Palmer v. Maine Cent. R. Co.

Decision Date12 January 1899
Citation42 A. 800,92 Me. 399
PartiesPALMER v. MAINE CENT. R. CO.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

(Official.)

Exceptions from superior court, Cumberland county.

Trespass by Jonathan P. Palmer against the Maine Central Railroad Company for false imprisonment. The plea was the general issue, with a brief statement justifying the imprisonment, on the ground of lawful arrest of plaintiff for fraudulently evading the payment of his fare as a passenger on one of defendant's trains. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant alleges exceptions, and moves for a new trial. Exceptions overruled, and motion overruled on condition of remittitur.

There was evidence tending to show:

That, at the time alleged, the plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's train from Rockland to Brunswick.

That, in payment of his fare, he tendered to the defendant's conductor, Jones, a mileage book, which contained as a part of the contract, signed by the party to whom it is issued, the following, among other provisions:

"That it is good only for the person in whose name it is issued, and, if presented by any other person, the right to any remaining rides to which the purchaser might have been entitled shall be forfeited, and the conductor shall be authorized to take up this ticket, and return the same to the general ticket office as forfeited, and conductors are authorized to obtain the signature of holder of the ticket for identification."

That the mileage book tendered to said Jones purported to be signed, "Jona. P. Palmer."

That said Jones was not personally acquainted with the plaintiff.

That said Jones exhibited the signature to the plaintiff, and asked him if that was his signature, but that he refused to say that it was, and persisted in doing so, and in refusing to identify himself in any other manner, and left the train at Brunswick without paying his fare.

That, after leaving the train at Brunswick, said Jones caused the plaintiff to be arrested by one Norman, a constable of Brunswick, for fraudulently evading the payment of his fare, claiming that he was so authorized, as provided in Rev. St. c. 51, § 78, as follows: "Whoever fraudulently evades payment by giving a false answer, or by traveling beyond the place to which he has paid, or by leaving a train without paying, forfeits not less than five, nor more than twenty dollars, to be recovered on complaint."

That said Jones immediately made complaint to the judge of the municipal court of Brunswick, who issued a warrant thereon, and whereupon proceedings took place, the record of which is as follows:

"Cumberland—ss.: At the municipal court for the town of Brunswick, in the county of Cumberland, holden at the municipal court room in said Brunswick, on the tenth day of June, A. D. 1896.

"Wm. P. Jones, of Lewiston, in the county of Androscoggin, on the tenth day of June, D. 1896, on behalf of said state, on oath complained to the judge of said court that Jonathan P. Palmer, on the tenth day, of June, A. D. 1896, at said Brunswick, in the county of Cumberland, fraudulently evaded the payment of his fare to Wm. P. Jones, conductor for the Maine Central Railroad Co., against the peace of said state, and contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided.

"And now the said respondent is brought into court upon a warrant issued in the complaint aforesaid, for examination thereon, and said complaint is read to Jonathan P. Palmer, and he pleads and says he is not guilty.

"Whereupon the complainant acknowledged satisfaction in writing, as follows, to wit:

"Brunswick, Me., June 10th, '96.

"To whom it may concern: I hereby acknowledge complete satisfaction to Jonathan P. Palmer for evading his railroad fare as per my complaint before F. E. Roberts, judge of the municipal court of Brunswick, of this date. W. P. Jones.

"The defendant paying the costs of prosecution taxed at three & 37-100 dollars it is considered and ordered by the court that the said Jonathan P. Palmer be discharged.

"Attest:

"Frank E. Roberts, Judge."

The defendant seasonably requested the presiding justice to give the jury the following instructions:

(1) "The conductor had a right to ask plaintiff's name, and to ask if the name signed to the mileage was his, and it was the plaintiff's duty to answer the questions truly."

(2) "If the jury find that Norman was an officer when he arrested the plaintiff, and that Jones, within a reasonable time, made oath to the complaint before a magistrate having jurisdiction of the offense alleged in the complaint, and thereupon a warrant was issued by the magistrate upon which the plaintiff was held by the officer, and was brought before the magistrate to answer to the complaint, this action cannot be maintained."

(3) "That the proceedings before the magistrate, as shown by the copy of the record put in evidence by the plaintiff, are a bar to this action, and it cannot be maintained."

But the presiding justice refused to give each requested instruction, and to each refusal the defendant seasonably excepted, and his exceptions were severally reserved.

The foregoing satisfaction thus acknowledged by the complainant is authorized by Rev. St c. 133, § 18, which is as follows: "When a person has recognized or is committed by a magistrate, or is indicted for an assault and battery, or other misdemeanor, for which the party injured has a remedy by a civil action, except felonious assaults, assaults upon or resistance of an officer of justice in the execution of his duty, and assaults and batteries of such officers, if the injured party appears before the magistrate or court, and in writing acknowledges satisfaction for the in Jury, the court, on payment of all costs, may stay further proceedings and discharge the defendant; the magistrate may discharge the recognizance, supersede the commitment by his written order, and discharge the recognizance of the witnesses."

