kill himself.' G.S. § 97-12.

In this proceeding the parties stipulated: (1) On July 21, 1960, Tolvin Edgar Painter, defendant's employee, suffered an injury 'by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.' (2) 'Death occurred on September 2, 1960, and that it was selfinflicted.'

This Court has not passed on the question whether suicide following an injury by accident is compensable, and, if so, under what circumstances. Text writers, commentators, and other courts have dealt with the question on numerous occasions. By statute, in most cases, death is compensable if it proximately results (within time limits) from the industrial accident. Likewise, most states have statutes similar to our own denying recovery if death is the result of the wilful intent of the employee to kill himself. Many jurisdictions emphasize the proximate cause theory and do not attach much importance to the 'wilful intent.' However, cases of suicide are so different and dissimilar that each case must be classified according to its own facts.

In 1915 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted what has become known as the harsh rule. 'It is that where there follows as the direct result of a physical injury an insanity of such violence as to the cause the victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy 'without conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge of the physical consequences of the act,' then there is a direct and unbroken causal connection between the physical injury and the death. But where the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary willful choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which knows the purpose and the physical effect of the suicidal act even though choice is dominated and ruled by a disordered mind, then there is a new and independent agency which breaks the chain of causation arising from the injury.' In re Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466, L.R.A. 1916A, 333.

Other courts followed and the foregoing became the majority rule. Among cases supporting the rule are: Jones v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 599, 169 S.W.2d 160; Barber v. Industrial Commission, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199, 143 A.L.R. 1222; Karlen v. Department of Labor and Industries, 41 Wash.2d 301, 249 P.2d 364.

On the other hand, the English courts, Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Co., 13 B.W.C.C. 353; Graham v. Christie, 10 B.W.C.C. (Scot.) 486; and a growing minority in this country have held that the death is compensable if a work-connected injury causes insanity which in turn induces the suicide. Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., Fla., 43 So.2d 464; Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431; Burnett v. Industrial Commission, 87 Ohio App. 441, 93 N.E.2d 41; Prentiss Truck and Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So.2d 272, 88 So.2d 99; Olson v. F. I. Crane Lumber Co., 259 Minn. 248, 107 N.W. 2d 223.

'The basic legal question seems to be agreed upon by almost all of the authorities: it is whether the act of suicide was an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation between the initial injury and the death. The only controversy involves the kind or degree of mental disorder which will lead a court to say that the self-destruction was not an independent intervening cause. * * * (I)f the sole motivation controlling the will of the employee when he knowingly decides to kill himself is the pain and despair caused by the injury, and if the will itself is deranged and disordered by these consequences of the injury, then it seems wrong to say that this exercise of will is 'independent', or that it breaks the chain of causation. Rather, it seems to be in the direct line of causation.' The foregoing is according to Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 1, §§ 36.00, 36.20, and 36.30, p. 503, et seq., citing many authorities.

The Sponatski rule has been criticized as an application of the test of criminal responsibility not justified in workmen's compensation cases. 'Its effect is unnecessarily harsh as a measure of civil...