Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC
Decision Date | 10 March 2021 |
Docket Number | Opinion No. 28010,Appellate Case No. 2019-002052 |
Citation | 856 S.E.2d 150,432 S.C. 633 |
Parties | PALMETTO CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC, Respondent, v. RESTORATION SPECIALISTS, LLC, Reuben Mark Ward, and Lynnette Pennington Ward, Petitioners. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
A. Bright Ariail, Law Office of A. Bright Ariail, LLC, of Charleston for Petitioners.
Jaan Gunnar Rannik and Andrew K. Epting Jr., Epting & Rannik, LLC, both of Charleston for Respondent.
This is a civil action to collect a debt under a contract that contains an arbitration provision. The defendants appealed the master in equity's order refusing to set aside the entry of their default. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis that an order refusing to set aside an entry of default is not immediately appealable. Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC , 428 S.C. 261, 266, 834 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2019). The defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari claiming the order is immediately appealable because it had the effect of precluding their motion to compel arbitration, and in fact, the order states, "Defendants’ motion to stay and compel arbitration is denied as [the defendants are] in default." See Cape Romain Contractors, Inc. v. Wando E., LLC , 405 S.C. 115, 121 n.4, 747 S.E.2d 461, 464 n.4 (2013) ; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-200(a)(1) (2005). We affirm the court of appeals.
Palmetto Construction Group brought this action against Restoration Specialists, its managing member Mark Ward, and his wife Lynnette Ward for payment under a construction contract with an arbitration provision. The defendants did not answer the complaint. The circuit court found all three defendants were in default under Rule 55(a), SCRCP, and referred the case to the master in equity pursuant to Rule 53(b), SCRCP. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the entry of default. The master denied the motion, and the defendants appealed. The court of appeals held the master's order was not immediately appealable and dismissed the appeal. Palmetto Constr. Grp. , 428 S.C. at 266, 834 S.E.2d at 206. The court of appeals found the fact the order refusing to set aside the entry of default effectively precluded the defendants’ effort to compel arbitration did not affect the immediate appealability of the order. 428 S.C. at 266-67, 834 S.E.2d at 207.
A party in default has three primary options: (1) do nothing pending the entry of judgment by default under Rule 55(b), SCRCP ; (2) file an appearance under Rule 55(b)(2), SCRCP, in an attempt to protect its interests before the entry of judgment by default; or (3) request the entry of default be set aside pursuant to Rule 55(c), SCRCP. Under either option, the party has no right of appeal until after final judgment. See Thynes v. Lloyd , 294 S.C. 152, 153, 363 S.E.2d 122, 122 (Ct. App. 1987) ( ); but see Johnson ex rel. Jefferson v. Gene's Used Cars, Inc. , 295 S.C. 317, 317, 368 S.E.2d 456, 456 (1988) ) .
The defendants contend the law of arbitration changes the immediate appealability of the master's order. To support their contention, they rely on language from the Supreme Court and this Court stating the law "favors" arbitration. See, e.g. , Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S. Ct. 927, 941, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 785 (1983) (); Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs. , 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) (). However, there is nothing in the law of arbitration that affects the immediate appealability of an order refusing to set aside an entry of default. Specifically, the fact the order effectively precludes the defaulting party's effort to arbitrate the claim does not change whether the order may be immediately appealed.
Our courts’ statements that the law "favors" arbitration were never intended to elevate a contractual right of arbitration above the procedural rules of the court or other contractual provisions. See Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause As Super Contract , 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 531, 533 (2014) (). Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1924 to "ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate."
470 U.S. at 219-20 n.6, 105 S. Ct. at 1242 n.6, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 164-65 n.6 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96 at 1-2) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of South Carolina first discussed a "federal policy favoring the arbitration of disputes" in Trident Technical College v. Lucas & Stubbs, Ltd. , 286 S.C. 98, 103, 333 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 (1985), cases interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act. Referring to a similar "policy" in South Carolina, we cited cases that simply recognized the right to contract for limited arbitration. 286 S.C. at 103-04, 333 S.E.2d at 785 () ).
Before Trident Technical College , South Carolina practiced a reluctance similar to that of the federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements because they deprived the courts of jurisdiction. In Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Federal Insurance Co. , 269 S.C. 631, 239 S.E.2d 647 (1977), for example, we stated, "It is well established in South Carolina that general arbitration agreements which oust the South Carolina circuit court from jurisdiction are unenforceable as against public policy." 269 S.C. at 636, 239 S.E.2d at 649 ; see also Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 237 S.C. 455, 460, 117 S.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1961) ( ); Jones v. Enoree Power Co. , 92 S.C. 263, 267, 75 S.E. 452, 454 (1912) ().
In Episcopal Housing Corp. , however, we finally accepted the supremacy of federal law permitting general arbitration agreements. "It is equally true," we stated, referring to the previously quoted statement that general arbitration agreements were unenforceable, "that under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution ..., this Court must recognize that federal statutes enacted pursuant to the United States Constitution are the supreme law of the land." 269 S.C. at 636, 239 S.E.2d at 649. In Trident Technical College ,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
City-To-City Auto Sales, LLC v. Harris
...Ct. 2000); Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC, 834 S.E.2d 204, 207-08 (S.C. Ct. App. 2019), aff'd as modified, 856 S.E.2d 150 (S.C. 2021); LaFrance Architect v. Point Five Dev. S. Burlington, LLC, 91 A.3d 364, 372-74 (Vt. 2013); Interconex, Inc. v. Ugarov, 224 S.W.3d......
-
Davis v. Isco Indus., Inc.
...provisions. There is, however, no public policy—federal or state—‘favoring’ arbitration." Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC , 432 S.C. 633, 639, 856 S.E.2d 150, 153 (2021), reh'g denied , S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated Apr. 20, 2021."Generally, ‘arbitration is a matter o......
-
Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC
... ... also Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v. Restoration Specialists, ... LLC ... ...
-
5star Life Ins. Co. v. Peek Performance, Inc.
...motion to set aside an entry of default is not appealable until after final judgment."), aff'd as modified on other grounds , 432 S.C. 633, 856 S.E.2d 150 (2021) ; Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC , 432 S.C. 633, 635–36, 856 S.E.2d 150, 151 (2021) ("A party in defa......