Argued before PETERS, C. J., and EMERY, HASKELL, STROUT, and SAVAGE, JJ.

J. E. Hanly, J. F. Libby, Levi Turner, and T. J. Boynton, for plaintiff.

J. H. & J. H. Drummond, Jr., for defendant.

SAVAGE, J. Trespass for false imprisonment. The verdict was for the plaintiff for $550. The case comes up on exceptions by the defendant, and on motion to set aside the verdict, on the grounds that it was against law, and against the weight of evidence, and that the damages are excessive. Substantially the same legal propositions are presented under the motion as under the exceptions. It will be more convenient to consider the motion first, for the conclusion which we think must be reached under the motion will necessarily dispose of the exceptions.

There is little dispute as to the essential facts. The questions at issue are chiefly legal ones. In January, 1896, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant, and there was issued to him, a mileage book or ticket with coupons, one to be detached for each mile the purchaser should travel. By the purchase of this book, the plaintiff became entitled to travel 1,000 miles on the defendant's railroad. Upon the ticket was a contract, which was signed by the plaintiff at the time of purchase. This contract discloses that one of the conditions under which the ticket was sold was the following:

"That it is good only for the person in whose name it is issued, and, if presented by any other person, the right to any remaining rides to which the purchaser might have been entitled shall be forfeited; and the conductor shall be authorized to take up this ticket, and return the same to the general ticket office as forfeited, and conductors are authorized to obtain the signature of the holder of the ticket for identification."

In June, 1896, the plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's train from Rockland to Brunswick, and, in payment of his fare, tendered to the conductor the mileage ticket above referred to. The conductor was not personally acquainted with the plaintiff, and, for identification, he asked the plaintiff if the name upon the ticket, "Jona. P. Palmer," was his name. The plaintiff refused to say whether it was or not, though he told the conductor that the ticket was his own. The conductor then declined to accept the ticket, and asked the plaintiff to pay a cash fare, which the plaintiff refused to do. As the plaintiff was leaving the train at Brunswick, without further payment or tender of his fare, the conductor caused him to be arrested by a constable, without a warrant, for fraudulently evading the payment of his fare; and this is the arrest complained of. The plaintiff was immediately taken before the municipal court of Brunswick, where the conductor made a complaint, under oath, against him, under Rev. St. c. 51, § 78, which provides that whoever "fraudulently evades the payment" of fare over a railroad "by giving a false answer, or by traveling beyond the place to which he has paid, or by leaving a train without paying, forfeits not less than five, nor more than twenty dollars, to be recovered on complaint." The plaintiff pleaded "Not guilty." The plaintiff then paid his fare and the costs of prosecution to the judge of the court. An acknowledgment of "complete satisfaction" was filed by the conductor, and the plaintiff was thereupon discharged without further prosecution. No question is raised but that the conductor was acting within the scope of his authority as a servant of the defendant corporation.

The defendant endeavors to justify the arrest. It claims that the conductor had a lawful right to ask the plaintiff, as a means of identification, if the name on the ticket was his name, and that it was the plaintiff's duty to answer truly; and, further, that if the conductor had reasonable cause, from the plaintiff's conduct, to believe that he was fraudulently evading the payment of his fare, and did so believe, the conductor was justified in causing the plaintiff's arrest by an officer, as he was in the act of leaving the train,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • State v. Parker
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • April 16, 1964
    ...S.W.2d 685; Rich v. Bailey, 123 Ky. 827, 97 S.W. 747, 748; Lima v. Lawler, D.C. Va., 63 F.Supp. 446, 451; Palmer v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 92 Me. 399, 42 A. 800, 803, 44 L.R.A. 673; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Cain, 81 Md. 87, 31 A. 801, 803, 28 L.R.A. ...
  • Hanser v. Bieber
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1917
    ... ... Colo. 495; Grinnell v. Weston, 95 A.D. 454; Park ... v. Taylor, 55 C. C. A. 56; Palmer v. Railroad, ... 92 Me. 399; Wehmeyer v. Mulvihill, 150 Mo.App. 197 ... (5) The same state of ... ...
  • Newport v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • May 2, 1939
    ...59 Colo. 461, 149 P. 627; Petit v. Colmary, 20 Del. 266, 55 A. 344; O'Malley v. Whitaker, 118 La. 906, 43 So. 545; Palmer v. Me. Cent. Ry. Co., 92 Me. 399, 42 A. 800; Comisky v. Norfolk, etc. Ry. Co., 79 W.Va. 148, S.E. 385; Claiborne v. Chesapeake, etc. Ry. Co., 46 W.Va. 363, 33 S.E. 262; ......
  • Nadeau v. State
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 1, 1978
    ...imprisonment. False imprisonment involves the unlawful detention or restraint of an individual against his will, Palmer v. Maine Central R.R. Co., 92 Me. 399, 42 A. 800 (1899). To be actionable, the authority upon which plaintiff is confined must be unlawful, as where a warrant is defective......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT