Paley v. Cocoa Masonry, Inc.

Decision Date03 February 1978
Docket NumberNo. 77-1356,77-1356
Citation354 So.2d 945
PartiesSidney H. PALEY and Allen Tucker, Appellants, v. COCOA MASONRY, INC., Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Barry J. McCaughey of McCaughey, Knaust & Evans, St. Petersburg, for appellants.

Jere E. Lober of Lovering, Pound & Lober, Rockledge, for appellee.

DANAHY, Judge.

Appellants/plaintiffs file this interlocutory appeal from the stay order of the trial court entered pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(d) which prevents them from proceeding further in this cause until payment of court costs assessed against their assignor in a prior suit wherein appellee/defendant was plaintiff and appellants/plaintiffs' assignor was defendant.

The stay order may not be reviewed by interlocutory appeal. Fla.App.Rule 4.2. But we choose to treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari. Stein v. Bayfront Medical Center, Inc., 287 So.2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). 1 Certiorari is granted and the stay order is quashed.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs sued defendant, a masonry contractor, for breach of a contract between defendant and an apartment developer, Paltuco Carribbean of Florida, Inc., which arose from a dispute on a construction project known as the "White Lake" job. Plaintiffs are assignees of Paltuco's claim against defendant under that contract.

In the prior suit, defendant (plaintiff there) successfully sued Paltuco to foreclose a mechanics' lien on a construction project known as the "Tudor Village" job. In that suit, Paltuco voluntarily dismissed a permissive counterclaim it had filed against defendant alleging a breach of contract on the "White Lake" job. The claim contained in Paltuco's counterclaim is the same claim brought by plaintiffs in the case at bar.

The final judgment of foreclosure in the prior suit taxed costs in favor of defendant and against Paltuco by reciting: ". . . $6,000 for attorneys' fees with $712.40 court costs now taxed under the lien sued on in this action . . ." The judgment neither identifies nor apportions costs between the main claim of defendant and the counterclaim of Paltuco. And there was no separate order assessing costs against Paltuco on the dismissed counterclaim.

In the stay order, the trial court required the total sum of $6,712.40 to be paid by plaintiffs to defendant as a condition to further proceedings in the suit at bar.

Defendant contends, and the lower court agreed, that the stay order was an appropriate remedy under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(d) because the claim contained in the counterclaim in the prior suit was the same claim and between the same parties as in the case at bar.

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(d) provides:

"(d) Costs. Costs in any action dismissed under this rule shall be assessed and judgment for costs entered in that action. If a party who has once dismissed a claim in any court of this State commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same adverse party, the court shall make such order for the payment of costs of the claim previously dismissed as it may deem proper and shall stay the proceedings in the action until the party seeking affirmative relief has complied with the order." (Emphasis supplied).

The intent of the rule is clear enough. If a party voluntarily dismisses a claim, he cannot proceed in a second suit against the adverse party on that claim without first paying those costs assessed against him by the court in the original action. The operation of the rule, therefore, requires that the costs be assessed in the original litigation and that there be an identity of parties and claims in both actions. See Gordon v. Warren Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 340 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).

In the case at bar, there is an identity of parties because plaintiffs, as assignees of the "White Lake" contract claim, stand in the shoes of their assignor, Paltuco. But the "White Lake" and "Tudor Village" claims are not the same. Paltuco was the apartment developer and defendant was the masonry contractor on both...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • McKelvey v. Kismet, Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 19, 1983
    ...a part of the costs between the parties, these fees must also be assessed and a judgment entered in that action. Paley v. Cocoa Masonry, Inc., 354 So.2d 945 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1212 (Fla.1978); Bankers Multiple Line Insurance Co. v. Blanton, 352 So.2d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA As R......
  • Klein v. Royale Group, Ltd., 87-3017
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 12, 1988
    ...courts of appeal has been reviewed by common law certiorari, Kahn v. Milon, 332 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Paley v. Cocoa Masonry, Inc., 354 So.2d 945 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Stein v. Bayfront Medical Center, Inc., 287 So.2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) or by non-final appeal. Regan, Inc. v. Val-R......
  • Rohleder v. Wiberg
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 13, 2013
    ...The order “effectively prevent[s]” Rohleder from his “day in court without any adequate remedy by appeal.” Paley v. Cocoa Masonry, Inc., 354 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (granting certiorari relief where second court stayed second action until costs were paid from first action; a porti......
  • Super Prods., LLC v. Intracoastal Envtl., LLC
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 25, 2018
    ...Perdido Ass'n, 104 So.3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012). Orders staying proceedings are reviewable by certiorari. See Paley v. Cocoa Masonry, Inc., 354 So.2d 945, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) ; Stein v. Bayfront Med. Ctr., Inc., 287 So.2d 401, 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) ; State v. Antonucci, 590 So.2d 998, 999......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT