Palmer v. Reis.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1949
• Citation: 135 Conn. 388,64 A.2d 537
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: PALMER v. DES REIS.

135 Conn. 388

64 A.2d 537

PALMER

v.DES REIS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 21, 1949.

Appeal from City Court of Middletown; Cambria, Judge.

Action by Kalman P. Palmer against John F. Des Reis, wherein judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and defendant filed an appeal. On plaintiff's motion to erase defendant's appeal from an order of the City Court of Middletown rectifying the appeal.

Motion denied.

Aaron J. Palmer, of Middletown, for plaintiff.

F. Howard Stickney, of Deep River, for defendant.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ., and PATRICK B. O'SULLIVAN, Superior Judge.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

On July 30, 1948, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. On August 14 the defendant filed an appeal in the usual form. It included a statement that his attorney was recognized in the sum of $150 to prosecute the appeal to effect, signed by the clerk of the court. On September 25, 1948, the plaintiff filed ‘An Application to Rectify Appeal’ on the ground that the appeal was mailed to the clerk by the attorney with a place for the signature of the clerk after the notation of the recognizance, and that, without the appearance of the attorney before him, the clerk wrote his signature thereon. On November 12, 1948, the court made an order in which it found the statements of the application true and directed that the part of the appeal containing the recognizance be stricken out. From that order the defendant has filed an appeal to this court. The plaintiff has made a motion to erase the appeal on the ground that the order of the court was not a final judgment within the appeal statute.

Section 335 of the Practice Book, 1934, p. 98, provides that appeals shall be filed with the clerk of court within a certain time and that at the same time the appellant shall pay the record and entry fees to the clerk ‘and shall give sufficient security to the adverse party by bond or recognizance conditioned that he will prosecute his appeal to effect and will pay all costs if he shall fail to do so; unless the fee be paid and the bond be so given the appeal shall be void and of no effect.’ The bond or recognizance required is solely for the protection of the appellee. There is no reason why a failure to furnish such security could not be waived by the appellee and every reason why he should be entitled to waive it. The word ‘void’ is often used with the meaning of ‘voidable,’ particularly where the condition imposed is for the benefit of the adverse party. United States v. New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 93, 36 S.Ct. 41, 60 L.Ed. 161; Sherman v. Smith, 185 Iowa 654, 656, 169 N.W. 216; Good v. Starker, 216 Wis. 253, 255, 257 N.W. 299; 44 Words and Phrases, Perm.Ed., page 322. Despite the provision that an appeal where proper security has not been given is not only ‘void’ but ‘of no effect,’ we cannot construe it as meaning otherwise than that such an appeal is voidable upon the taking of proper steps by the appellee. In State v. Pallotti, 119 Conn. 70, 74, 174 A. 74, it is true we stated that an appeal without a requisite bond was by the express provision of the rule void and of no effect; but in that case we had no occasion to consider with care the effect of that provision in the rule, as we have now done. See Corden v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 131 Conn. 654, 657, 41 A.2d 912, 159 A.L.R. 849; Spencer v. Broughton, 77 Conn. 38, 41, 58 A. 236; Sackett v. Carroll, 80 Conn. 374, 376, 68 A. 442.

The filing of the appeal for most purposes transferred the case to this court, MacDonald v. Newman, 112 Conn. 596, 598, 153 A. 296; but the trial court can still perform certain functions with reference to it, as, e. g., opening the judgment. Cristini v. Griffin Hospital, 134 Conn. 282, 284, note, 57 A.2d 262. Certainly one of those functions is, for due cause shown, to cause its records to...